

JPRS-NEA-89-060  
7 SEPTEMBER 1989



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-89-060

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### Status of Paris Muslim Community

45190115 Paris LE MONDE in French  
19 Jul 89 pp 1, 9

[Henri Tinco interviews Tedjini Haddam, rector of the Paris Mosque: "The Muslims in France"]

[Text] Christian Bourgois recently published 65,000 copies of Salman Rushdie's book "The Satanic Verses." They will be available as of Wednesday. Tedjini Haddam, rector of the Paris Mosque for the past month, gave us an interview in which he expressed his views on the Rusdhie affair, Muslim extremism and the integration of Islam in France. He declared: "The Muslims in France are not a second-rate community."

[LE MONDE] The French translation of Rushdie's book is off the press. What are your views on the subject?

[Haddam] Too much importance has been given to that affair. The author, Rushdie, was not the first one, and will not be the last, to blaspheme the Prophet, but I feel that, taking into account the difficulties of integrating Islam into a Western society, we did not need the publicity given to that book.

I view it as being akin to the publicity given Scorsese's movie "The Last Temptation of Christ" and, I cannot help but wish that, just as there is an international law, there should be some sort of international ethics, for which one of the rules would be respect for the large groups of believers around the world.

[LE MONDE] A few surges of extremism were recently observed within the Muslim community in France. Were they circumstantial, as a reaction to the book "The Satanic Verses," or were they due to frustrations linked to the inadequate integration of that community into the French environment?

[Haddam] As far as I was able to judge the situation, these forms of extremism—to use your own word—were limited and circumstantial. After all, the problem of the integration of Islam remains untouched. If our religious community is to respect the secular rules of the host country, it must not be viewed as a second-rate community.

The means of information can play a crucial role in achieving this integration. The same is true of the educational effort that I would like to discuss with you.

That we should wish for Koranic schools to channel the aspirations of our young people, as well as for a sufficient number of prayer sites and Islamic cemeteries, just as there are Israeli cemeteries, seems to me legitimate requests.

[LE MONDE] You are both a surgeon and a theologian, a politician, and a diplomat. What motivated you to accept the post of rector of the Paris Mosque, which makes you the highest Muslim authority in France?

[Haddam] I have been studying the Koran since my early childhood and I have not stopped delving deeper into

issues of compared theology. I think that I am a man open to differences because of this. Tolerance, brotherhood, and love of others are for me sacred values. You may be surprised to learn that, like the Catholic students, I made the pilgrimage to Chartres when I was studying at the Sorbonne. Later, when I was an assistant to a prominent professor in Sweden, at Christmas, I went to midnight mass in a Lutheran church and I argued with the pastor until dawn. My first visits in Paris were to Rabbi Sirat, the former grand rabbi of France, and to Pastor Stewart, president of the Council of Christian Churches in France. To be able to extend sincerely and honestly a hand to all the spiritual families is one of the reasons for my being here. Why? For the simple reasons that the present world is searching for a way and is concerned for its future, its environment, and the parity of its nuclear arsenals. In that context, I am convinced that one of humanity's guarantees for survival is the peaceful coexistence of all the spiritual and religious families.

[LE MONDE] There were many discussions about the way in which you became head of the Paris Mosque. Was it necessary to go through the Algiers government to choose the spiritual leader of a religious community settled in France?

[Haddam] People made too much of that affair. The statutes of the Association of the Habous and Holy Sites of Islam, which manages the Paris Mosque, were respected. I was co-opted by the administrators of that association, who later elected me rector. An unwarranted controversy arose from that decision. Taking into account the size of the Algerian population in France, particularly in the Parisian region, it is quite legitimate that my country should follow carefully the progress and future of the Paris Mosque. I do not want, however, to discuss further this sterile and outdated controversy. All of us together must now move forward.

### No Algerian Monopoly

[LE MONDE] While the Algerian community is the largest, does not Islam count the important French and foreign minorities in France? Is not the Paris Mosque suspected by these minorities of wanting to monopolize the representation of Islam in its dealings with the French authorities?

[Haddam] I disagree totally. In my opinion, Islam is for everyone. There is no distinction between a French, Senegalese, Algerian, and Pakistani Muslim. It would be a deadly sin if such a distinction was made on the basis of differences of nationality and race. The Paris Mosque is for everyone, for all the Muslims. Monopoly is a sin against Islam. We cannot monopolize—and do not wish to—the representation of Islam in France.

On the other hand, the representation of the 3 million Muslims living in France is under discussion. Unlike the Catholics, we have no hierarchy. Unlike the Jews, we

have no consistory. Islam is a religion that is both individual and communal. Its integration in France and the future of this Euro-Islam within the economic, political, cultural, and religious conditions of the West assumes the existence of a coordinating administration. The Paris Mosque must obviously be part of that administration.

[LE MONDE] What kind of administration should it be? An elected consistory? A representative council? A confederation?

[Haddam] I am thinking about it and have not yet found a solution. All obstacles must be tackled honestly, including the theological obstacle of hierarchical status within Islam. Only God can differentiate between one Muslim and another and compare his worth with that of another. Among us, hierarchy can only be divine in origin, it is not human.

I led the Ramadan prayer for 3 years—in 1947, 1948 and 1949—in the Paris Mosque. From an emotional standpoint, I am, therefore, very pleased to be back. I am also aware that, since then, our differences and preferences have, however, increased. They can be explained by the tremendous socioreligious changes experienced by the Muslim community over the past 20 years.

A better understanding of what is unique and intangible in the diversity of Islam's geographic and political environment will enable us to bring together our views and our behavior. This demands a tremendous educative and informative effort; it will take time.

We must, however, get to work here and now. The doors of the Paris Mosque are wide open. I wish that, together, we would all—the mosque, the various associations and the French Government—think of a way to overcome these difficulties and to find the best formula for reuniting and representing Islam in France.

#### **'Safeguards' for Secularity**

[LE MONDE] What priorities do you intend to establish for your action?

[Haddam] Firstly, to reorganize the management of the mosque. It is experiencing substantial material difficulties. As it stands, it is to our advantage that it runs smoothly. The government wants to avoid any form of

religious outburst. It goes without saying that it is also our desire, for religion to us is synonymous with tolerance and brotherhood. In order to succeed, though, we must throw our resources into it and give Muslims decent reception and praying centers.

Secondly, to meet with the largest number of representatives of French and foreign Muslim associations and other spiritual families. I need that contact in order to absorb the best ideas, enlighten myself and advance understanding and union, which is my true ambition. For me, the issue of the structures of the Muslim community is secondary.

Thirdly, to promote the education of the community. As long as we lack training institutes in France, we will be forced to continue to recruit our imams abroad. Some of the social difficulties and dissolute morals are partially due to a secular education which, in France, is taken too literally.

Secularity is undoubtedly an excellent idea and a positive asset for a country like France, but it must not be expressed in the anarchy of moral values. It must be protected with safeguards and provided with more resources for a basic religious education. The basic principles of the monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—sharing the soil of France must also be better disseminated.

#### **'Neither Taboos, Nor Complexes'**

[LE MONDE] Do you basically believe that Islam is compatible with secularity and the modernism of Western societies?

[Haddam] I am a surgeon and I never beat about the bush. I am one of the founders of the League of Human Rights in Algeria. I am the president of the Planned Parenthood Association and the vice-president of the National Family Protection Committee. As you can see, I have, therefore, neither taboos nor complexes on the subject of secularity and modernism. Islam stands for individual and collective freedom. As a modern religion, it is open and capable of development. The proof is that it requires all its faithful to acquire knowledge from birth until death. "From the cradle to the grave," as the Prophet told us.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### AL-SHA'B Warns Israel Against Reacting to Boat Incident

45000178 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Aug 89 p 5

[Text] Since the recent incident of the Israeli fishing boat that entered Egyptian territorial waters for disgraceful espionage purposes and was pursued by the Egyptian Navy, leading to the death of the boat's pilot, Israeli forces on the border with Egypt have been practicing unusual activities in their border patrols and observation points.

Israel has tried to take advantage of any position enabling them to react to the fishing boat incident. We say to Zion that the Egyptian border forces will thwart your malicious intentions and are carefully and warily watching for any vile deed, which will be countered immediately.

### Increase in GIC Assets Recorded

44000622a Doha GULF TIMES in English  
24 Jul 89 p 11

[Text] Riyadh: The total assets of the Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC), which has completed five years of operations, grew by 32 percent yearly, reaching \$1,717 million by the end of 1988, Dr Khalid al-Fayiz, the corporation's chief executive officer has said.

He said shareholders' equity increased from \$420 million at the end of 1984 to \$730 million at the end of 1988.

The average rate of return on paid up capital for five years was 11 percent and the net income for 1988 was \$38.4 million, he added.

By the end of 1988, GIC's investments portfolio in projects within GCC member states, rose from around \$10 million at the end of 1987 to 44 million at the end of 1988. The amount represents GIC's investments in 10 projects.

Dr Khalid al-Fayiz made these observations on the occasion of the release of the corporation's latest annual report and accounts for 1988, which was made available to the Saudi Press Agency in Riyadh.

Dr al-Fayiz said the GIC was able to identify 28 new investment opportunities the year bringing the total to more than 120.

He affirmed that the GIC also played a leading role in extending a number of loans in the GCC countries, including the management of a \$400 million loan for the development of Qatar's North Field gas project, and a \$220 million lease financing for Gulf Air.

GIC continues to place emphasis on strengthening its staffing capabilities. During the year under review, 60 staff members benefitted from a training and or refresher courses.

### Gulf May Face Critical Water Shortage

44000613 Doha GULF TIMES  
in English 27 Jun 89 p 3

[Text] Kuwait: Gulf Arab states could face a critical water shortage over the next decade, leaving them heavily dependent on potentially vulnerable supplies, according to western economists and scientists.

Geologists say underground water is being consumed to such an extent that unless consumption is cut quickly, up to a 1 million hectares of Saudi grain and fodder fields could be at risk.

"The implications for current water and agricultural policies could be serious," said an internal report prepared by an embassy in Saudi Arabia, a copy of which has been obtained by Reuters news agency.

Governments in the Gulf could be forced in time to rely largely on militarily vulnerable pipelines and desalination plants. Diplomats said the livelihood of thousands of Saudi bedouin farmers may be threatened.

The Saudi Ministry of Agriculture and water had no immediate comment on the report.

In Bahrain, which shares a fresh water aquifer with Saudi Arabia, officials say the water situation is alarming, and a system of night-time rationing has begun in some areas.

Kuwait, with few underground supplies of its own, recently agreed with Iraq to build a 160-km pipeline to pump water from the Shatt Al-Arab waterway within four years.

In Saudi Arabia, farmers are paid generous subsidies as part of a high-level campaign to build up a strategic food source independent of foreigners. Diplomats said the subsidies were also aimed at coaxing nomadic bedouins to settle on the land.

A government support price of \$533 per tonne of wheat thrust Saudi Arabia last year into sixth place among wheat-exporting countries. Other subsidies made it a net exporter of dairy products.

The report said only a small proportion of water used in Saudi Arabia last year came from replenishable underground or surface sources or from desalination plants. The rest, around 18 billion cu m, was drawn from "fossil" reservoirs often millions of years old that are not being replenished. The vast bulk of all supplies went into agriculture.

Ideas to meet and expected shortfall of water have included piping Nile water in Sudan to the coast and shipping it across the Red Sea, building a pipeline from Turkey and even towing icebergs from Antarctica. But

because of political and technical problems, diplomats say they doubt whether any of these would get off the ground soon.

Every day, 6.9 million cu m of desalinated water flow into Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which account for nearly 60 percent of world production of desalinated water. But one economist estimated the amount of desalinated water to irrigate a tonne of wheat would cost more than \$3,500.

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### Reportage on 'Arafat's Talks in Amman

*JN2408100089 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD  
in Arabic 22 Aug 89 pp 1, 21*

[Excerpt] Amman, Cairo, Tunis, AL-ITTIHAD—Jordanian circles appear satisfied with the outcome of the talks with Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat. Palestinian sources have said that the meetings between King Husayn of Jordan and the Palestinian president resolved the differences and the issue of the U.S. conditions imposed on the PLO to play a role in boosting the peace process, conditions that were made during the latest meeting between the PLO and the U.S. ambassador in Tunis. The sources said that during the tripartite meeting in Baghdad, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn mediated between 'Arafat and King Husayn to settle their outstanding issues.

The sources revealed that the Palestinian president asked the Jordanian king to restore ties and to return to the Amman agreement. The sources also revealed that Washington has set impossible conditions on the PLO for it to boost the peace process. In the Jordanian capital, reports have been circulating about two Palestinian figures—Hikmat al-Masri and Tahsin al-Faris—conveying an Israeli viewpoint to 'Arafat during their 90-minute meeting with him yesterday. Both are known for their enthusiasm for accelerating the settlement plan.

Palestinian sources in Cairo expect the Egyptian capital to witness a broad and important meeting between a number of Palestinian figures from the occupied territories and a PLO delegation, which may even include the Palestinian president himself, to discuss a number of political issues related to the Israeli elections plan.

The sources said that a number of those figures—including Ibrahim al-Qara'in from Jerusalem, Fayiz al-Qawasimi from Hebron, 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Darawishah, and Dr Hatim Abu-Ghazalah—have actually arrived in Cairo.

The sources pointed out that the new Palestinian direction toward Jordan came after the PLO became burdened with issues of education, exports, and job opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza following the disengagement. It also came after the explosive situation

in the Lebanese arena and the failure of the tripartite committee to produce results, and the PLO's fear of European and U.S. attention being diverted from the intifadah [uprising] to Lebanon.

At the same time, the PLO is worried about intelligence information reaching it from inside the Israeli entity on Israel's intention to launch a lightning military campaign against Jordan to attack a reported presence of an Iraqi force in Jordan.

The Palestinian sources confirmed to AL-ITTIHAD that, in Baghdad, the Jordanian monarch received a request from Abu-'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] to return to the Amman agreement. Abu-'Ammar also demanded a Jordanian retreat from the disengagement in response to a Palestinian request.

The sources say that King Husayn had reservations about those two Palestinian requests. Instead, he offered 'Arafat another proposal, namely to reactivate the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee, whereby the disengagement resolutions can be revoked quietly and without any new shocks. King Husayn also demanded readherence to the international conference formula and the formation of an Arab committee comprising a number of states, which Jordan will agree to join, in order to activate the settlement plan.

The sources said that 'Arafat asked King husayn to intercede with the U.S. Administration to accept the European initiative which aims to bring the U.S. viewpoint on the international conference in line with that of King Husayn.

AL-ITTIHAD has learned that the conditions which the U.S. administration have presented to the PLO have been described as impossible to meet, especially with regard to naming the members of the Palestinian delegation to participate in the first session of talks between Israel and the PLO under U.S.-Egyptian sponsorship. The U.S. Administration has insisted that the Palestinian delegation must be entirely from the West Bank and Gaza, and that PLO members should be excluded. Meanwhile, the PLO has insisted "or demanded" that the meeting must be attended by two PLO members as observers; namely, Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh and Muhammad Milhim.

The talks reached a deadlock when the U.S. ambassador in Tunis insisted on rejecting all PLO reservations on the Israeli elections plan in the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO demanded that the United States issue an open or an official political statement announcing that it does not fully sponsor the Shamir concept.

The U.S. ambassador communicated a third condition that the Israeli Labor party will not support negotiations with the PLO under any formula unless the PLO declares beforehand that it will abandon the independent Palestinian state plan. The ambassador said that sovereignty



over the West Bank and Gaza must belong to Jordan while maintaining a theoretical formula satisfactory to Palestinians.

The ambassador told the PLO that Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, America's strong man in Israel, submitted, during the last Labor Party meeting a paper to this effect, which was adopted with an absolute majority.

AL-ITTIHAD has learned that Rabin's paper gave justifications for the settlement and its horizons and the need to go ahead with it via the national coalition government. The paper indicated that the Labor Party wasted a big opportunity before the intifadah [uprising] when Jordan and the PLO were ready to join the settlement process on the basis of the Amman agreement.

Rabin called attention to the dangers of the continuation of the intifadah and the Israeli army's inability to end it through bloodshed because that would destroy Israel's international reputation, as he said. [passage omitted]

#### **Al-Husayni Calls on Israeli Arabs To Aid Territories**

TA2208130289 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
22 Aug 89 p 4

[Report by Galilee correspondent 'Atallah Mansur]

[Excerpt] Faysal al-Husayni called on Arab Israeli citizens to increase practical and political aid to their brothers in the territories. Al-Husayni was the guest of honor at the closing ceremony of the first camp for volunteers organized by the 'Arrabah local council.

A political delegation from the territories headed by al-Husayni participated in the camp's concluding assembly on Saturday night. The thousands of participants welcomed al-Husayni with great excitement. He was carried on the shoulders of youths for hundreds of meters up to the podium where he made the main speech.

Al-Husayni said that the inhabitants of the territories do not suggest that Arab citizens of Israel act like the population of the territories. He said the residents of the territories studied the measures used by the Israeli Arabs, but in view of the different conditions did not adopt them. [passage omitted]

#### **New Organization's Leaflet Calls for Escalating Uprising**

TA1108115589 Jerusalem Domestic Service  
in Hebrew 0900 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] A leaflet signed by an organization calling itself The Popular Resistance Committee—Victims [halal] Brigades was disseminated in East Jerusalem's Abu-Tor neighborhood today.

Our police affairs correspondent Moshe Nussbaum reports that the leaflet calls for escalating the uprising. It also threatens the lives of merchants in the neighborhood, urging them to heed the uprising's leaflets, and not purchase Israeli-made products. It denounces people suspected of aiding the authorities, but calls on the inhabitants not to act in haste when taking action against them. The inhabitants are called upon to confirm their suspicions first, so that the enemy does not exploit mistaken identifications for propaganda purposes. Our correspondent points out that the group belongs to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

#### **Gazans, West Bankers Express Opinions on Elections**

44040492 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI  
in Arabic 1 Jul 89 pp 35-48

[Excerpt] The order of responses is based solely on technical considerations. AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI attaches equal importance to all responses and deeply appreciates those who provided them.

Do you approve of holding elections in the occupied territories based on an Israeli withdrawal from the cities under the supervision of UN or multi-national observers, provided that these elections are a first step toward a comprehensive, just peace in the region, and why!

This was the text of a question which was posed to average Palestinians and to a large number of representatives of key figures and Palestinian organizations in the occupied territories in order to settle the argument and debate and to clarify and present the view, desires and aspirations of the Palestinian people in light of the special character of the current phase regarding which route must be taken by the ship of solution in the region and who should pilot this ship!

#### **Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal al-Rifa'i, al-Aqsa Mosque Teacher and Administrative Inspector of the Islamic Law Courts**

I believe that our people, like all other peoples, is the master of the issue and the decision maker regarding our self-determination. Based on this view, I believe it that it must be through the people of the Palestinian camps, villages, streets and cities throughout our holy land, through what they think and what emanates from them, because the problem is their problem. They are the ones suffering from pain, hunger, and deprivation. They welcome anything which realizes their aspirations for freedom based on justice and the preservation of the honor of this patient people lined up in fighting positions.

Our cause is indivisible. The sole representative of all cadres of our people can only be based on an idea which springs from them, from within their camps, cities, and villages in the absence of any sign of occupation, under the international umbrella of the Security Council and

the major states which have seats on this council and within guarantees for the liberation of the Palestinian land and people, each of which is inseparable. I do not believe in phases. I view them completely as diversions given to children. If the world wants true peace and stability in our region for all peoples in our holy land, it is incumbent upon the entire world—which recognizes that our land is holy and the heart of the entire world, inasmuch as it is the cradle of prophecy, from which the prophets went forth—it is incumbent upon the followers of those prophets throughout the world to generously provide a tax to our people—its children, women and men—in order for them to work toward liberating the land and people simultaneously.

**Clergyman 'Awdah al-Ranitsi, the Elected Deputy Mayor of Ramallah**

I first ask, what is the purpose of holding these elections? Is the intent to select a group to represent the Palestinian people in the interior instead of the PLO? If this is the intent and the goal, it is rejected completely, because the Palestinian people have a representative, which is the PLO. If Israel aims to select a group to negotiate with it, we repeat that there is the PLO, which provided Israel with what it demanded for the sake of peace by recognizing Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the right of the all the parties to live in peace and security and by renouncing terrorism.

Thus, the goal of applying the idea of elections is to divide Palestinian ranks and create rifts between brothers so that there will be no peace in the region. This is corroborated by Israel's postponement, delay and wasting of time until something new happens, and it would consequently abase us under this new matter and strike a blow to the peace process in the region, thereby laying to rest the Palestinian people and the establishment of a state.

I am wary as I recall that in 1976 there were elections for municipal mayors, resulting in some being deported by Israeli authorities and others being subjected to assassination attempts. This is Israel's policy, which has never been, nor will be in the interest of the Palestinian people, because even if elections occurred, their goal, as I mentioned previously, is to divide the unified Palestinian ranks, forfeit the rights of our people and prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

**Ilyas Frayj, the Elected Mayor of Bethlehem**

I agree in principle to the holding of free and democratic elections. I advise that conditions not be set until the Israeli side discloses its conditions.

I also believe that when Israel announced that it was allowing the citizens free and democratic elections, it was seeking to win over world public opinion, and I personally doubt its credibility.

**Hilmi Hanun, the Elected Mayor of Tulkarm**

I am against the holding of elections in the West Bank and [Gaza] strip, because the Palestinian people have a recognized leadership, namely the PLO, which represents the Palestinian people in the interior and abroad. Any negotiations in the future, undertaken by either Israeli or American officials, must be carried out with the PLO.

I believe that the idea of elections in the West Bank and the strip aims to end events currently prevailing in the territories. If they desire a solution to the Palestinian problem, the Palestinian people, as I mentioned, has its leadership. We do not need to hold elections in the West Bank and the strip to select a new leadership.

**Dr Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi, the Chairman of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society in the Gaza Strip**

I believe that it is disadvantageous for the Palestinian people to deal with any initiative or proposal unless it is based on prior recognition by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the achievement of a just solution through an international conference, which has mandates and which is attended by all parties, including the PLO, which would be on an equal footing with the rest of the other parties. In my view, it is not useful to deal on any other than this basis.

**Dr Amin al-Khatib, the Chairman of the Federation of Charitable Societies of the Governorate of Jerusalem**

I have no objection to the holding of democratic elections after the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Arab cities, villages, and camps in the West Bank. Nor do I object to these elections being under international supervision or the stipulation that these elections be part of a peace process in which the destiny of the Arab, Palestinian people is decided, provided that the initial election process obtains the approval of the sole, legitimate representative of the Arab, Palestinian people (the PLO).

**Ibrahim al-Daqaq, the Former Chairman of the Engineers Union in the West Bank and the Chairman of the Intellectual Conference Society in Jerusalem**

Responding to hypothetical questions is very difficult because they are outside an effective political framework. Therefore, the assumption that free elections could be held in the shadow of the occupation is unrealistic. There are no indications which would permit one to say that there is an Israeli willingness to provide such an atmosphere. Therefore, in reality, the election process is practiced by a people which exercises sovereignty on its land.

The idea of elections was proposed as part of an initiative undertaken by Shamir. This initiative is no more than a procedural means to perpetuate the existing situation. Under the soundest of assumptions, the claim that elections could be held under the auspices of conditions acceptable to the Palestinians and internationally contradicts a basic given, namely that the elections, as

they were proposed, are a procedural step and not part of a comprehensive solution. Therefore, I believe that the assumption was non-existent from the start and has come to more resemble an intellectual exercise.

**Hana al-Atrash, the Elected Mayor of Bayt Sahur**

A Palestinian constitution must be established before any type of political elections are held, and there must be a clear Israeli and American commitment to these elections being part of a comprehensive solution and Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I believe that withdrawal from the cities means nothing, nor does it confer sovereignty on the people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These elections must also be part of a comprehensive Arab plan agreed upon by the neighboring states so that we do not find ourselves inside a closed circle at the mercy of Israel.

Accordingly, the problem is not withdrawal and elections, but the method for finding a comprehensive—not partial—solution, which addresses the problem of our people in the interior and abroad, crystallizes a comprehensive, complete solution, and sets a time period for implementing the points agreed upon in order to establish a Palestinian state. If we enter this maze without defining [these aspects], it would be the greatest hoax into which the entire Palestinian people has walked since 1948.

**Faysal al-Husayni, the Chairman of the Arab Studies Association in Jerusalem**

There a host of questions which present themselves: Would the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the cities before elections preclude their return to them after elections were held? If they do return, I do not believe that the matter merits study, because there is no difference between the occupation forces before or after elections, as long as they are present in the end.

If they do not return to the cities after the elections, would they be present on the roads between the cities, and would they consequently be able to exert pressure on us by their presence on these roads?

A third question: We live in cities and villages, and travel not only between these cities and villages, inasmuch as our society is agricultural, and we work our lands far from our villages and cities. Therefore, what will be the limits of authority over us on these lands?

I believe that the result of this is that elections would be nice, because they mean freedom, democracy, sovereignty and pride in the fact that I own "my future." Any presence of occupation forces on land over which I have sovereignty runs counter to and contradicts sovereignty, pride, dignity, democracy and freedom.

**Samihah Khalil, Chairwoman of the Society for the Promotion of the Family, al-Birah/Ramallah**

Our people has suffered much pain and tragedy and has endured many calamities and misfortunes. In all

instances, it was alone in the field. Its was abandoned by its friends before its enemies, by its own people before foreigners. It has fought alone. These have all been, and still are, waiting for its demise, so that they can march in its funeral procession, then hasten to destroy and dis-parage, which would be the end of the matter for them.

The Palestine National Council [PNC] agreed to that, and the overwhelming majority of our people supported this difficult, crucial, and conclusive decision. Then, the Arab summit in Rabat gave its support to these decisions, which means that a Palestinian and Arab consensus has granted Israel security and peace.

Even worse is that Shamir conveyed his orders and conditions for holding these elections to American President Bush. Of course, Mr Bush carried out these orders immediately. He conveyed them to Mr Gorbachev, asking him to fulfill Israel's wish by recognizing the state of Israel, permitting the immigration of Jews from Russia to Palestine and making efforts to soften the Arabs so that they would agree to elections and help stop the violence before the start of elections, with the understanding that Jerusalem would be outside the [election] framework and that Gorbachev would disregard the call for convening an international conference.

Mr Bush added that a solution would proceed step by step until peace is finally attained, which means autonomy as far as they are concerned. Our people has already experienced promises: The allied states promised to grant the Arabs a unified Arab state after the First World War in exchange for their help against Turkey, with the result being that the Balfour Declaration was exchanged for a unified Arab state.

America promised to protect the Palestinians after the withdrawal of Palestinian forces from Lebanon. The result was the massacre of Sabra and Shatila. And now, who will guarantee the obtainment of a Palestinian state on the soil of the fatherland and the holding of elections? America's policy is well known to us. It has gnawed into our bones and plucked out our teeth with its consecutive conspiracies. The imprints of the veto still burn in our ears and set our nerves on edge. Why should we beat around the bush after we gave everything. We can give no more except to go around in the streets barefoot and naked, begging for a bite of bread at doors here and there. Finally, our demands are clear and obvious, namely the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the soil of the fatherland with its capital in Arab Jerusalem under the leadership of our sole representative, the PLO. Anything else is basically futile. The mindful shall fear God.

**Lawyer Jurays al-Khuri, the Former of Head of the Lawyers Union in the West Bank**

The plan to solve the Palestinian problem proposed a while ago by Yitzhaq Shamir aims essentially to establish a transmuted autonomy. The program focuses on a clause which pertains to holding elections for the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the

bayonets of the occupation, in order to cultivate an administrative council which would negotiate with Israel to give form to the aforementioned autonomy. The part of the plan pertaining to elections has outweighed other its other aspects, to the extent that some have come to call it the elections plan. The truth is that elections are the most dangerous part of the initiative.

As far as I am concerned, elections are rejected in Palestinian terms for numerous reasons, including the following:

1. Because they would be limited to citizens in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and would exclude close to three times as many Palestinians in the Palestinian diaspora. Thus, if we presume that the Palestinians would accept elections, such elections would not be truly representative.

2. Because elections would be considered the abandonment by the Palestinians of their legitimate leadership, the PLO, which they chose as their sole, legitimate representative.

3. Because they would involve a fatal division of the Palestinian cause (including national and political rights population and region, etc.) and would be installed on the foundations of this cause, thus destroying them.

4. Because they would be a substitute for examining essential matters (such as the right to self-determination, the establishment of an independent state and the exchange of land for peace, etc.). Instead, the elections would focus on purely procedural matters (the holding of elections), even though elections are not Israel's jurisdiction, but are solely at the heart of Palestinian rights, including the right to decide to hold or not to hold elections whenever they wish in the manner which they deem appropriate.

The preemption of elections by a plan formulated by the Palestinians or the PLO being mentioned as a possibility would not change the situation at all, as long as elections are rejected and prohibited from the start. In addition, entering into the details of elections would involve an implicit acknowledgement by the Palestinians of the legitimacy of elections and their consent to them.

Thus, a discussion of the election program is fundamentally rejected. It behooves the Palestinian people to be very wary and not to enter into or preoccupy themselves with the election plan in any way, in view of its danger and its destructive effects on the Palestinian cause and Palestinian rights, aspirations and wishes. The diligent have a share, and God supports their endeavor.

**Radwan Abu-'Ayyash, the Chairman of the Arab Journalists Union in the Occupied Lands**

It is natural for me to agree to any withdrawal of the Israeli Army, regardless of its type, because I would consider that the start of Palestinian sovereignty on the way to realizing the aspirations of the Palestinian people. This withdrawal must be accompanied by international

supervision in order to transfer authority to the Palestinian people so that it can practice its right to sovereignty and self-determination on its land. This step must logically be a basic part of determining a comprehensive solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hence, an Israeli withdrawal would indicate a true Israeli inclination to discuss a comprehensive, lasting solution to the crisis in the region, which would give our people some confidence in Israeli approaches toward ending the crisis in the region and would also indicate Israel's good intentions. Our people, through its leadership's positions, have demonstrated, leaving no room for doubt, its orientation toward a comprehensive, just peace based on firm, clear foundations. Moreover, it advocates putting forward a comprehensive, integrated plan for a solution, in which an Israeli withdrawal would be a step within this integrated, comprehensive phase. Likewise, international supervision is considered an important means for providing international legitimacy to a solution as well as an implementation mechanism, which requires this type of legitimacy in most of the phases involved in reaching a durable, just solution.

Hence, I believe that the implementation of a withdrawal from the cities, camps and villages and the areas populated by Palestinian residents and citizens will clear the way for implementing the phases of a comprehensive solution and will create a positive impression of the sincerity of Israeli intentions regarding a possible solution, provided that all phases are linked together consecutively on the way to ending the crisis in the region, which is liable to explode at any moment.

**Dr Sa'ib 'Ariqat, Professor of Political Science at al-Najah National University, Nabulus**

Elections are fundamentally a procedural issue. In my opinion, the entire Palestinian people is aspiring to a democratic political system after the establishment of an independent state, which would be based on elections. Regarding elections under the current circumstances, international legitimization established itself 4 months ago in Namibia, where the crisis or problem was solved by the withdrawal of South African forces, the arrival of UN "international supervision" forces secondly, and elections, in that order. Is this what must be applied in the occupied Palestinian lands if I want a true peace process to begin in the region?

**Dr Zakariya al-Agha, the Chairman of the Arab Medical Association in the Gaza Strip**

The clamor which is currently being stirred up over elections is a fabricated clamor, whose goal is clearly to divert world public opinion from what is happening in the occupied Palestinian lands, and an attempt to absorb the widespread international disapproval of Israeli practices against the Palestinian people and flee from facing a solution to the Palestinian problem in all of its national and political dimensions. The basic problem does not pertain to democracy as represented by elections and whether we accept or reject them. No one is opposed to

democracy. However, the practice of democracy requires a free will. A person bound by chains cannot practice democracy, because democracy and freedom go hand in hand. Democracy does not exist in the absence of freedom. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine free, fair elections under the bayonets of the occupation. On the other hand, elections are not an end in themselves, but are perhaps a means to achieve the end. Therefore, we are willing to accept the idea of elections if they are part of a comprehensive, clear plan to solve the problem justly, which would assuredly lead to the obtainment of our national rights, especially the right to self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state on national, Palestinian soil.

**Engineer Hatim Abu-Sha'ban, Head of the Engineers Union in the Gaza Strip**

The word elections is a nice word, which suggests democracy and the true path of civilized, refined peoples. The Palestinian people doubtlessly enjoy this fine quality, which numerous peoples in the world lack. However, the important question is whether there is any meeting point between democracy and civilization on the one hand and the occupation on the other. No one, I believe, would argue that there is no democracy under the occupation. We truly desire to achieve a just peace for all, including the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. I believe that if agreement is reached on any comprehensive solution or plan, such a plan would have to include recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination as its final point, and it could not distinguish between Palestinians in the interior and those abroad. It would also have to guarantee the security of all states of the region, including Palestine and Israel. If all of the parties were to sign the agreement, I would believe the following:

1. Recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination in the final phase of a comprehensive plan is tantamount to acknowledging the principle of complete withdrawal, and is a step toward its realization.

2. In this event, I would agree to elections in the occupied territories, including the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, with a guarantee of the right to vote for all, including detainees and deportees, based on an Israeli withdrawal from the main cities and villages, provided that such elections are supervised by UN or multi-national observers and are a first step toward a comprehensive solution.

3. The elected representatives cannot in any circumstance be an alternate leadership to the PLO; rather, they would be a veritable bridge to peace, which would sow seeds of trust between Israel and the PLO. Negotiations could begin with them as a first stage toward negotiations over a final, comprehensive settlement, which must be negotiated with the full, main participation of the PLO, the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in either an international peace conference or in direct negotiations between all of the parties.

**Yusri al-Barbari, the Chairwoman of the Palestinian Women's Federation in the Gaza Strip**

A Palestinian observer of recent developments and the numerous statements made by the Israeli and Palestinian parties regarding Shamir's election plan and Palestinian, American and other state's reactions to it, notes that the word elections has the magic of the concept of democracy. Israel has resorted to elections as a means to throw dust into the eyes of whoever directs sharp, stinging criticism against it because of its abusive policy against our struggling people. Therefore, I would like to state that any elections, which occur in the framework of Shamir's plan and his numerous statements—in which he does not acknowledge the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, nor recognize [the authority] of its sole, legitimate representative, the PLO, to achieve its national goals by establishing an independent Palestinian state on the land of Palestine and not abandoning one grain of sand of the occupied territories—would make us affirm that the elections scenario and the cosmetic camouflage being applied to it is nothing but an artifice to deceive world public opinion. One asks, where is democracy in holding elections in the shadow of the foreign occupation. As for the issue of international supervision, the occupied territories are teeming with international employees of the United Nations Organization Agency and foreigners who stand by meekly in the face of Israeli abuse of our people. What is the authority of these international observers over the occupation state? Therefore, I categorically reject any preconditions imposed by America or any Arab or foreign state to pressure the Palestinian leadership to agree to the holding of such elections. All that we want from the world is that it accord us the same treatment as that accorded to people of Namibia, regarding which the UN compelled the racist government of South Africa to withdrawal completely from Namibian territory, which was followed by the presence of international forces and the holding of elections under the supervision of these same extensively mandated forces. In this way, the Palestinian people would be granted full freedom to hold these elections, provided that they be part of a plan and agreement, guaranteed by the major states on the Security Council, regarding a comprehensive solution which would affirm the establishment of an independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO on the land of Arab Palestine.

**Khalid Qudrah, Deputy Head of the Lawyers Union in the Gaza Strip**

The PLO, in view of the fact that it is the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, has proposed a Palestinian peace initiative based on the decisions of the extraordinary session of the PNC [Palestine National Council] in Algiers on 15 November 1988. The PLO is the sole party empowered by the Palestinian people with the right to propose initiatives and issue decisions accepting or rejecting proposed initiatives or recommendations. The Palestinian people in the interior and abroad has the right to express its opinion regarding

everything that pertains to its affairs and future, but through the PLO, and only through it. This is the correct meaning of democracy. Individual efforts and direct contact with this or that party are considered terrible mistakes, even if they are undertaken with good intentions, because they damage the legitimacy of the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people. If such efforts are undertaken intentionally, they would be an inarguable deviation from the national consensus. Thus, in answer to the question, it can be said that the matter must be put to the PLO so that it can express its opinion on it. It would be appropriate for it to study it. Regarding this study, we see the need to clarify the following questions: Who would have the right to vote and nominate, would East Jerusalem be permitted to participate, which official agency would issue an elections law, would Palestinians abroad participate, what would be the role of the PLO in the process on the whole, would there be basic principles such as the right to self-determination and the establishment of a state which would be the basis for negotiations, to what extent would the Israeli army withdraw, what would be the guarantees given to elected personalities, how long would the negotiation process last, and other essential, important matters. Elections are not a goal in themselves. Rather, the goal is a peaceful, just, permanent, comprehensive solution which would guarantee the right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state under the leadership of the PLO.

**Dr Mahmud al-Qawasimi, the Head of the Engineers Union in the West Bank and the Director of the Polytechnic Institute in Hebron**

I reject the application of this scheme in the territories, because the current proposal is part of Shamir's plan, which aims for elections to absorb pressure being exerted by world public opinion and to attempt to demonstrate that Israel is proposing democracy, which the Palestinians understand. In addition, the greater goal of this plan is to leapfrog over the PLO and attempt to create an alternate leadership.

The word elections, which signifies democracy, is doubtlessly a nice, convincing word if it is posed at the appropriate time to achieve a specific goal. However, the current proposal, which is part of Shamir's plan, is rejected for three reasons:

1. The concept of land in the plan is that Palestinian lands are a part of Israel.
2. Regarding the status of the population, the plan holds that the Palestinians are a minority living inside the state of Israel, which requires a solution to its problems.
3. The plan does not treat the Palestinian problem and Palestinians in the diaspora, which is the essence of the problem, for elections would give us neither the right to self-determination nor a Palestinian state, and would strive to sow confusion inside the occupied lands. Therefore, the plan is rejected in its current formulation.

**Lawyer Hashim Daraghimah, Elected Mayor of Tubas**

The Palestinian people, whether in the interior or in the diaspora and abroad, is one people which can be neither divided nor split. It has its sole, legitimate representative. Consequently, I agree to what the PLO agrees upon without any reservation.

**Hajj Hashim 'Ata al-Shawwa, Chairman of the Federation of Citrus Growers in the Gaza Strip**

In my opinion there is nothing objectionable in holding elections on the aforementioned basis. It is preferable that they be under the supervision of UN observers, provided that they are multi-national observers, and that the purpose of elections is a comprehensive, just solution—a true, just solution would be wonderful—since elections are not an end, but only a means.

**Shahir Sa'd, the Chairman of the Federation of Unions in the West Bank**

I am in favor of the Palestinian plan regarding the holding of elections, provided that they are a first step in a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian problem, which means the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian national soil.

In my opinion, the elections formula proposed by Shamir is not much different from autonomy, whereas the Palestinian plan to hold elections expresses the aspirations and desires of the Palestinian people inside the occupied lands. Any plan which is proposed without international guarantees neglects the Palestinian problem in general.

**Dr 'Abdallah Sabri, the Chairman of the Physicians Union, Jerusalem Branch**

I agree with the holding of elections in the occupied lands based on the conditions proposed by the Palestinian leadership.

**Dr Yasir 'Ubayd, Director of the Arab Health Center in Ramallah**

I find it strange that different parties, such as Israel, the United States and others, are concerned with the Palestinian people electing its representatives, inasmuch as no Palestinian has declared that he does not agree to the PLO being his sole, legitimate representative.

However, if elections must occur, the Palestinian people is an indivisible unity. In my opinion, democratic elections to determine the representatives of the unified Palestinian people must permit deportees to nominate themselves, such as Muhammad Milhim from Halhul, Faruq al-Qaddumi from Nabulus and similar such people. In addition, elections must also take place in the camps in neighboring Arab states, such as Lebanon and Syria. This can take place under UN supervision through the Refugees Aid Agency, which supervises the camps in the interior and abroad.

The Palestinian problem is not limited to being a dispute between Israel and the residents of the occupied territories. Rather, it is a dispute between Israel and the Palestinian people everywhere, and consequently the Arab nation. The masses of the occupied territories cannot solve the Palestinian problem in isolation from Palestinians abroad and the Arab nation, as did Anwar al-Sadat in "Camp David" previously, which led to the isolation of the residents of the occupied territories from their Palestinian brothers abroad and Arabs in general. No Palestinian, I believe, could accept such a situation.

Given the foregoing, I see no need to hold elections, because the representative of the Palestinian people is known and recognized by all states of the world. It is the only representative authorized to sign any decision pertaining to the Palestinian problem, and Israel must talk with this representative if it desires a just, lasting, comprehensive solution for this region.

**Dr Dhiyyab 'Ayyush, Dean of the College of Humanities and the Chairman of the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Bethlehem**

I agree to everything adopted by the PLO given that it is the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, because it possesses a complete vision and a political perspective, and it is more aware than any other party of what the Palestinian people can achieve under these circumstances, in which the popular uprising has emerged as a primary catalyst regarding the Palestinian problem.

There is no doubt that there are fears of a repetition of what happened in mayoral elections in 1976, when the will of the Palestinian people, which elected the mayors, was not respected, and some were deported while others were dismissed from their mayoral positions. In any case, whatever the PLO deems advantageous to the Palestinian people will be agreeable to me.

**Dr Sari Nusaybah, Jerusalem**

If Israel were to agree and commit itself to everything contained in the question, including a commitment to a just, comprehensive peace based on UN resolutions pertaining to the Palestinian problem, including resolutions 181 and 194 and Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, I would agree to this measure.

**Dr Muhammad Zayn-al-Din, Chairman of the Blood Bank Society in the Gaza Strip**

The question which arises is, why elections. Palestinians in the interior and abroad, the Arab states and most of the states of the world agree that a legitimate, sole representative exists. The call for elections in this constricted political and security atmosphere aims only at dividing and splitting the Palestinian people. From a constitutional, technical standpoint, elections should represent the final phase of national consolidation. A military withdrawal should come first, followed by international peace talks with the participation of the parties

to the conflict, including the PLO and the permanent member-states of the Security Council. After that, elections could be held under the aegis of national freedom. It is unacceptable for an outside party to impose elections. The imposition of elections in their current form would be like reversing the order of the alphabet. Is this reasonable, where is the position on the positive, rational decisions of the 19th PNC session, have they been forgotten?

**Sa'id Kan'an, Chairman of the Association of the Friends of al-Najah National [University] in Nablus**

First of all, we agree to what the PLO agrees upon, and we reject what it rejects. Therefore, the comprehensive view of the PLO and its knowledge of the underlying reasons for international activity and regional balances inspire in us confidence in the wisdom of this leadership and its better legal claim to maneuvering, planning and decisionmaking.

We also know that the goal of elections, as Shamir proposes, is to flee before the reality of the PLO and the Palestinian peace program. Therefore, we hastened to reject Shamir's plan, certain that it shifts the focus from being on the basic issue to being on peripheral, procedural issues which disregard the attainment of a just, comprehensive, lasting peace.

In this decisive phase, there are new given facts which make us place specific conditions on accepting the idea of elections, with the goal of attaining self-determination for the Palestinian people and the establishment of an independent state under the leadership of the PLO. On this basis, we accept the conditions established by the PLO regarding the withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas of population concentrations under the auspices of international supervision, provided that it is a step toward a comprehensive, just solution in the region.

In any case, this is an important, crucial issue. We will let our leadership make the necessary calculations and appropriate decision, and we support it wholeheartedly.

**Dr 'Izzat Ghawrani, Economics Professor, Bir Zayt University**

The contents of the question and the manner in which it was formulated have been frequently heard recently in the east and the west. The contents have been formulated in a diplomatic, obscure, deceptive language.

The idea of elections and the method for their implementation as contained in the question must be rejected on the whole and in detail.

Elections are not a Palestinian objective. Rather, they are an Israeli goal to select an alternative to the PLO, the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The proposed method for holding "elections" opens the door to a new maze with neither a beginning nor end, and it raises a number of questions, each having more than one answer. Who will guarantee that the Israelis will



not return to the cities, what would be the role of international observers after the "elections," what is the meaning of a "comprehensive, just" peace—to whom is it just and comprehensive, what are the foundations on which this comprehensive, just peace are based—are they full, complete recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination?

**Dr 'Isa al-Salti, Director of the Ramallah Hospital and Chairman of the Arab Medical Care Association**

I agree to the holding of elections in the occupied territories in the light of the aforementioned conditions pertaining to international supervision and Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian cities, villages and camps, because I believe in the principle of democracy and election; in this way, we could put an end to Israeli doubts as to the unity of the Palestinian people in the interior and abroad; and finally, because the most difficult phase in the peace process is the start of a dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis.

I also believe that the role of the elected must not go beyond discussing issues pertaining to phases and procedures, whereas negotiations must be carried out with the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, namely the PLO.

**Dr Mahmud Muhammad, Tulkarm**

We agree to the holding of elections if Israeli forces withdraw completely from the occupied lands, and not just from balloting locations, based on a guarantee of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO, and of course under the auspices of international supervision.

**As'ad al-As'ad, the Secretary-General of the Federation of Writers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip**

I favor the holding of elections provided that they are not a goal in themselves, but are a step to be followed by steps leading to the end of the occupation and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the land which Israel occupied in 1967, and that they take place through the PLO, in its capacity as the political leadership of the Palestinian people and its legitimate representative.

In my opinion, no one opposes the exercise of the right to elect representatives in a free, democratic manner, although we must emphasize that freedom and democracy cannot be achieved in the shadow of the occupation.

**Khalid Ahmad, Hebron Employee**

I believe that the idea of elections in the territories is an unsuccessful idea, because it will not gain the same measure of consent on the part of all the different Palestinian orientations and currents.

We ultimately favor a just, honorable peace, not a peace which uproots our cause and eliminates the role of the PLO, such as the idea to hold these elections for example.

**Pharmacist Amil Tubasi, Ramallah**

Current proposals and questions pertaining to elections for representatives of the Palestinian people inside the occupied land must be examined as part of a comprehensive plan to solve the problem of the Palestinian people and the problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The examination of this issue or the possibility of settling it should take place at an international conference with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including Israel, the PLO, the neighboring Arab states and the permanent member-states of the Security Council under UN supervision to reach a just, comprehensive solution of the conflict through the establishment of the fixed national rights of the Palestinian people, and its right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state next to the state of Israel.

As for talk of the method for holding elections, it must be, as I mentioned, a step toward a future program entailing a comprehensive, just solution for the two peoples, which is linked to a plan with international guarantees and a set timetable to bring peace to the region following the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces under international supervision in a democratic atmosphere far from the atmosphere of occupation and oppression.

**Ghazi Hananiya, Chairman of the Society of Friends of the Sick in Ramallah**

The Palestinian people has proven throughout the ages that it hallows democracy and always strives for freedom. Inasmuch as elections are an expression of the opinions of peoples and are one of their basic rights, they have continued to be a popular demand of our people. Our people will not oppose these democratic, civilized practices.

But the question is how can we exercise our right to democracy under pressures, conditions and threats?

Therefore, before we agree to or oppose the holding of elections, the appropriate circumstances and correct stipulations must be available, which, at a minimum, would have to include:

1. The withdrawal of the Israeli army.
2. International supervision of the elections process.
3. The participation of the PLO in the peace process in an international conference.
4. Recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.



After the fulfillment of these basic conditions, I believe that it would be appropriate for us to think seriously about accepting the idea of elections.

**Mahmud 'Abd-al-Hadi, the Secretary of the Federation of Aid Agency Teachers**

I maintain that elections under the current circumstances would entail complications regardless of the stipulations which could be established for holding them. We consider the PLO the sole, legitimate representative of our people wherever it is located. Consequently, there is no need to hold elections to select elements to represent the Palestinian people as an alternative to the PLO in any future peace talks.

Also, the idea was proposed initially by the Israeli, not the Palestinian, side. We know the extent to which the Israelis act fraudulently, procrastinate and outflank the rights of our people. They cannot propose an idea or solution which is incompatible, even minimally, with their expansionist plans and dreams. Consequently, we would expect the election procedure to be rejected absolutely.

**Muhammad Qunaytah, Chairman of the Federation of Palestinian Labor Unions in the Gaza Strip**

- Yes we agree to holding elections, which would be prepared well and soundly as a transitional phase to a comprehensive solution.
- Elections cannot be free and democratic unless Israel withdraws from the occupied lands. The army could withdraw as part of a phased plan from the cities in which the elections are held, and it would not return to them according to an agreed program guaranteed by the permanent member-states of the Security Council.
- In many similar cases, such elections are supervised by neutral parties, be they the states guaranteeing the phased working document or the UN.
- The Palestinian people must have an unequivocal view that the elections constitute a first stage on the way to a comprehensive solution, and that the role of the elected is inseparable from the role of the rest of the representatives of the one Palestinian people, whether in the interior or abroad, to secure the aspirations of this people to establish an independent Palestinian state.

**Engineer 'Uqayl Salih Matar, the Former Head of the Engineers Union, Gaza Strip**

Elections are the height of the exercise of democracy. Can democracy be practiced in the shadow of the occupation? However, if the elections are a step in Shamir's plan for a solution to the problem, which would begin with elections and end with the right to self-determination for the Arab Palestinian people, no one would reject them, provided that they would clearly provide for the participation of the Palestinians in the interior and abroad in the second phase of a comprehensive solution and would not be an attempt to divide the two parts of the one people.

**Dr Muhayyah Khalfah, Pediatrician, Nabulus**

In my opinion, no one opposes the principle of elections in the territories, provided that Israeli forces withdraw completely from the territories, and that the territories are placed under international supervision. Subsequently, the holding of elections would be a first step on the road to a just, comprehensive solution in the region.

**Lawyer Muhammad Hashim Abu-Sha'ban, Gaza**

An Israeli withdrawal from the cities would only tend, to a certain degree, to lessen friction between Palestinians and army and Border Guard soldiers in the occupied lands, which could be considered a step toward reducing the intensity of daily tensions and the number of Palestinian victims. Nevertheless, while the release of all prisoners is a necessary, significant step, it would not be considered sufficient for holding democratic elections in the broad sense of democracy. If there is a withdrawal from the cities, what about the thousands of refugees in the camps and the numerous villages in the occupied lands?

There is no doubt that we are one inseparable totality, and that all must enjoy the same circumstances and guarantees which ensure freewill and democracy. What about the Palestinians in Jerusalem and the diaspora? It is also unacceptable to enter into elections fettered by numerous hardships which deprive elections of democracy, as is proposed! Even if there were international supervision, it would have to come after the Palestinian people is given its freedom to exercise its right to self-determination, far from the occupation and its pressures and practices. Also, the expression of a first step toward a comprehensive, just solution is an ambiguous first step, and the intended comprehensive solution must clearly be acknowledgement of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and a guarantee of return and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian soil next to Israel. Any elections excluding the PLO and its role as the Palestinian people's acknowledged, sole, legitimate representative, are destined to failure.

**Muhammad Jadallah, Secretary of the Federation of Health Care Committees in the Occupied Territories**

It must apparently be acknowledged that Yitzhaq Shamir was able, through his "initiative balloon," to distract the world for a while with talk of holding elections in the occupied territories to facilitate his isolation of our Palestinian people and to be able to crush it with his forces' bayonets. The result is a large number of martyrs and wounded, thousands of prisoners and hundreds of destroyed houses, which are part of a daily program being perpetrated by Israeli army forces within the sight and earshot of the world, which in part—the U.S. for example—sees "positive elements" in

Shamir's initiative and is calling on the Palestinians to encourage the plan and cooperate with it. Moreover, there are signs of extremism and racism in circles of Israeli society which enjoy the encouragement and blessing of the government, such that we have begun to see a sharp increase in the practice of racist forms and behavior, either in imitation of racist measures in South Africa and/or the Nazi practices of Hitlerite Germany.

If we Palestinians do not fundamentally reject elections, because we view them as a democratic phenomenon paving the way for a high degree of freedom for peoples and as a way to choose the nature and form of state, we oppose Shamir's elections, because: They are based on the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; they seek to divide the Palestinian people and its national cause; they deny our people the right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state; they reject recognition of our sole, legitimate representative, the PLO; and they are a peripheral clause in Shamir's scheme, which addresses the Arab governments but treats our Palestinian people as a minority on its national land, which is more inferior than what is contained in the Camp David accords, which our people shot down at the time.

Shamir's plan to hold elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is an attempt which aims to extricate Israel from its political predicament and provide it with ways to end the intifadah [Palestinian uprising] with political means after it failed to end it militarily. Elections can only occur after an Israeli withdrawal and the complete end of the occupation in all its forms and aspects, and under international supervision to provide the appropriate circumstances and necessary protection in which the Palestinian people can practice its right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state under the PLO's leadership based on the Palestinian peace initiative established by the PNC in its 19th session, which obtained the welcome and support of most of the states of the world.

**George Hizbun, the Secretary-General of the Federation of West Bank Unions**

If elections are based on the right to self-determination and recognition of an independent, Palestinian, national state, we welcome elections, provided that they are supervised by the UN under the auspices of the five permanent member-states of the Security Council, in view of the fact that the only way is to establish the right of peoples and solve the problem through the convocation of an international conference.

**Hajj Dawud Wazwaz, a Member of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce**

The PLO agrees to the holding of these elections, albeit based on conditions, namely an Israeli withdrawal, international supervision, and that elections be a step within the framework of a comprehensive plan to lay the foundations for a comprehensive, just solution in the region. Therefore, we are not opposed, especially since

our Palestinian people is fighting for its rights and to make peace, not for the sake of acting hostilely toward others. Therefore, we would like to be treated like the rest of the peoples and states of the world.

**'Abd-al-Ra'uf Abu-'Asab, a Member of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce**

Even though elections are a nice dream to which any people in the world would aspire, inasmuch as this dream aims to select a leadership which truthfully, faithfully and sincerely expresses the truth of the masses and knows how to defend their rights, I nonetheless believe that Israel's goal in holding elections is nothing more than a trap or a pothole to destroy all peace efforts in the region and to be satisfied with throwing crumbs to our people, when it is more appropriate for Israel—instead of all of these complications, and turning and circumventing with initiatives which are ultimately useless to all parties to the conflict in the region—to apply itself directly to a dialogue with the PLO to lay the foundations for a just, comprehensive peace. Israel should also not be content with indirect discussions represented by meetings between Palestinian and Israeli personalities or by the American-Palestinian dialogue. It must know that the PLO is the sole party authorized to speak on behalf of our people.

However, in the event that these elections are held in the territories, our consent will be subject to the consent of the PLO and the conditions which the PLO has proposed, which are withdrawal, international supervision, and the proviso that elections are a step toward a comprehensive, just solution in the region.

**'Abd-Abu-Diyab, the Director of Employee Affairs and Former Chairman of the Jerusalem Electric Company**

If these elections are in the framework of a comprehensive, integrated plan from the standpoint of granting the Palestinian people the right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state on our soil, and representation by our sole, legitimate representative, the PLO, we are in favor of these elections, which must be held under international supervision following a withdrawal from the borders of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including Jerusalem, and the granting of freedom, democracy and expression to the Palestinians, in the sense that we agree to elections according to the Palestinian plan and not according to the Shamir plan, which does not grant our minimum legitimate rights.

**Nabil al-'Izzah, Secretary of Workers and Employees of the Arab Jerusalem Electric Company**

We maintain that elections are a type of democracy. However, as long as the occupation exists, there is no type of democracy. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the way of holding these elections under international supervision inside occupied Palestine after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from them, provided that they are the start of a step toward a final solution.

**Engineer 'Abd-al-Rahman Abu-'Urfah, Shu'fat, Jerusalem**

Holding elections in the territories is an internal Palestinian matter through which the Palestinian people living in these territories would exercise its natural, democratic right based on the complete freedom to exercise this right. Inasmuch as the occupation bluntly contradicts the principle of freedom, there is no sense in practicing democracy in the absence of freedom, or before it exists as a natural condition.

Nonetheless, if a circumstance existed in which the elections process were to become the prelude to the realization of political equality, whereas the occupation still weighed heavily, the UN would have the right to call for holding these elections through the General Assembly, which would order the issuance of a special resolution based on the request of the representative of Palestine to the UN to hold elections to select the representatives of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for membership in the PNC based on the provision of an atmosphere of freedom needed to hold elections, including the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the release of prisoners under the supervision of a team appointed by the UN to organize, administer, examine and announce the results of the elections.

In the light of these results, the PNC would decide the mandates to be entrusted to the elected members, especially the conducting of preparatory negotiations to formulate arrangements for the full withdrawal of Israeli forces and the settlement of affairs in the occupied territories, while the completion of arrangements for a lasting settlement would be effected through an international conference.

**Dr 'Abd-al-Latif al-Barghuthi, Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies at Bir Zayt University**

We agree on the principle whereby the elections process would be carried out according to declared Palestinian conditions, which the media, citing the PLO leadership, has circulated. Without these conditions, elections would be meaningless.

**Dr Jamal Salsa', Bethlehem**

In my opinion, if the elections are held, they must be linked to a comprehensive plan for ending the Israeli occupation, granting the Palestinian people its full rights and recognizing the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, provided that the PLO, in the next stage, would participate in deciding the plan for the final stage, which would include and guarantee the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

**Writer and Journalist 'Ali al-Khalili, Nabulus**

We are a people which believes in, and also practices democracy. Elections are a prominent indicator of democracy. Therefore, I view elections fundamentally as one of our rights. However, in this phase, and based on the political settlement of our problem, these elections

must constitute an initial entryway to a comprehensive settlement through which our right to self-determination is established.

It is natural that the exercise of the right to elect means all of our Palestinian people in the interior and abroad and in all cities, villages and camps in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip according to the 1967 borders—together and at the same time. Also, the exercise of this right requires a democratic, fair atmosphere, which requires the withdrawal of the Israeli army and reasonable UN or international supervision without any conditions being imposed on the electorate or the elected, except for the condition to achieve "peace" and justice in this region.

**'Atallah Rashmawi, an Elected Member of the Bayt Sahur Municipal Council**

I agree, provided that there is coordination with the PLO, Israeli forces withdraw from the populated areas, and that these elections are part of a comprehensive plan guaranteed by the major states, which leads to a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian problem.

**Dr Khalid Kan'an, Chairman of the Academicians Committee in the College of Sciences and Technology in Abu-Dis**

If elections are a step on the road to a just, comprehensive solution to the Palestinian problem—which would be represented by the granting of the Palestinian people the right to self-determination, return and the establishment of an independent, Palestinian state—and if they occur under international supervision after the withdrawal of Israeli forces, they would, in my opinion, be an acceptable step as far as the Palestinian people is concerned, because these circumstances would eliminate fears of the possibility of returning to the Camp David formula, of influence on the course of elections, of fraud regarding the election results or fears of influence being exerted on the elected representatives in any way. In other words, such elections would be democratic elections, which is what everyone desires for the sake of attaining a just peace.

**Dr Samir Hizbun, Bir Zayt University**

There is no objection to the principle of a dialogue between the parties to the conflict with the objective of arriving at a fully-mandated international conference. Although, it should be noted that elections are the fourth point in Shamir's plan. Consequently, we find that the "Camp David" formula has only been adorned. In addition, the Israeli side has so far not consented decisively to elections. The problem must be solved by establishing two states for two people, not by discussing large generalities which do not provide any realistic definition and continue to be conditions of the various parties. Therefore, I see no need to argue and debate regarding side issues which distance us from the basic goal for a solution, which is to hold an international conference encompassing all solutions and international and local guarantees. [passage omitted]

**Professor Discusses Role, Influence of Leaflets in Intifadah***44230141 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
23 Jun 89 p 5B*

[Article by S. Mish'al: "Intifadah of Leaflets"]

[Text] The leaflet is not the invention of the intifadah [uprising]. It has its beginning during the Jewish-Arab struggle in the land of Israel. Leaflets as tools for expressing a stand and as an instrument for directing behavior already accompanied Arab-Palestinian politics in the days of the British Mandate. After 1948 and, more vigorously, after 1967, they continued to appear on the West Bank, on the Gaza Strip, and among Israeli Arabs. This time, the face of things is different. The variety of leaflets, the frequency of their appearance, the extent of obedience, and the response to them attests to their success in becoming a central factor in the lives of the population. Lacking local leadership with a formal stand and authority in the midst of the population, the leaflets have become an "alternate leadership."

The centrality of the leaflets is not coincidental. The leaflets and their formulators are dependent upon the ideology and organization of two political camps that put down roots among the population in the period preceding the intifadah—the national camp and the religious camp. The national camp is identified with the central organizations in the PLO: Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian Communist Party. In the religious camp are the Muslim Brothers and The Islamic Mujma' Organization. The power of the national camp is greater on the West Bank and less in the Gaza Strip, while the religious camp demonstrates its presence and influence mainly in the region of the Gaza Strip.

The PLO and the leftist organizations sheltered by it turned to intensive political activity on the West Bank and Gaza primarily in the period following the Yom Kippur War (1973). The fruits of this activity were not long in coming. In the years following 1973, the PLO succeeded in recruiting support among the population and even in gaining positions of power in municipal bodies, student organizations, professional societies, and other civilian institutions. The institutional success was even accompanied by ideological success. The PLO became a source of political inspiration for broad strata of the population, the communicator of the national desires for the Palestinian and inter-Arab leadership. For many, the PLO and the Palestinian problem are inseparable.

The Muslim Brothers worked with quieter, though no less effective methods. The establishment of an Islamic state throughout Palestine by Jihad, that is, by holy war against Israel, is the final objective. But this has been perceived as a long-term goal that necessitates the preliminary activity of fitting the hearts of believers with the spirit of Islam. Therefore, the "Brothers" turned their

energies to the realm of education and broadened community activity. The mosques became the main arena of their activity. There, they taught the Koran to the youth and there they dealt with propaganda and educational activities.

The divergent activity of the national camp and the religious camp did their parts in the period of the intifadah. The intermingling was recognized in the activities of the four bodies that stand behind the drafting of the declarations: the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (al-Qiyadah al-Wataniyah al-Muwahhadah; hereafter, the Unified); the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah; hereafter, Hamas); the Palestinian leftist organizations, and the Islamic Jihad. Each of these four bodies ideologically identifies with or is connected organizationally to the national or religious camp.

The organizations with the most weight are the Unified—also known by the term Qawm, meaning "nation" or Qawim, meaning "fight," "revolt!"—and Hamas, meaning "courage" or "enthusiasm."

The Unified is a coalition of Fatah supporters, the Democratic Front, the Popular Front, and the Communist Party. The close connection between the Unified and the PLO finds expression at the beginning of the leaflets of the Unified. Beginning with leaflet number two, each leaflet opens with the proclamation: "There is no voice that will be louder than the voice of the uprising, there is no voice that will be louder than the voice of the Palestinian nation—the nation of the PLO." Appearing in leaflet three and thereafter is the declaration that the leaflet is published under the auspices of the PLO and the Unified National Leadership, and the marks of both of them appear side by side at the end of the leaflet.

The integration of the leftist organizations into the Unified National Leadership has not prevented them from issuing their own leaflets. There appear to be two reasons for this: one, to emphasize their existence in the territory; and, two, to demonstrate ideological and organizational singularity by emphasizing the differences between them and Fatah on central issues. This is especially stated in relation to Jordan and the attitude toward the political order.

**Variety, Frequency, and Effectiveness**

The leaflets of all organizations that we listed, aside from those of the Unified, are homemade. They are created exclusively by activists on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The leaflets of the Unified are put together in the territory as drafts. Their contents are sent outside, to the PLO, and there they receive their final polish. At the end of the formulation process, their contents are broadcast on the PLO's radio station from Baghdad and the al-Quds radio station operating from Damascus. Only afterward are they distributed to the population.

Alongside the regional leaflets appear the local leaflets. The initiative for these leaflets comes, for the most part, from the organizations operating under the auspices of the Unified National Leadership. These leaflets were designated to translate the directives appearing in the regional leaflets into specific instructions in accordance with the needs of the place in which the leaflet appears.

There are also detached leaflets appearing on behalf of professional or volunteer organizations in various settlements. Even in these leaflets, the fingerprints of the Unified are, for the most part, recognizable, as often are those of the leftist organizations and the Communist Party.

The frequency of the appearance of leaflets is high. In the first year of the intifadah, (from December 1987 to December 1988) 31 leaflets in the name of the Unified and 33 in the name of Hamas appeared. The average is, therefore, two to three per month for each of these two organizations. The frequency of appearance of leaflets from each of the leftist organizations, as well as the Islamic Jihad is low in comparison to the leaflets of the Unified and Hamas. According to our estimate, the number of leaflets put out by all leftist organizations in the first year of the intifadah is 20. It is almost certain that the reason for the low frequency is that they are partners in the leaflets published in the name of the Unified National Leadership.

The Islamic Jihad is the organization with the least number of leaflets. Since the outbreak of the intifadah, we have located only three leaflets published in its name. The Islamic Jihad, itself, claimed that it was hesitant to publish leaflets, because, in its eyes, the entire Palestinian public is the leadership of the uprising.

The difference in the scope and frequency of the distribution is reflected in the different levels of success of the organizations standing behind the leaflets in achieving a response and in guaranteeing obedience from the population. All leaflets profess to dictate the daily routine in the territory. Nevertheless, the leaflets of the Unified and Hamas have earned the position of government edicts among the population. The response and obedience to them are great. Alongside calls of self-encouragement and stocktaking of the achievements of the intifadah, these leaflets take care to sustain the population with a series of detailed directives regarding what is permitted and forbidden, what, when, and how to act. In comparison to the leaflets of the left and the Islamic Jihad which are, in general, limited to defined matters, the leaflets of the Unified and Hamas encompass a broad variety of areas in life: work, health, transportation, education, agriculture, and commerce; when to hold a general and a partial strike, during which hours it is permissible to open stores, how to conduct studies in spite of school closings, who is permitted to travel on roads on strike days, and who is permitted to work. The leaflets include calls for mutual assistance, collection of donations for the needy, for the families of those killed and arrested, for the selective boycotting of goods made in Israel in the

agricultural industries, for wounding settlers, for the resignations of Arab workers in the civil administration, especially the police, tax employees, and members of appointed municipal and village councils. In Hamas' leaflets, which are composed in the Gaza Strip, a pile of religious directives even appear: prayer, charity, repentance, and, simply, proper behavior, such as obeying traffic rules in the spirit of the "Muslim manners."

The Unified's leaflets have well known influence not only over the local population, but also over that of the authorities of Israeli rule. The leaflets have become "working papers" dictating the scope of missions and the pace of IDF [Israel Defense Forces] activity, the civil administration, and the remainder of factors involved in the performance of security.

Lacking a local leadership with a formal stand and authority among the population, the leaflets have become the "written leadership" of the intifadah. If a leadership can be discerned in accordance with the ability to formulate values, to define goals, and to merit continual responses and adherence of sheep to their shepherd, then the composers of leaflets of the Unified and Hamas stand up to these conditions. The written leadership differs from its predecessor on two central points: first, in the period preceding the intifadah, the leadership was identified with political persons of stature among the population. They filled official roles as heads of municipalities and local councils, members of trade boards, heads of professional unions, or influential jobs, such as reporters and lawyers. A follow-up of the "written leadership" teaches that its members are not professional politicians, and its composition is not constant. Arrests and expulsions have thinned its ranks. If the "written leadership" has continued to demonstrate operational ability, this is mainly due to the charismatic nature that it has succeeded in bestowing upon its role and less on the composition of personalities at its head. Thus, one learns that a leader comes and a leader goes, but the institution is constant.

Second, the leadership in the period prior to the intifadah kept a simultaneous attachment to Jordan and the PLO. In contrast, the intifadah-version of "written leadership" has a distinct Palestinian orientation. The sources of inspiration for the leadership are the same: the national-Palestinian world outlook of the PLO is not the same outlook as that of the religious camp. But, together with this, both define themselves as Palestinian movements whose designs for a Palestinian identity and a Palestinian state are at the top of their thoughts. And both had a part in defining the goals of the intifadah and in shaping its path. An examination of the leaflets teaches that the organizations operating in the intifadah have two primary goals: the establishment of a Palestinian state and weakening of Israel's governing mechanisms in the territories through civil disobedience that will drive Israel from them.

### The Palestinian State

A significant difference is revealed between Hamas and the Unified National Leadership in the nature of the Palestinian state, and within this, in the political process and the position taken toward Israel. The difference stems from the sources of inspiration for the two organizations. Hamas, which is sustained by religious ideology, strives for the establishment of a Muslim-ruled state throughout the entire territory of Palestine. The land of Palestine, according to the Hamas covenant of August 1988, is the Muslim holy land (waqf) and Hamas is the "exclusive Palestinian movement...working to wave the flag of Allah over every inch of land in Palestine." Hamas is a link in the chain of Jihad (holy war) against Israel. Conceding portions of Palestine is not possible, because that would mean conceding part of the religious duty of Islam.

Hamas' saddlebag also contains political arguments for why it is necessary to reject every attempt at a political arrangement with Israel. An example of this is contained in leaflet 28: "Israel understands nothing but the language of power and does not believe in negotiation or peace. It will always continue with its evasiveness, with building a military presence, and with the exploitation of opportunities for attacking and breaking the Arab's nose." Also: "The Arab world is not so weak that they run after peace, and the Jews are not so strong that they can enforce their will. How long will Israel be able to resist all of the forces?"

Hamas even attributes demonic characteristics to Israel and the Jews that justify not speaking with them. "Israel is a cancer that is spreading through the Muslim ground and threatens the entire Muslim world." (leaflet 16) Also, "The Jews are brothers of monkeys, murderers of prophets, blood suckers, instigators of war...only Islam can break the Jews and destroy their dream." (leaflet 1)

Hamas frequently uses historical images and events taken from Islamic tradition in order to emphasize the religious character of the struggle with Israel. The names of Muslim commanders mentioned frequently in the leaflets are Khalid Abu-al-Walid, who fought in the battle of Yarmuq, in the year 634 and was named "the sword of God" by Muhammad; Salah-al-Din al-Ayyubi, who defeated the Crusaders in the battle of Hittin in 1187; the Royal Sultan Baybars, who also fought the Crusaders in the battle of 'Eyn-Harod in 1260, and Ja'far Abu-Talib, a friend of the prophet Muhammad, who fought the Byzantines in 629. According to Muslim tradition, Ja'far waved the flag in battle with his one hand. When it was cut off, he put it in his second hand. When that one was cut off, he held it to his chest and died.

In the leaflets of the Unified National Leadership, a different picture is drawn. Reality is perceived by them in secular, pluralistic terms. In the Unified's leaflets, which serve as a mouthpiece for the national trend, there is room for Christians and Muslims together. "Religion

is for Allah and the homeland is for everyone" (al-Din lillah wal-Watan lil-Jami'a), and not the perception of Hamas of "religion and the universe"—that is, that religion is everything. Therefore, in the Unified's leaflets, there are almost no heroes or events from the ancient Muslim history. There is ample mention in the leaflets of people from modern history who have become national heroes. Three frequently recurring names in these leaflets: Shaykh 'Izz-al-Din al-Qasim, who was killed by the British in 1935 and became the pioneer of the armed struggle in Palestine; the author and poet 'Isam Kanafani, who was killed during an IDF operation in Beirut in 1972, and 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni, slain in the battle of Qastal in 1948.

The leaflets go to great lengths to emphasize the tie between Muslims and Christians. Leaflet 22, for example, calls for "prayers for the exultation of the slain and participating in processions and protest demonstrations over the actions taken by the occupational forces against the places that are holy to Islam and Christianity." Leaflet three refers to the upcoming Christmas holiday in this language: "The day of 24 December is one for the ringing of church bells and the call of 'Allahu Akbar' from the turrets of the mosques to indicate the birthday of the messenger of peace, the anointed lord. We bless our Christian Palestinian brothers and ask them to be content with the fulfillment of the religious texts."

With the Unified, the struggle with Israel is perceived as a national struggle, not religious, while the leftist leaflets add the social-status aspect to the struggle. The reform of Palestinian society, it is stated in the Unified's leaflet 28, will come from the force of "self-determination and establishment of the independent state, whose capital is Arab Jerusalem for eternity," and not from the force of Palestinian reform of the universe, with the kingdom of Islam.

The Unified National Leadership even appeals to Israel, directly or indirectly, with practical requests from which we learn that the vision of Israel is pragmatic and not demonic, realistic and not mythological. A common example of the requests directed to Israel appears in leaflet 26. The leaflet demands "a cancellation of the regulations for emergencies from 1945...removal of the army from Palestinian population centers. Release of all prisoners of the uprising and the return of those expelled. Holding of free elections in all municipalities and local, municipal, and village councils under UN supervision. The ceasing of punitive measures...such as, economic blockade, destruction of houses, torture, expulsion, administrative detentions, and the establishment of Jewish settlements."

The leaflets frequently go out with appeals directed to the Israeli public, with an effort to explain why the intifadah broke out, and to clarify the need for a political arrangement. A striking example appears in leaflet 28: "Qawim (the Unified) emphasizes to the Israelis that our uprising...did not wish to spill Palestinian or Jewish

blood, but it was a revolt against the injustice of the occupation, its oppression, and fascism, and a national hope for the establishment of a just peace in our region, (peace) that will be determined only with the establishment of our Palestinian state on our national land. In addition to our demand from our national council to adopt real decisions and plans in order to support our people, to put an end to the occupation, and to establish our independent state, we are also taking advantage of the opportunity to emphasize the appeal that the PLO/Qawim made to the Israeli public recently, which called for the Arab and Israeli voters to choose the peace forces that support the right of our people to self-determination and the establishment of our independent state on its national land."

The difference between Hamas and the Unified National Leadership on the matter of the Palestinian state and the stand toward the political process has caused periods of tension and friction between them. As much as the Unified tended to support a political solution and as much as the PLO's activity increased in this direction, so did the differences of opinion between them become sharper, until Hamas was prepared to act without coordinating with the Unified. Therefore, in leaflet 25, the Unified goes out against the decision of Hamas to determine the days for a general strike on different days from those decided by the Unified, and it sees in this a blow to the unity of the ranks, as well as a blow to aid to Israel. However, the Unified even defended acts of violence against those who did not answer the call of Hamas to strike.

Hamas did not want to remain obligated. In leaflet 30, which they published, they cleanse themselves of all blame: "The Jews and their supporters are trying to split the ranks and plant dissension by spreading rumors that the Hamas movement is competing (with other movements) or is trying to be an alternate to them. In response to these poisonous rumors, we call to the people to look at the covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement in order to get to know it up close and to learn its goals. We repeat (and emphasize) that we are in favor of unity in the ranks, against a split, in favor of anyone who faithfully works for the sake of the liberation of Palestine, all of Palestine. We are against the surrender of even one handful of our land that is saturated with the blood of the friends of the prophet and those who follow him."

The tension between Hamas and the Unified mounted after the meeting of the National Palestinian Council in Algeria, in mid-November 1988, where they declared the establishment of a Palestinian state. In leaflet 19, whose headlines read "The Rejoicing of the Palestinian State," the Unified turns to "a number of fundamentalist factors (in a plea) to give preference to the interest and to cease the presentation of negative stands and revelations, which serve the enemy, whether they want to or not. They should draw conclusions from the many celebrations of the struggle in connection with the declaration of the (Palestinian) state that express the deep roots of its

legal leadership and our sole representative, the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It is still not too late to mix all of the loyal forces in the melting pot of the uprising and the Unified National Leadership." In response to this, Hamas repeats the claim that it is against splitting the ranks, and if there were such attempts, this is because of "leaflets planted in the Hamas movement distributed by the occupiers in order to divide the ranks and to tarnish the reputations of the (different) trends." And the crux: "(We) must protect the unity of the people. We cannot pay heed to the enemy's attempts to bring a split between families, clans, trends, and ideas." (leaflet 31)

The Hamas' response to the Unified's accusations attests to Hamas' complex treatment of the national trend. On one hand, Hamas does not hesitate to exacerbate the dissension between it and the Unified to the point of frontal confrontation. Such a confrontation would weaken the struggle in Israel and would harm the advancement of the goal of a Palestinian state. The hitch is that Hamas does not make a commitment that such a confrontation would not take place in the future, if, indeed, the Unified were a partner, together with the PLO, in a political arrangement that would mean conceding the principle of the liberation of all of Palestine.

The close-distant relations of Hamas toward the national trend are clarified in Hamas' covenant. The relationship between Hamas and the PLO is described as the close relations among family members: "The Palestinian Liberation Organization is one of the closest to the Islamic Resistance Movement. It has fathers, brothers, relatives, and friends. Can the Muslim abandon his relatives and friends? Our homeland is one, our trouble is one, and our fate is one." But, together with this, the secularism of the PLO is not to their liking: "We cannot change the Islamic nature of Palestine in the present and the future by adopting the secular idea. The Islamic nature of Palestine is part of our religion, and whoever relinquishes his religion loses." When the PLO adopts Islam as a way of life, "the position of the party toward the PLO will be as a son to his father, as brother to brother, and as relative to relative."

The ideological difference between Hamas on one side and the Unified and the PLO on the other creates the potential for a frontal confrontation and an irreparable tear in the relations between the two camps. However, besides the opposing interests on the ideological level, there is an awareness of the existence of common interests on the practical level in the daily struggle against the Israeli enemy. As long as Israel's military operations continue at full strength, and as long as the PLO version of the Palestinian state does not become crusted over with skin and sinew, the less chance there is that the ideological difference between Hamas and the Unified will develop into the proportions of an all-out war.



### The Question of Civil Disobedience

A second goal of the intifadah, for which the Unified National Leadership and Hamas are partners, is a weakening of the mechanisms of the Israeli government in the territories by civil disobedience that will result in driving Israel away from them. If there is known to be a significant difference between the Unified and Hamas regarding the designs of the Palestinian state, the political process, and the position toward Israel on the matter of civil disobedience, there is a closeness between the two. This closeness is expressed in the almost identical directives for the population in the matter of the activity that is required to be accomplished within the framework of the uprising.

The population is called upon to join in violent and nonviolent activity. The violent activity includes throwing stones and burning bottles, placing of barricades, burning tires, using knives and axes, clashes with IDF forces, and actions against collaborators. In order to ensure that this activity is indeed accomplished, strike forces operate within the framework of the Unified National Leadership (al-firag al-daribah). They are supposed to ensure the fulfillment of instructions not only in violent activities, but, also in matters connected to nonviolent activities.

A detailed description of the activities of the shock groups is found in leaflet 22 of the Unified. "The Unified National Leadership blesses the pressure groups for their active role against the occupational forces, its organizations, and its mechanisms, and against those who deviate from the will of the people. They are called upon to smite with an iron fist anyone who did not resign. They are asked to block the roads on days of general strikes and to permit only doctors' automobiles to pass. They must write national slogans...and sign only in the name of the Unified National Leadership. They must wave flags, organize demonstrations, burn tires, throw stones and Molotov cocktails."

Leaflet 26 appeals to the inhabitants for the "escalation of daily confrontations against the occupational troops and groups of Jewish settlers and damage to property belonging to the enemy." In the same leaflet, as well as in the preceding one, there is a call to act against collaborators with the Israeli authorities.

On the matter of nonviolent activity, we can distinguish between three types of directives to which the population is required to adhere:

1. Severance of contact with Israel in the areas of economy and services.
2. Disobedience of laws and regulations.
3. The existence of solidarity, meaningful activity.

The directives in the area of severance of contact with Israel include:

- Refraining from departures to work in Israel.

- Refraining from working in the Jewish settlements.
- Boycotting goods made in Israel.
- Withdrawal of deposits from Israeli banks.
- The resignation of local workers from their positions in the civil administration.
- The development of a domestic economy—the directive includes an appeal to the population to grow vegetables and raise livestock in their yards, as well as an appeal to farmers "to plant seeds and legumes, such as lentils, chick peas, broad beans, garlic, as well as wheat, etc., for storage." (leaflet 24 of the Unified)
- Expansion of local factories and absorption of new workers.
- The establishment and expansion of national committees for the affairs of education, propaganda, guarding, and agriculture.
- The maintenance and fostering of frameworks for "national education"—the directive targets parents, teachers, and students to maintain the study routine, despite the closing of educational institutions by the governing authorities for extended periods of time.

On the matter of nonadherence to the laws and regulations, the directives for action include:

- Evading tax payments.
- Evading the payment of fines.
- Partial trade strikes.
- General strikes on designated days.

In the realm of solidarity activity, the population, and, frequently groups from within it, are required to fulfill instructions whose substance is:

- Strike days and identifying with those arrested.
- Strike days and identifying with the families of the slain.
- Remembrance days for traumatic events, such as "Black September," that is, the civil war that broke out in September 1970; Sabra and Shatila, Qibiyah, and the establishment of the government of all Palestine in Gaza in September 1948, under the auspices of the Arab League.
- Coordination of the treatment of detainees by lawyers and the organization of press conferences on their behalf, in order to reveal detention conditions in the camps to the Israeli public and the world.
- Sit-down strikes of students, teachers, and parents at diplomatic consuls and closed schools.
- Doing volunteer work for farmers to help in the olive harvest.
- Helping needy families.
- Limiting rent increases.
- Lowering the cost of medical treatment collected by doctors and hospitals.
- Writing slogans and waving flags.

The longer the uprising continues, the greater the increase in the number of violent directives. In the first months of the outbreak of the intifadah, only 14 percent of all directives in the Unified's leaflets called for violent activity. Toward the end of 1988, the rate of violent



directives more than doubled in comparison to the beginning of the same year. With Hamas, a similar phenomenon is revealed, although the rate of increase is moderated: 30 percent of all directives at the beginning of 1988 and 40 percent toward its end were directives for violent activity.

In parallel, a drastic reduction is seen in the rate of directives calling for severing contact with Israel. In the first months of the intifadah, the rate of directives of this type stood at 27 percent with the Unified, and was reduced by more than double toward the end of 1988. With Hamas, the reduction was even more drastic: from 27 percent at the start of the intifadah to 5 percent with the end of the first year of the intifadah.

The increasing recognition on the part of the Palestinians in the matter of the secular role that violence plays in moving the wheels of the intifadah, and the political achievements that it amasses, explains the significant rise in violent directives in the leaflets of the Unified National Leadership and in maintaining a high, steady level of violent directives in Hamas' leaflets.

On the other hand, the test of the intifadah was dependent upon the economic stamina of the population. Lacking independent economic capability, the dependence on Israel has become a necessity for existence. Under these circumstances, great pressure to sever contact with Israel in the realm of economy and services is the type of decree that the public cannot withstand. This would mean a blow to the tens of thousands of workers who earn their living in Israel and to the income of many local merchants and factory owners who have commercial and economic ties with Israel. Too hard an economic blow to them could weaken the hold of the Unified and Hamas and could increase noncompliance and result in licentiousness. If we recall that the secret of the power of the intifadah is concealed in its ability to continually gain cooperation and in the response of all strata of the population, young and old alike, we would understand why what was perceived as ideologically improper has, with time, become economically unavoidable.

Lacking ability or lacking preparedness on the part of the merchants, factory owners, and workers to fulfill the many directives calling for economic severance with Israel has brought both the Unified and Hamas to adapt themselves to the circumstances of the times. As the data show, the more that time has passed, the fewer the directives in the matter of severing contact with Israel. Directives of this type continued to appear, but they became more selective and specific. This is the shape of things on the subject of work in Israel and on the matter of boycotting goods made in Israel.

The continual decline in the number of directives calling for severing contact with Israel in the realm of the economy and services teaches us about the sobering awareness that has taken hold within the Unified and Hamas regarding the limitation of the power of the intifadah. This awareness even explains why, despite the

great importance that they attached to violent activity, the two have been wary of calling for comprehensive civil disobedience and have preferred to reindoctrinate that the uprising is a phase toward a comprehensive uprising.

The examined civil disobedience, as well as the continuing decline in the scope of directives calling for the severance of economic contact with Israel, attest, therefore, that the intifadah's leadership has enough half-tones contrary to the Palestinian vision. They are aware of considerations of loss and profit and are not so venturesome to the point of absurdity in the formation of its goals. Crossing the threshold in recognition of the limitations of its strength, and taking care not to boil over with a confrontation with Israel to the point of no return—this is guiding its considerations. The leadership of the intifadah is not free of internal contradiction and opposing interests. But, together with all this, they have been intelligent enough to find ways that will enable them to live with contradictions and oppositions without being destroyed by them.

#### Courses of Actions and the Ability to Continue

The source of the intifadah's strength is its success in creating a merge and the establishment of cooperation between the middle classes and the young radicals: between the merchants, businessmen, factory owners, doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other white-collar workers and the generation of the Rolling Stones which absorbed its instruction in the universities of the West Bank, in the mosques of the Gaza Strip, and in youth movements. The young generation was in the territory even before the outbreak of the intifadah. But the conditions for cooperation between it and the middle classes did not ripen as long as there was an accepted and effective local leadership. This leadership could not protect the middle classes from the radical pressures of the young. The weakened stand of the local leadership to the point of the removal of many from within it created a void to which the young were drawn. In such a situation, there was no one to protect the middle classes. They were drawn, almost without choice, into intifadah-style radical activity.

The integration between the young and the merchants, and the rest of the middle classes, explains the force of the outbreak, but does not explain its continuity. The merchants are losing and are even complaining. The same applies to the free professionals. Their interests do not coincide with the interests of the young who are filled with national fervor and the desire for sacrifice. Therefore, continually recurring instructions appear in the leaflets and appeal to the merchants to pay heed to the business hours in accordance with those stated in the leaflets or not to raise prices, and there are also repeated appeals to the local workers in the civil administration to resign—and they attest to the great measure of unrest within these groups.

If the intifadah has continued, despite this, through a joining of arms between the middle classes and the young, this is due to the ability of the leading bodies to make good use of a number of mechanisms that reduced the danger of a split and made possible the continuation of momentum. A study of the leaflets shows three such mechanisms: organizational instruments, economic means, and symbolic rewards.

### **The Organizational and Economic Realm**

We can learn from the leaflets that the intifadah is characterized by decentralized activity that places an emphasis on local activity. This is borne on the shoulders of the national committees that arose during the uprising. They expanded to hundreds in the urban neighborhoods, in villages, and refugee camps throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As interpreted from the leaflets of the Unified National Leadership, these committees serve as an executive agency. Their role is to ensure that directions are followed in the spirit of the directives in the leaflets, as well as to look after the daily needs of the population that is subject to military and economic pressures from Israel. The existence of the committees permits close supervision using persuasive measures or means of coercion and pressure, if needed, against those who refuse to heed instructions.

We can also learn from the leaflets of the broad variety of committees organized by profession or geographic location. Among the professional committees appearing in the leaflets are merchant committees, medical committees, judicial committees, and committees to deal with prisoners. Among those mentioned based on geographical location are neighborhood committees, guarding, and defense committees that arose following the resignation of police, and committees for mutual assistance. In addition to these committees, the shock groups operate. They are supposed to ensure that instructions are followed and, if need be, to punish those who are not prepared to heed the directives. Besides the executive agency on the local level, we can point out organizations that existed before the outbreak of the intifadah, and their activity interlaces with the activity of the national committees. Among them are organizations of women, workers, students, charitable and relief organizations, and religious organizations, as well.

The extensive activity of these organizations among the population has chewed away at the authority and weakened the position of the offices of the Israeli government. The committees have become, to a large extent, parallel government offices that draw encouragement and cooperation from the local population. The leadership of the uprising has paid attention also to the economic realm. This matter was expressed by the distribution of funds to those who were wounded as a result of Israel's actions, such as the families of the slain, the wounded, the expelled, and those whose houses were destroyed, or by the directives that were intended to reduce the economic damage among the population.

Commercial strikes are, for the most part, partial; the boycott of goods made in Israel is selective, as are the instructions to avoid working in Israel. The leaflets even go to great lengths to publish directives intended to give the population a sense that, indeed, the leadership of the uprising is aware of their straits and is doing everything in its power to divide the economic burden among them all. Examples of this are the directives calling for property owners to defer the due date for payment of rent for whomever cannot afford it and even not to raise it. They also call for those who can afford it not to refrain from paying on time. In a similar spirit, the leaflets appeal to doctors and hospital not to raise the costs of treatment and to lawyers to avoid raising their fees.

Here stands out the effort to give the entire population a sense of participation in a historical process of utmost national importance. The leaflets go to great lengths to boost the activity of the entire population, and to praise its great contribution to the achievements of the intifadah. The achievements, as they appear from the viewpoint of the leaflets, are numerous and varied.

In the economic realm, the intifadah has caused Israel, according to the Unified, \$2 billion in damages. Militarily, the intifadah has proved that Israel cannot withstand the stone and the Molotov cocktail. Two-thirds of the Israeli army is occupied with quelling disturbances. Israeli soldiers need psychological treatment. One of the Unified's leaflets even quotes Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, who claimed that it is impossible to defeat the intifadah by force. In the civilian realm, the leaflets praise the "breakdown of the mechanisms and tools" of the Israeli government in the territories and the construction of the mechanisms for the "national government."

In the political realm, the leaflets emphasize the intifadah's contribution toward bringing the Palestinian problem to international attention and the diplomatic damage and the internal split that it has caused Israel. In leaflet 30 of the Unified it is stated: "The magic of the heroic deeds of our many munificent people, through the tiger's roar over the force of the occupation, its tyranny, and evil, was the primary factor that lifted our Palestinian problem to the top of international, Arab, and domestic attention. In such a way, the Palestinian problem has become a topic in every diplomatic and political meeting and conversation in all corners of the earth. At the same time, the hateful occupation has caused situations of political and social splits and divisions due to the continuation and escalation of the uprising."

In addition to all these, the leaflets praise the sense of pride, the joint fate and proud bearing that the intifadah has bestowed upon the Palestinian population in the territories. The intifadah, which began as an unintentional, spontaneous outbreak, rose on a track of intensive and continued activity, whose participants came from all strata of the population. The collective resistance, willingness for personal sacrifice, and proud national

bearing in the presence of harsh means of punishment taken by Israel were the outstanding achievements of the intifadah.

The central figures standing behind the activity—the Unified National Leadership and the PLO, on one side, and Hamas, the Islamic Mujma', and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other, succeeded in ensuring a large measure of adherence to the directives and achieved a broad response on the part of the population. The organizational tools, the national committees, and shock groups reduced the capacity for deviation by possible opposers among the middle classes and pushed the indecisive into compliance with instructions. While the use of persuasive means on those who are indecisive—through controlled directives in the economic realm and in giving a sense of a shared responsibility as well as in emphasizing their participation in the political gains that bestowed pride and national honor—has increased their willingness for vigorous activity.

The Israeli failure to crush the intifadah is caught in the difficulty in finding an effective and quick answer to the mechanisms of coercion and persuasion that the organizations standing behind the uprising perform upon the Palestinian population in the territories. The source of this difficulty is in both political coercions as well as internal disagreements, within the judicial limitations and moral considerations that guide the political and military echelons in Israel. On the assumption that all these will continue to dictate the character of the Israeli activity against the intifadah, and on the assumption that the continuation of such activity will make it difficult for Israel to prevent the organizations supporting it from continuing to achieve adherence and a response from the population, political dialogue is unavoidable. For if not, this war of the club against the stone will never cease, the leaflets will flourish, and the intifadah will continue to be like a millstone around Israel's neck.

## BAHRAIN

### Government Dictating Baharainization

44000620a Manama GULF DAILY NEWS  
in English 12 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by Soman Baby]

[Text] The Labour Ministry is ordering 400 private companies to provide jobs for 20,000 Bahrainis over the next five years. Each company is being told to recruit a certain number of Bahrainis to selected positions every year.

"The plan doesn't envisage that non-Bahrainis occupying those positions should be necessarily replaced, but the agreed number of Bahrainis must be absorbed," said 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Zayyani, Director of Labour.

"The companies are allowed to retain or even increase the number of expatriates depending on their growth, but our concern is to find jobs for Bahrainis," he added.

Mr al-Zayyani said that 400 companies and establishments had been identified by a Labour Ministry committee to implement the programme.

"Letters have been delivered to 235 companies, and the remaining will be given within two months," he said.

The letters contain the details of job classification as well as the number of Bahrainis to be employed in each category, according to a time schedule.

Mr al-Zayyani said the size of the companies, the nature of work, and the aptitude and ability of Bahrainis to occupy the positions available, had been taken into account.

### Flexible

"After studying the programmes, the companies may present their proposals to the Labour Ministry, and we could be flexible according to the circumstances in each company," said Mr al-Zayyani.

In a speech to mark May Day earlier this year, Labour Minister, Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-Salman Ibn-Muhammad Al-Khalifah said that the plan was to replace a third of the 60,000 expatriates working in the private sector with Bahrainis in five years.

He also said that 13 categories of jobs which Bahrainis could eventually take over from expatriates had been identified.

They include administrators, supervisors, engineers, technicians, computer operators, nurses, clerks, accountants, secretaries, drivers, sales and marketing people, and hotel and restaurant workers.

### Private Industry Urged To Invest in Tourism Sector

44000620b Manama GULF DAILY NEWS  
in English 12 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by David King]

[Text] Private industry is being urged to invest in Bahrain's growing tourism industry. The message came from the Directorate of Tourism's new superintendent of tourism relations, Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-'Abdallah Al-Khalifah.

He said that there was ample opportunity for industry to join hand-in-hand with the directorate in shaping Bahrain's future.

"We would like to see the private sector support the tourism industry," said Shaykh Khalifah.

**Involved**

"We are trying to pull industry with us, as the Government cannot do everything by itself. There must be private companies involved," he said.

Shaykh Khalifah said that there was vast scope for industry to join in partnership with the Government.

He said the directorate had a number of projects in the pipeline to expand the island's tourism infrastructure.

But there were many more which could be fulfilled with industry's support, he said.

"We will support the private sector 100 per cent. I am sure their investment will earn a good return, as we hope to attract many more tourists to Bahrain in the future," said Shaykh Khalifah.

He said that the Directorate had targeted the European market as its prime source of tourists, but would eventually look further afield, to America and Japan.

Currently there are between one and two million visitors to Bahrain each year, a figure which Shaykh Khalifah said would grow in leaps and bounds during the next decade.

"Just give us another five to eight years to allow us to develop the industry," said Shaykh Khalifah.

"But when we go to Europe, we really have something to sell, especially in the winter when the temperatures there are below zero.

"The weather in Bahrain is fine then, and we have found that Europeans are interested in archaeology and history, that they are looking for a bit of sun and different culture," he said.

But Shaykh Khalifah warned that Bahrain's culture should not be sacrificed at the expense of tourism.

**Expansion of Islands Smelter Decided**

44000623 Doha GULF TIMES  
in English 26 Jul 89 p 11

[Text] Abu Dhabi: Bahrain plans to delay modernizing its oil refinery and use foreign loans to expand its aluminum smelter instead, according to Gulf oil and financial sources.

"You cannot chew more than a mouthful at once," a banker told Reuters. The smelter project will cost \$1.4 billion and the refinery modernization more than \$1 billion, the sources said.

"Bahrain gave priority to expand the capacity of the smelter because its neighbors are entering the same game," an oil industry source said.

The sources said 85 percent of the smelter expansion cost is likely to be financed by borrowing, much of it from international banks and equipment suppliers.

A syndicated loan of about \$500 million will be arranged by the end of 1989, the sources said.

The smelter run by Aluminum Bahrain BSC (Alba) will produce 400,000 tonnes of aluminum a year by the end of the four-year project. A programme is already under way to boost output to 205,000 tonnes a year from 170,000.

Earlier this month Bahrain said it raised its stake in Alba from 57.9 percent to 74.9 percent. Saudi Arabia holds 20 percent and Breton Investments of West Germany 5.1 percent.

Industry sources have said Saudi Arabia plans to build a 240,000-tonne a year smelter. Qatar also aims to build one and Dubayy aims to expand its existing one of about 170,000 tonnes a year.

All the countries will benefit from having cheap natural gas, used extensively by smelters.

The sources said Bahrain would delay for at least a year plans to modernize its Bahrain Petroleum Company BSC (BAPCO) refinery, which has a capacity of 250,000 barrels a day (b/d).

They said modernization would lower the sulphur content of the refined oil. Bapco would also produce less heavy fuel oil and more lighter products such as petrol, which well at a higher price.

"In a few years time Bahrain might not be able to find a market for its products with this high sulphur content," an oil industry executive in the Gulf said. Many countries control sulphur emissions to protect the environment.

The sources said Bapco might build a unit to extract sulphur at a lower cost than the planned total upgrading.

Bahrain owns 60 percent of Bapco and Caltex Petroleum Corp 40 percent.

Saudi Arabia supplies more than 200,000 b/d of crude oil to Bapco to supplement just over 40,000 b/d produced domestically.

Bankers said Bahrain could finance the smelter project and the refinery modernization at the same time but preferred not to approach international banks for financing in the same year.

**EGYPT****Organization Blames US for Israeli 'Violence'**

45000180 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Jul 89 p 5

[Text] The Egyptian Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Committee, under the chairmanship of Ahmad Hamrush has announced that the United States bears the greatest responsibility for the continuing Israeli violence in the occupied territories. The United States continues to offer material and moral support to Israel, despite the

fact that the PLO offers all assurances that it is ready to accept a peaceful, just solution recognizing the existence of the Palestinian state alongside Israel.

This came in a communique issued by the committee that explained that the position of Israeli Prime Minister Shamir toward the uprising in the occupied territories is irresponsibly undermining international public opinion and international organizations.

### **African Diplomat Reportedly Deported on Spy Charges**

*JN1308171289 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic  
12 Aug 89 p 1*

[Text] Cairo—AL-ANBA' has learned that a secretary of an African embassy in Cairo has been deported after being caught, together with two other persons, in a network spying for the [Israeli] Mosad in Cairo. The network's mission was to collect information about the Egyptian Armed Forces.

### **Defense Minister Encourages Local Arms Manufacturing**

*45040429b Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI  
in Arabic 25 Jul 89 p 5*

[Article by Husayn Fathallah: "At Graduation of Students at Military Technical College Abu-Talib Says, 'Our Military Policy Depends on Manufacturing Weapons Locally, Diversifying Weapons Sources;' Attention Given to Academic Preparation of Graduating Students; Efforts Being Made To Manufacture Egyptian-Arab Weapon"]

[Text] Gen Yusuf Sabri Abu-Talib, minister of defense and military production and general commander of the armed forces, announced that Egypt's military policy depends on manufacturing advanced weapons locally and on diversifying weapons sources. He said that the state has never been reluctant to give the armed forces the funds that are necessary to purchase the weapons they need for their various missions. In building the armed forces the state followed the most modern standards of preparing the armed forces scientifically in a manner that is consistent with requirements for the future. Gen Abu-Talib affirmed that Egypt was on its way to manufacture an Egyptian-Arab weapon. He said that the phrase, "Made in Egypt," could then be applied to that weapon.

At a ceremony celebrating the graduation of a new class of students from the Technical Military College and the graduation of a group of students from the fraternal country of Sudan, Gen Abu-Talib indicated that the weapons and equipment which were available to the graduating students were to be considered something they were to hold in trust, protect, and add to. He addressed the graduating students and said, "The knowledge you offer your country and Arab countries, now that you have acquired that knowledge at this major

academic institution, will ultimately pave the way to that time when Arabs shall be of one mind, when they shall have the same knowledge, and when they shall have the same weapon."

Gen Abu-Talib said, "Now that you have taken this oath, you have joined the ranks of the armed forces as fighters. You have now enriched yourselves with knowledge and with the highest degrees of learning. From your midst will emerge a long line of scientists, who will be capable of designing, producing and developing. What you have learned will enable you to preserve, maintain, and repair the equipment of the armed forces. What you have learned will give you the tools for scientific research. In the final analysis, however, you remain fighters, and that is one thing you must never forget for as long as you serve in the armed forces."

Gen Abu-Talib advised the graduating students to remember always that they are just starting their quest for knowledge. He advised them that they must always learn more. He told them to remember that keeping up their technical and tactical skills by using weapons would go a long way in helping them achieve success. Development and innovation would then follow.

Maj Gen Muhammad Khulusi, an engineer and director of the college, delivered a speech in which he said, "The graduating students have been provided with the most modern technology in the world. They are thus qualified to handle the most sophisticated modern weapons and the most advanced equipment which has been furnished to the armed forces."

He indicated that the new class of graduates included a group of students from the fraternal country of Sudan, and he said that the college had prepared those students to join the army of the fraternal country of Sudan. Maj Gen Khulusi said that the college had awarded numerous master's degrees and doctorates and that it had held scores of graduate courses for officers and engineers in all the branches of the armed forces.

The celebration had started with a procession of college students marching in review. After reciting the college's motto, "Faith, Knowledge, Work," the students presented a karate demonstration. The students also demonstrated the art of self-defense, and the arts of the special forces, the al-Sa'iqah Group.

After the result was announced (99.4 percent for the Egyptians in the class and 100 percent for the Sudanese), the general commander of the armed forces gave his consent to awarding the graduating students of the Class of June 1989 bachelor's degrees in engineering and certificates showing that they completed military studies.

When the ceremonies of turning over the command from the college's 26th class to the 27th class were completed, it was announced that the president and commander in

chief of the armed forces had approved the graduates' appointment on probation at the rank of 1st Lieutenant as of 1 July.

At the conclusion of the ceremony the minister of defense and military production awarded the top student in the graduating class the medal of military duty, second class. The minister then visited the exhibit which was being held at the college and which contained the graduation projects that were completed by the graduating students.

### **Petroleum Minister Signs Oil Exploration Agreements**

45040249c Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH  
in Arabic 18 Jul 89 p 4

[Article by Nasir al-Ba'thi: "13 New Oil Exploration Agreements; Drilling Costs To Be \$459 Million"]

[Text] Mr 'Abd-al-Hadi Qandil, minister of petroleum and mineral resources, who is also a chemist, is to sign 13 new agreements for oil exploration during the coming period. The agreements cover an area of 36,960 kilometers, and that area includes al-Sallum, the western desert, central Sinai, the Gulf of Suez, northeast Shuqayr, and the southwest Delta.

Seven of these agreements to explore and drill for oil and gas in the Delta, the Gulf of Suez, and the western desert will be signed today. The agreements call for 82 wells to be drilled: 11 of these wells will be drilled in the western desert; 8 will be in central Sinai; 31 will be in the Gulf of Suez area; and 32 wells will be drilled in the Delta. Twelve international companies are participating in the implementation of the agreements.

The agreements cover territory whose area amounts to 36,960 kilometers. This territory covers the areas of al-Sallum; the western desert; central Sinai; the Gulf of Suez; northeast Shuqayr; and the eastern, western, and southern parts of the Delta. The companies will spend up to \$270.5 million to search for oil. In addition, they will pay \$188.4 million in grants: \$164 million will go for production grants, and \$24.4 million will go for periodical grants which will be awarded to search for oil at intervals of time expanding from 3 to 9 years. It has been determined that the agreements would remain in effect for a 20-year term which, at the companies' request, may be extended for another 5 years.

### **Delegation Explains New Investment Law to Gulf States**

45040424A London AL-HAWADITH  
in Arabic 21 Jul 89 p 39

[Text] An Egyptian economic delegation has visited the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to explain the new advantages of the new investment law in Egypt.

During the tour, the delegation held a number of meetings with Gulf businessmen and investors and informed

them about investment opportunities in Egypt and about the facilities that the new investment law insures.

The delegation met with members of the Egyptian communities in the Gulf states and informed them about the map of investment projects in Egypt, especially small projects with a quick return, to encourage them toward profitable investment in their country in light of the current tendency that aims at removing all obstacles in order to provide new work opportunities serving the goals of the Egyptian development plan.

It should be mentioned that the new law provides for freedom to transfer profits abroad, increases tax exemptions to 20 years, instead of 10, and exempts the free zones from being subject to the taxes and duties law and the law of title deeds.

The law gives the General Authority for Investment broad powers to solve investors' problems. The authority may allot land necessary for projects, conclude contracts for this purpose on behalf of the relevant agencies, and obtain the necessary permits for building, managing, and operating the project from relevant government agencies on behalf of project owners.

### **Ambassadors to FRG, UAE Assume Duties**

#### **Ra'uf to FRG**

45000169 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 26 Jun 89 p 6

[Text] The government of Unionist Germany [FRG] has agreed to the appointment of Ambassador Ahmad Ra'uf Mansur Ghunaym as extraordinary ambassador commissioned to it by the Arab Republic of Egypt.

#### **'Uthman to UAE**

45000169 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 28 Jun 89 p 6

[Text] Ambassador Fakhri 'Uthman, the new Egyptian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates [UAE], will leave Cairo for the UAE the day after tomorrow to assume his duties there.

After yesterday's reception for him by minister of state for foreign affairs Dr Butrus Ghali, the ambassador stated that relations between Shaykh Zayid and President Mubarak are strong and brotherly, strongly supporting relations between the two countries in all areas.

### **Agreements Signed To Develop Domestic Uranium**

51004607 Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH  
in Arabic 2 Aug 89 p 6

[Report by Faruq 'Abd-al-'Aziz]

[Text] The Nuclear Materials Authority has begun to develop uranium ore in recently discovered areas and determine future quantities for mining and use. This

comes after the discovery of ore in the areas of Jabal Qatar, (al-Mustat), al-'Aridah, and Um Qar in the Eastern Desert.

Dr Husayn 'Abd-al-Muhsin, chairman of the authority, said that operations to develop uranium ore require digging tunnels to trace the ore veins in the rock.

The Ministry of Electricity has signed several technical cooperation agreements with Australia, Canada, and Niger for advanced technology transfer in the fields of mining and uranium ore development, with the intention of providing the nuclear fuels needed for the Egyptian nuclear power-generating program, should the government agree to it.

### **Ummah Party Split Over Leader, Executive Committee**

45040465b Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR  
in Arabic 28 Jul 89 p 19

[Article by Majdi al-Daqqaq: "True Nature of Split in al-Ummah Party"]

[Text] Controversy continues in al-Ummah Party over the legitimacy of the party chairman and of its Executive Committee now that a number of party members have withdrawn their confidence from Ahmad al-Sabahi and that a new Executive Committee has been formed. Meanwhile, al-Sabahi has denounced this departure from the "legitimacy," stressing that these members lost their membership when they were dismissed from the party last June.

Formation of al-Ummah Party was announced in 1983 and the party has only 150 members throughout the republic. The party convened its latest congress last March in the presence of 67 members only. Al-Sabahi, who is 74 years old, is the party chairman and secretary general. Samir, al-Sabahi's oldest son who lives in the United States permanently, is the party deputy chairman. The party's second deputy chairman is Judah 'Abd-al-Hamid Salim, al-Sabahi's brother-in-law. Shaykh al-Sabahi's youngest son, an employee of al-Nasr Car Company, holds the position of assistant secretary general and youth secretary. Suhayr, al-Sabahi's daughter, holds the position of the party's women's secretary.

What has happened in al-Ummah Party cannot be viewed as a real reform similar, for example, to the reform that occurred in the Labor Party. Engineer Diyab Ramadan, who has been elected by the new Executive Committee as the party chairman in place of al-Sabahi, has said that the former party chairman failed for several years in building up the party. The party has no party bases and no leaderships and it has been merely exploited by al-Sabahi as a slogan to serve his personal objectives.

However, dissidents within the party insist that the developments constitute a new turning point for the

party and that the real reasons behind their position is that al-Sabahi amended the party constitution, imposing new restrictions that serve his objectives. These include holding elections in 5 years instead of 3 years, giving himself absolute powers to expel members without investigation, accepting no new members and permitting no candidates to run for higher leadership positions in the party's internal organizations. Al-Sabahi also imposed the condition that the party chairman must be one of the founders and older than 50, a condition which he alone meets.

The dissidents also view their decision to oust al-Sabahi and to amend the constitution as an endeavor to revive the party. According to their statements, they plan to expand the membership and to imbue the party practices with a democratic character so that the party may be able to seriously participate in the political action through the legitimate and constitutional channels.

But al-Sabahi clings to his position and to his announcement that the dissidents' connection with the party ended because they have not paid their membership dues as of last July. Al-Sabahi has also announced that he welcomes the dispatch of a committee from the Central Accounting Agency to examine the party papers and records. It is well known that Lawyer Muhammad Abu-al-Fadl al-Jizawi, a leader of the Socialist Labor Party, has hosted the congress of the "Democratic al-Ummah Party," which is the name the dissidents have given themselves.

Some sources have said that the members of the new Executive Committee of the Democratic al-Ummah Party will seize the party's main offices in implementation of the resolutions of their congress. However, these events will remain within the limits of their current dimensions. The fact is that these developments reflect disagreement among 67 members in a party which includes no more than 150 members.

### **Labor Party Leader Comments on Iran, Arab Unity**

45040360a Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 9 May 89 p 6

[Interview with Ahmad Shawqi, Secretary of the Labor Party executive committee, by Mahmud Bakri; date, place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [AL-SHA'B] The charge is made that the line presently being taken by the Labor Party amounts to blind imitation of the Iranian model of Islamic practice, a model on which many observations could be made... To what extent is this statement true?

[SHAWQI] First; the Iranian model of practical implementation is not known to the vast majority of Egyptians, for reasons due to the stringent media blackout.

Secondly; we derive our information on the Iranian model from Western information sources which harbor

for Islam, and for any Islamic model, a deep animosity. So much for general observations.

With particular reference to the Labor Party, we are an Egyptian party in flesh and blood, heart and mind, thought and action, and Islam for us is a general framework that governs the thinking and conduct of the party. I believe there is no such thing as Iranian Islam or Egyptian Islam or Saudi Islam; Islam is Islam, and any disagreement lies in models of practical implementation.

We in the Labor Party cannot believe in imitating Iran or anyone else. Here in Egypt we have genuine Islamic roots; we are the country of al-Azhar, as a nation we are among the most important Islamic states in the Islamic world and, in my view, those who say such things as you have referred to are fanciers of ideas imported from the outside.

### The Socio-Cultural Agenda

[AL-SHA'B] Lam'i al-Mati'i, in an essay published by the newspaper AL-WAFD, considers that, at its present stage, Egyptian society carries within it the embryo of a new socio-cultural agenda for the special character of Egyptian society, its history, traditions, its religious values. It is said to be an agenda for social justice, one with an enlightened relationship with the requirements imposed by the domestic, inter-Arab and worldwide situation, and one with which, in his view, Egypt will enter the twenty-first century. He presents this as though it was in opposition to the Labor Party. Does the Party differ with regard to this socio-cultural agenda?

[SHAWQI] Lam'i al-Mati'i refers to the socio-cultural agenda without making it sufficiently clear what it is that we can possibly agree or disagree about. In the nature of things, however, when a crisis situation becomes ingrained in a nation, then it is essential for that nation to seek a way of extricating itself from its plight. If it does not do so, the crisis will exact a heavy toll, because the logic of things and the common practice of life is that no condition should be permanent. Crisis or tranquillity cannot persist in an unbroken line, and history is replete with examples of great states which have become second-class states and vice-versa.

Hence I would say that the crisis can have two alternative outcomes; either the entire Egyptian people will rise up to contain it and deal with it forcefully in order to resolve it, or the crisis will resolve itself. How different the two alternatives are! With the first, the crisis will be under human control, and men will formulate the appropriate solutions to cope with it. With the second alternative, it is the crisis that will hold men in subjection to the solution, and it will make them the powerless means and instruments of that solution. In other words, it will deprive them of the will to control.

[AL-SHA'B] But...what is the solution?

[SHAWQI] The problem will solve itself through disasters, disease and the various natural phenomena that

impose on people a solution. A solution imposed by people, however, will come about through restraint, reform, association, and other factors.

This requires a socio-cultural agenda. And here there emerges the importance of the fact that the socio-cultural agenda with which Egypt will enter the twenty-first century should be a successful one, in that it must be capable of coping with Egypt's dilemma. Accordingly, the view of the Labor Party is that the optimum agenda is that which adopts Islam as an all-embracing framework governing Egyptian action and that Islam should be the major guiding force of such a socio-cultural agenda.

For example; we are now taking action, but the question is: What will be the outcome of such action? The value of Islam in that connection is that it demands of the worker good workmanship, of the merchant that he should be compassionate and renounce greed, of the ruler justice and equity and consideration for the good of his subjects—over and above the essential and fundamental values of Islam which can create a society. This is because we in Egypt are not at present living as a society at all. I would claim rather that the Egyptians are 45 million people who form a population in the demographic sense but do not form a society. A society has specific features and characteristics, the most significant of which is a dominant pattern of values. Those values are cohesion, solidarity, cooperation, and sacrifice for others, and all of them are values which create a communal feeling binding citizens to each other and creating from a demographic grouping a homogeneous society capable of coping with problems as a single man.

In this connection, we must refer to those writings published in the media by psychologists and sociologists specializing in such matters. They all agree that contemporary Egyptian life lacks social bonds. To ascertain that fact, we have only to look at the conduct of Egyptians at the present time and the kinds of crimes that the newspapers bring to our attention every day, all evidence of the extent of social disintegration from which Egypt is suffering. All of these factors call insistently for a socio-cultural agenda based on this nation's Islam.

### Labor and the Muslim Brotherhood

[AL-SHA'B] There is a view that, in the event that the Muslim Brotherhood should insist on forming its own party and the alliance with you is then dissolved, the result would be the break-up of the Labor Party because its alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood has had negative repercussions on it and on its activities in the political arena. What is your view of that?

[SHAWQI] I see it as the other way around, because the Labor Party has its own personality and its own distinctive approach, and this is known to the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. The proponents of such views want us in the Labor Party to attack the alliance and the Muslim Brotherhood in order to demonstrate our independence and defend our identity so that the alliance will be weakened and dissolved instead of its prospects



gaining strength within the framework of the ten-point program announced. Apart from those ten points, we have shown a degree of intellectual difference, and it is altogether natural that we should differ to such an extent. They have not merged with us and we have not merged with them, but we have formed an alliance in order to attain agreed political goals. [passage omitted]

### The Arabs and Islam

[AL-SHA'B] What about the Party's view of the issue of Arab and Islamic unity?

[SHAWQI] The Labor Party has no need to stress the fact that it is an Arab-Islamic party or to emphasize that outlook repeatedly.

At the time when Egypt had somewhat poor relations with many Arab countries, the Labor Party stressed that Egypt was an Arab state whose security was linked with Arab security—that its security was an integral part of Arab security. This is a conviction that the Labor Party takes as a basic premise...in both thought and action.

The Islamic approach to be adopted cannot be separated from this Arab affiliation, because it is also the relation of a part to the whole. We consider the Arab world to be the heart and nucleus of the Islamic world. We do not wish this question to be a matter of disputation or wrangling, because those that raise it must be fully aware that to do so causes rifts and divisiveness which we desperately need to repudiate. We also need cohesion and mutual assistance, since the world around us is moving quickly and forcefully towards the creation and formation of large groupings which will leave no room for small entities to survive.

### Jihad Leader Describes Arrests, Incarceration

45040465a Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 8 Aug 89 p 8

[Article by Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim: "From Disciplinary Ward to Engineers Union and Humanitarian Associations: Intervene, They Are Killing Us"]

[Text] From the graveyard of the living and the home of the tortured, from Egypt's Bastille which witnessed the 1981 massacres, from the Turrhah Prison disciplinary ward I write to the Egyptian and Islamic public opinion about the tragedy which is being experienced by this country's citizens. I have been destined to experience some of the ugly events or bitter chapters of this tragedy which is embodied in renewed detention for the 10th time, ugly torture and threats of murder inside the prison.

My story begins at the time when I was released on 8 September 1988 after 7 years of incarceration in Turrhah Prison in the Jihad case. My release from prison coincided with one of the harshest periods experienced by the political prisoners in Turrhah Prison following the escape of al-Qamari and his colleagues. I personally went through the acts of mass annihilation [as published]

against our brothers there, beginning with the denial of visits, medical care, and exercise and ending with the burning of personal belongings and of the library and the denial of clothing and bedding, and so forth. My freedom did not last long because the minister of interior re-arrested me nearly a month later (15 October 1988). I appealed to the judiciary and was released. But the minister of interior arrested me anew. The 'Ayn Shams incidents then occurred in December 1988 and I found myself heading the 'Ayn Shams organization in case No 120 of 1989. I appeared before the court and was absolved. But the minister of interior arrested me a third, fourth and fifth time. For 10 months, I have lived between arrest and re-arrest.

I wish the matter ended at this. Between one arrest and another, I have been forced to report to the police departments of al-Khalifah, Qina and Asyut and the security squads in al-Ghardaqah. The law requires the minister of interior to release me but the minister circumvents the law every time, releasing me only to make me report to the various police departments and then be brought back to jail. This has recurred after each arrest. In this period, I was taken to Lazughli [Prison] 4 times and subjected to extreme torture every time. I was beaten mercilessly and subjected to electric shocks. My beard was plucked, I was disrobed and showered with cold water and was subjected to other barbaric methods to which my body still attests. It suffices that I continue to urinate pus and blood as a result of the electric shocks. The attorneys have submitted numerous reports to the attorney general but nobody has made a move. In Lazughli, a state security officer told me: You have two options: Either emigrate from Egypt or die in jail. We will not shoot you. We will simply dump you into a cell and isolate you from life until you depart on a stretcher.

God knows that I thought that this was just a threat to intimidate me. But with the passage of time, I realized that they were actually serious about killing me. I have been in detention for 10 months despite the court orders. I still live in a solitary cell in the disciplinary ward allocated for hardened criminals. I am only allowed to leave my cell once [a day] to go to the toilet. A month ago, they surrounded the disciplinary ward with a high wall that does not allow sunlight or fresh breeze to enter the ward. They have separated me from my colleagues with whom I used to converse through windows. They have also sealed the door slot through which the guard made sure that his prey was still alive. They have isolated me completely from the prison world and have denied me newspapers and radio, meaning that they have also isolated me completely from the outside world. I am dead while still alive. I have developed skin and rheumatic ailments, not to mention poor eyesight. This has compelled the lawyers to complain to al-Ma'adi Prosecution Office, accusing Muhammad 'Awad, the prison warden, Mustafa 'Umar, an intelligence officer, and Nabil 'Uthman, director of the Prisons Authority, of killing me in jail. This condition is what has motivated me to address this message to the Engineers Union, of

which I am a member, and to all the international organizations concerned with human rights to rescue me from this gang and to draw the attention of the Muslim public opinion and of Egypt's honorable writers so that they may do their duty by this country's afflicted citizens. This is not a personal issue. There are tens of others like me. There are 50 juveniles from 'Ayn Shams who have been in detention for 9 months, who have been re-arrested 4 times and who expect to be arrested for a fifth time. Next to me, there are youths who have been re-arrested 6 times since August 1988, i.e. in one full year, and they expect to be arrested for a seventh time. They include Hamdi al-Kiki, Hasan Abu-al-Hajjaj and Muhammad 'Atiyah al-Azhari. I also have with me here in Egypt's graveyard the youths from 'Ayn Shams who have been in detention for one and ½ years. These youths have been re-arrested 9 times and they expect to be arrested a 10th time. They include Muhammad 'Abduh, Husayn al-Khudari, Ahmad Kamil Jum'ah and numerous others. We have all developed skin, chest and rheumatic ailments as a result of the humid cells. We have also developed extremely poor eyesight as a result of prolonged detention in completely dark cells. What is happening in the receiving jail is a human massacre. The prison walls have eroded our health and our lives. This is a heinous crime perpetrated by Zaki Badr, his henchmen and his partners and by all who remain silent on such tragedies. Our consolation is in God's words: "Verily God will defend (from ill) those who believe" and His words, may He be praised, "think not that God doth not heed the deeds of those who do wrong."

### **Jurists Criticize New Drug Law as Weak, Biased**

53004624 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 18 Jul 89 p 6

[Article by 'Imad Mahjub: "New Drug Law Considers Addicts' Class: 6 Months Therapy for the Rich; Life in Prison for the Poor; Government Ignored Islamic Law, Kept Alcohol"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

### **The Well-To-Do and Their Habit**

[AL-SHA'B] Who is addicted to the white poison of narcotics? What is the philosophy behind attacking the drug problem inside the country by concentrating on the addict and the user?

A senior security official replied, "A large percentage of addicts, up to 80 percent of them, come from large families that are socially and economically prominent. Many of these people go to clubs and attend universities. That is why there is a mandatory death sentence for anyone who is convicted of selling drugs at or near these places. Many of these addicts after a period of time find themselves compelled to become involved in gangs that are organized to steal cars and rob apartments. They do that after having robbed their relatives. Some have gone so far as to commit murder so they can continue supporting their habit and taking drugs. In other words,

these people are dangerous, and they have become a threat to the security and safety of society."

### **The New Law Threatens Innocent People**

"Reform is indivisible. When society is afflicted with corruption, that corruption manifests itself in many ways, and the affliction assumes a variety of forms. We live in a society where waste, bribery, and fraud are widespread." That was how Mr Ahmad Sayf-al-Islam Hasan al-Banna started his remarks about the new law. Mr al-Banna is an attorney and a member of the People's Assembly representing the coalition.

Mr al-Banna added, "The administrative and the social system are flawed. The government ignored alcohol when it wanted to issue a law to limit the danger of narcotics. This indicates that the government is not serious about its assertion that it seeks reform. It is extraordinary that the government made no reference to Islamic law, not even in the explanatory note that was appended to this law. Although the administrative authority lacks proper discipline, this new law gave it broad powers even though in the past it had managed to get full confessions out of innocent people and brought them to justice only to discover and apprehend the real perpetrators afterwards. The administrative authority could use the same method and cause the execution of innocent people. For example, Article Four of the law regarding the formation of a gang is broad, and many blameless citizens can be associated with gangs of smugglers, traffickers, and users in the same way that was used by the government in Article 48 of the Criminal Code to implicate people in a criminal conspiracy. The government used its clients and informants to provide it with false information on organizations that were formed to overthrow the government. It used these informants to entrap innocent people. These informants were then turned into witnesses in the case. The coalition requested that the article be amended and that something be added to the article to indicate that execution of a criminal plot had been initiated or that steps had been taken to commence the execution of a plot. That is to say, the coalition maintained that evidence that such a gang had been organized had to be available."

Mr Ahmad Sayf-al-Islam al-Banna added that the new law stipulated that a judge could either send an addict to a hospital for treatment, or he could sentence him to life in prison. But given the corruption of the administrative system and the lack of scruples among those who interfere in the preparation of reports, rich people will go to hospitals and poor people will be sent to prison for life. A prisoner who is serving a life sentence in prison turns into a brutal beast who will commit all sorts of crimes. Will a life sentence in prison offer him therapy? [passage omitted]

### **Broad Powers for Agencies of Ministry of Interior**

[AL-SHA'B] Attorneys expect the new law to increase the possibility that drug dealers and drug users will be

found innocent. The harsher the penalty, the less likely a judge will find a defendant guilty unless the evidence is irrefutable. Many people also think that the new law is full of holes and that it does not offer the best remedy to the drug problem.

Mr Fayiz Muhammad 'Ali, an attorney, says, "Egypt succeeded in eliminating the cocaine use phenomenon when the practice of sniffing cocaine became widespread more than 40 years ago. At that time religious clerics were used to fight the practice, and a cocaine user was ridiculed and disparaged. At the same time, the use of other drugs like hashish and opium continued. The continued use of these drugs was based on 'the claim' that religious law viewed such drugs differently from the way it viewed alcohol. That is, these drugs were considered objectionable, but they were not forbidden. With the liberalization policy and the emergence of new classes of people, heroin was brought into the country for those who could afford to pay hundreds of pounds every day and make arrangements for topnotch cocaine sniffing sessions. In a short period of time Egypt became one of the highest drug consuming countries in the world, and the government failed to prevent the entry of cocaine into the country. The government also failed to confront 'the danger' at the source. It tended to fight drugs by focusing its efforts against drug users and addicts." This is the philosophy of the Ministry of Interior. "I doubt that this philosophy would succeed especially since drug distribution methods have developed. Heroin in particular is being used by young people in universities, institutes, schools, and clubs, and it is also being used by people in the arts and entertainment world."

Mr Fayiz Muhammad 'Ali spoke about his most important observations on the law. He said, "There is considerable apprehension that the police will abuse the broad powers which were granted to them by the law." But Mr 'Ali's second and more important observation is this: "The government is ignoring alcohol, even though its dangers are not much less than those of narcotics. Whereas the law prohibited the use of narcotics, religious law is clear and unambiguous in prohibiting the use of alcohol." [passage omitted]

#### Harsh Penalties Impossible To Enforce

Mr Mahfuz 'Azzam, an attorney: "Enforcing stiffer penalties on drug pushers is consistent with society's interests. Whenever the interests of society and justice are served, God's law and his religion are also served. And yet legal rules tie a judge's hands. These rules make the application of harsher penalties, especially execution, very rare indeed. That is why putting stiffer penalties in the law is not considered something that will remedy the problem. Before the law was amended the penalties were adequate. And yet, just as legislative and punitive intervention is required, eliminating the causes which are behind the spread of narcotics crimes is also required. Most of these causes have to do with religious guidance and values in society. It is regrettable that narcotics and

white poisons are all compared to alcohol and its effects on the mind. This means that the stiffer penalties in this law are out of proportion with the reality of the state. Having uniform, balanced, and proportionate laws requires that we treat these substances in the same way, and this is something that the new law does not do."

[AL-SHA'B] We would add here that the statistics of the Anti-Narcotics Administration confirm a noticeable decrease in the crime rate in those governorates where the sale of alcohol has been suspended and where alcohol has been prohibited in hotels and stores.

Mr Mahfuz continued his observations and said, "Many of the provisions of the new law are based on the phrase 'with his knowledge.' This phrase is applied to the user, the pusher, and the person who is present at a site that has been prepared for drug use. A court cannot issue a verdict unless it is certain that the letter of the law has been followed. And knowledge, the term used in the law, is something that is within a person and is difficult to prove. I also think that the new law ignored an important matter. It ignored the fact that the vast majority of drug users come from a class of people who became wealthy as a result of their involvement in shady businesses. These people do not know what it means to toil and to labor. Radical treatment of the problem requires that we eliminate corruption and illegal gain once and for all. In this case, drug dealers will also fall."

#### Reducing Penalty Is Possible

Dr Fawziyah 'Abd-al-Sattar, professor of criminal law, vice dean of the College of Law at Cairo University, and member of the People's Assembly (the National Party), says, "The aim of the new law is to confront the phenomenon. The new law mandated the death penalty for drug pushers and for people who export, prepare, and traffick in drugs. In the latter case the penalty for drug trafficking may be a life sentence at hard labor. The law forbade the release of anyone convicted of such a crime under probation. In other words, a convicted felon is to remain in prison for the rest of his life. One manifestation of the fact that penalties are stiffer in the new law is this: the legislator mandated the death penalty for anyone who is convicted of selling drugs in places where people congregate, such as institutions of learning, places of worship, clubs, and neighboring areas." [passage omitted]

#### Strategic Studies Center Report Notes Positive Foreign Policy Trend

45040429a Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI  
in Arabic 24 Jul 89 p 1

[Article: "AL-AHRAM's Arab Strategic Report Sees Positive Change in Egypt's Foreign Policy; Arab Deterioration Halted; Hotbeds of Violence Brought Under Control"]

[Text] The Arab Strategic Report which is published periodically by AL-AHRAM's Center for Political and

Strategic Studies confirmed that ever since most Arab countries restored relations with Egypt in the wake of the Amman Summit meeting, which was held in November 1987, Egyptian foreign policy has been undergoing increasingly positive changes. The report, which covers 1988 and will be on sale today, also affirmed that Egyptian diplomacy has demonstrated a superior ability to confront the new changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egyptian diplomacy has demonstrated this ability despite Egypt's commitment to the peace treaty with Israel.

The report, which is usually divided into three sections dealing with developments worldwide, Arab developments, and Egyptian developments, mentioned that signs indicating that the deterioration in the Arab situation was being arrested had become evident in 1987 and were continuing in 1988. There were in particular indications that a greater measure of control was being exercised over the hotbeds of violence in the Arab homeland. The Palestinian intifadah (the uprising) was continuing, and steps were also being taken to build regional Arab blocs.

In that part of the report which deals with Egypt, the report stated that despite an increase in acts of political violence in Egypt in recent years (1986-1988), these acts of violence did not pose a threat to political stability. And yet, it is important to confront the complex social and economic reasons for these acts of violence.

### Shaykh Explains Slogan 'Islam Is the Solution'

45040435A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Khatib: "Wrong Ideas About the Slogan, 'Islam Is the Solution'"]

[Text] A young man wrote to me, "I wish you would clarify this matter for us, because I am very perplexed by what I have heard and seen. I heard an Islamic scholar on one of the morning talk shows question the proposition, 'Islam is the solution.' He wondered by what means this slogan would be applied and asked in his talk how and where there was a way to do it. Aren't such speakers supposed to be the people who clarify for us and explain to the people how Islam is to be applied and how it will solve the world's problems today and tomorrow?"

"Someone said to me that during the elections he heard one of these people say, 'Nothing annoys me as much the slogan, "Islam is the solution."' What is your opinion about such words coming from a Muslim?"

"As I have seen with my own eyes, tar is being thrown on posters bearing this slogan, and they are being covered with black. At the same time, all the naked pictures and slogans far from Islam are being left alone. Indeed, the ones contrary to Islam are left alone and preserved. Have matters come to such a pass in the country of al-Azhar and the nation of Islam?"

I say, with God's help:

I received this letter from one of the Muslims perplexed about the absurdities they hear and see—things that leave people who know about them perplexed. When a Muslim thinks that virtue is vice and vice virtue, he comes to be in temptation. When vice is commanded and virtue forbidden, temptation grows general and calamity increases. This person that you heard asking disapprovingly whether Islam is the solution knows very well that he is deceiving himself and misleading the person who takes what he says lightly. Those who sell their religion to gain the worldly prosperity of others are the biggest losers. God Almighty spoke truly, when He said, "Those who conceal the clear signs and the guidance after We have made it clear for the people in the book—on them shall be God's curse, and the curse of those entitled to curse,—except those who repent and made amends and openly declare the truth to them I turn; for I am oft-returning, most merciful." (Koran 2:159-160). What Islam asks, nay demands, of all who know even one provision of the Shari'ah is that they deliver the message to the people. A prophetic tradition says, "Deliver the message from me, even if only a single verse." "Islam is the solution," is not a hollow slogan. It is an Islamic truth. Its meaning is that God's Shari'ah, which he revealed, protected, and delivered to the Infallible One—may God bless him and grant him peace—rules among men. It is the only way to true betterment. It is the way to unite the nation and impel it forward. It was applied to Islamic society for 1,000 years, and that society was the happiest society in history.

This will happen only if the nation unites, rulers and ruled, to work and follow the guidance of the divine path and to approve of nothing incompatible with Islamic Shari'ah in deciding the affairs of the nation. One does not accept one part and leave out another. The Almighty has said, "But no, by thy Lord! They can have no real faith until they make Thee judge in all disputes between them, and find in their souls no resistance against thy decisions, but accept them with the fullest conviction." (Koran 4:65).

The Almighty has also said, "Then is there only a part of the Book that ye believe in, and do ye reject the rest? But what is the reward for those among you who behave like this but disgrace in this life?—and on the Day of Judgment they shall be consigned to the most grievous penalty. For God is not unmindful of what ye do," (Koran 2:85).

I wonder what will please those people.

Shall we say, "Socialism is the answer"? It has been tried. It has brought suffering on peoples. It has destroyed all the characteristics and components of man. Our recent experiment is not far away. See how nations in the east and west have rejected the manifestations of socialism and communism. Are events in China, Poland, Hungary, South Yemen, and even Russia itself remote from us?

Shall we advocate nationalism? Nationalism, when applied mistakenly as a goal, cuts ties; it is not a way to unite the [Islamic] nation.

Shall we say, "Secularism is the answer"? Secularism is what has been applied to fight Islam, notwithstanding the claims behind which some people hide.

Shall we say, "Pharaonism is the answer." Pharaonism equals a bunch of idols and statues. It advocates a regionalism that distances us from the source of our sustenance and strength in Islam. It advocates withdrawal inside narrow bounds surrounded with iron walls.

All these shades and models have been tried in our country. Socialism was a source of worry and poverty for the people. Secularism was a source of atheism and impudence against God, His Prophet, and all His prophets.

We also tried the Open Door Policy. It turned out to be loss, theft, plunder, drugs, bribery, extortion, debts, usury, and all forms of disintegration.

Islam's solution for our problems, such as unemployment, inflation, housing, rising prices, collapsing morals, drugs, etc., is not to solve each problem separately. Islam is a religion that has scrutinized every aspect of life. For the solution to be complete and comprehensive, the teachings of Islam must be applied in every aspect of life. The first and most important of these is the education and building up of Muslim individuals with an Islamic conscience and values, to be constructive, rather than destructive elements, as is now the case. Islam must exercise control over all government facilities—informational, educational, economic, social, and political. If we look, we shall see that most of the existing problems and crises are the fruits of non-Islamic systems of government to which we have unfortunately been exposed.

What do those people want who are not satisfied with, "Islam is the answer"? Without a doubt, they do not want prosperity for their nation or self-respect for their country.

If these words were actually said by an Islamic scholar who supposedly fully understands what we have mentioned, his situation is precarious and his position difficult. He ought to examine himself and repent. He should return to his Lord, before it is too late to repent. As for those who listen to him, not knowing this to be the correct judgment, he bears responsibility for them until the Day of Judgment.

If the person repeating such words is a Muslim who is not a specialist in religious learning, he still has no excuse in the eyes of God; for he has been enjoined to learn the provisions of his religion and to know truth from falsehood. He ought to ask someone whose religion he trusts. When he learns the judgment of Islam, he must adhere to it and correct his position. As for the ignorant, he is

excused by his ignorance; but the man who knows must explain to him, so that he comes to know. Afterwards, there is no excuse for anyone.

How strange matters are in this nation, some of whose members are uneasy about their Islam and their religion—so uneasy that they say, as was mentioned in the question, "Nothing annoys me as much as the slogan, 'Islam is the solution.'" Have matters gone this far with some people?

To these people we mention what a non-Muslim, the English philosopher Bernard Shaw, once said in his evaluation of Islam, the Islamic way, and the Prophet of Islam—may God bless him and grant him peace. He said, "Europe's destiny is toward Islam; if not in religion and doctrine, then in system, behavior, and method."

He also said, "I have always given the highest consideration to the religion of Muhammad because of its amazing vitality. It is the only religion that seems to me to possess the capability of digesting the different phases of life, so that it can become attractive to every generation of people." Developing the idea, he said, "Muhammad must be called the rescuer of mankind. I really believe that if a man like him took the reins of the modern world, he would succeed in solving its problems in a way that would bring the world peace and happiness. The Islamic religion is capable of healing the wounds of humanity."

This philosopher, a non-Muslim of course, decided:

1. Islam is the only decisive treatment and solution for mankind's problems.
2. Islam is the fast and effective solution.

That is what reasonable and fair non-Muslims who have studied Islam in a spirit remote from bigotry say.

What is strange in this slogan? Wake up, you who claim that you are religious scholars of this nation!

Wake up, you neglectful, heedless, anesthetized, ignorant ones! You have lost your identity. You have lost your reward in this world and the next—how evil a destiny!

### Fatal Livestock Virus Strikes Coastal Area

54004612 Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 7 Aug 89 p 1

[Report by Majdi Siblah]

[Text] The health directorates and veterinary units in Damietta and al-Daqhiliyah have warned against eating dairy products and meats because of the virus that has afflicted livestock in the coastal governorates.

This warning came after veterinarians failed to find a treatment for this virus.

A large percentage of the livestock afflicted with this illness has already died, and citizens have died from eating the meat of these afflicted livestock.

### Food Specialists Discuss Production-Consumption Gap

45040441 Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF  
in Arabic 17 Jul 89 pp 56-60

[Article: "Food and Agriculture Specialists Discuss Food-Gap Problem"]

[Text] Self-sufficiency and self-reliance are broad ideas and aspirations that occur to every nation at present and in the future. The individual, though a member of society's body, always hopes to rely on himself and to achieve sufficiency in whatever pertains to his personal needs. Because a state is a vast human bloc of a large number of individuals, then it behooves it to always seek to achieve sufficiency. But to accomplish this objective, it must always try to overcome whatever hampers it, i.e. it must move to eliminate all the obstacles facing it.

The problem of food and of achieving self-sufficiency through domestic production is the hope of every nation. Therefore, a nation works tirelessly on the ground, taking into account whatever events or developments may occur and may affect or obstruct the transformation of plans into an actual reality, such as the problem we are currently facing in the form of a continuous and constant population growth.

Since the government adopted the system of comprehensive development planning by increasing food production vertically and horizontally, an enormous leap has been made and its results are reflected clearly in the turn of the rudder from food importation toward greater domestic production. But we have more to do to reduce the gap between the production and consumption rates. This is why we have proceeded to explore the experts' opinions on the food-gap problem. Each of them had his own vision in his own field of specialization. So what did they say?

#### Return to Originality

To begin, Major General 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, Asyut governor, emphasizes several steps needed to narrow the gap and correct the course:

- Reclamation of arable lands—the desired [option and the one offering the most] hope.
- Adoption of a well-studied scientific plan to achieve ambitious development plans.
- Birth control, [keeping in mind the population growth] that devours and absorbs every [food production] increase.
- Freedom from bureaucratic redtape (bad application of the system).
- Sanctification and respect for work, as well as devotion by all to the service of this country.
- Restoration of the Egyptian farmer's loyalty to and bond with his land so that he may become a real producer and not a consumer.
- Exploitation of the natural elements with which God has blessed us.

- The countryside's recovery of its genuine customs and traditions

#### Work Plan With Clear-Cut Features

Maj Gen Muhammad Husayn Mudyin, al-Daqahliyah governor, asserts that Egypt's production crisis is embodied most clearly in food production. Egypt has turned from a country exporting most foodstuffs to a country importing the majority of its foodstuffs because of the growth of its population and the lack of change in [the size of] its cultivated acreage. These factors make it necessary to take decisive steps to end the gap. In the following, I will note some of these steps briefly:

- The need to increase production and, on the other hand, to tighten consumption. This is a feeling that emanates from the individual and which underlines the individual's role in contributing to the lifting of hardship within society as a whole.
- Family planning and raising the marriage age.
- Establishment of well-studied methods to encourage savings and to facilitate the means of investment.
- Denying the fourth child [born to a family] the right to free education and confining subsidies to 5 members per family as a maximum.
- Defining women's role in streamlining consumption, considering that women are the main contributors to forming society's behavioral patterns.
- Giving youth the opportunity to reclaim land through scientific programs.
- [Defining] the role of the media and drafting specific programs to develop national awareness among the citizens.

#### Sound, Secure and Certain Solution

Engineer 'Adil 'Izzi, chairman of the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank's Executive Board, says: We cultivate nearly 150,000 tons of potatoes in two cycles. Egypt's total potato production amounts to 1.2 million tons [annually].

He adds: In view of the high cost of importing potato seed from abroad, Egypt began to produce the seed needed for the Nile [winter] cycle from its summer crop. We are now producing summer seed from the summer crop under the supervision of the experts of the technical agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture and of the Vegetable Research Institute. This means that we have been able to overcome the problem of the constant importation of potato seed from abroad. This is why imports will be limited to high-quality potato seed imported for reproduction, not for consumption. Eng 'Adil 'Izzi adds: It is time for us to be proud of the accomplishments made by the International Potato Seed Research Center in Kafr al-Zayyat which has been able to produce potatoes from seed, not from tubers, and to produce seed from the potato varieties we cultivate, such as Alfa, al-Barakah and King Edward. By adopting the modern

scientific methods, we will, God willing, be able to dispense with potato seed imports and to produce such seeds locally.

### **Decisive Steps and Extraordinary Efforts**

Eng 'Ali Abu-Jaziyah, chairman of the Board of Directors of the General Federation of Garden Crop Producers and Consultative Assembly member, says that to narrow the food gap, we must take several decisive steps:

First, move in two parallel directions:

A. Horizontal growth embodied in reclaiming and cultivating new acreage.

B. Vertical growth by increasing production per feddan through the use of modern technology, scientific irrigation systems, improved seed and fertilizer. At the same time, drainage means must be improved, new drains must be built and the existing drains must be improved and maintained.

Second, alter the consumption patterns. This must be coupled with a concerted and purposeful national campaign in which the efforts of the religious, health, information and social institutions unite to reduce the average per capita food consumption. Our average is one of the world's highest consumption averages.

Third, adopt scientific research methods. We have, in fact, implemented the local seed-production project, thus saving more foreign currency that used to be consumed to import such seed from abroad. It is expected that this project will be expanded in the coming seasons to achieve self-sufficiency in potato seed production within 4 years. Any surplus can be then exported to the Arab countries. Dr Yusuf Wali, the deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture and land reclamation, devotes great attention to and constantly follows up on this project.

### **Narrowing Gap and Ideal Solutions**

Eng 'Adil al-Shahawi, chairman of the Executive Board of the Public Sector Food Industries Authority, says: To narrow the food gap, we must take a number of steps for each crop. For example, the sugar gap ranges from 600,000-700,000 tons which are currently imported from abroad. It is possible to reduce this gap by:

- Turning to the reclamation of new lands.
- Setting up agro-industry complexes to produce sugar beet.
- Improving the productivity of the cultivable land and of the sugarcane varieties cultivated.
- Implementing the clear-cut and specific policies set for each agency.
- Increasing the use of high-fructose sugar in industry.

'Adil al-Shahawi adds: As for oils, expansion in the cultivation of oil-producing crops must become a national cause. Hopes are pinned to the reclaimed lands which are good for cultivating these crops, be they

sunflower seeds or soybeans. Farmers must also be encouraged and oil-extraction units must be set up. We must also import oil seeds instead of importing oils so that we may exploit the capacities of the existing plants and may save foreign currency.

### **Well-Studied Scientific Plans**

Eng 'Isam Shabanah, chairman of the Executive Board of the Public Sector Livestock and Poultry Authority, stresses that narrowing the gap requires well-studied and gradual scientific plans. Regarding red meats, we must not rely on meat as a main source of protein because protein can be obtained from other sources, such as poultry, eggs and fish. He adds: The existing poultry gap can be filled by exploiting the idle capacities, forming a producers federation and setting up cooperatives that contribute to overcoming the problems of importing the production and marketing requirements. Eng 'Isam Shabanah further says: Finally, the subsidy the government provides in the various production phases must be channeled more realistically so that it may go to the final product only.

### **Self-Reliance**

Dr Faruq al-Bardini, chairman of the Executive Board of the North Alexandria Flourmills Company, says: We must rely on ourselves and must conduct applied scientific studies in which all specialists from all fields participate with sociologists to establish the right means to begin increasing productivity in the various fields, depending on our needs in each field separately.

### **Creating Proper Climate**

Samahah Yusuf, chairman of the Executive Board of the Foodstuffs and Refrigeration Authority, points out that there are two ways to narrow the food gap: The first is to create the motive force by creating the right general climate, by exploiting the available capabilities and by encouraging investment. The other is to streamline consumption by having every citizen ration his needs only, not rush to hoard goods, and by paying attention to packaging so as to reduce loss and damage.

### **Taking Several Steps**

Eng 'Abd-al-Khaliq 'Ajinah, chairman of the Executive Board of the Egyptian Bottle-Filling Company, says that the food gap can be reduced by taking a number of steps, the most important of which are:

- Expanding the reclamation of new lands so as to increase the arable acreage.
- Devoting attention to all the means capable of increasing productivity.
- Exploiting ideally all the capabilities to implement the state's development plans.

### **Concerted Efforts**

Chemist 'Abd-al-Hamid Salamah, chairman of the Executive Board of the Delta Sugar Company, asserts that

under the umbrella of the increasing sugar consumption rates, the government must spread among the citizens awareness of the need to economize in sugar consumption in order that we may narrow the gap. He adds: It is necessary to build new plants—and to provide them with the material resources and the technical expertise—which rely on beets by virtue of the qualities that distinguish beets from sugarcane, considering that sugarcane cultivation is limited to the current acreage and that it is necessary to turn to cultivating beets in the new and reclaimed lands.

#### **Increased Production Is Ideal Solution**

Muhammad Badawi 'Abd-al-Rahman, chairman of the Executive Board of al-Ahram Consumer Complexes Company, says that production must be increased, considering that this is the ideal solution. This increase will come by encouraging the reclamation of new land, by invading the desert to increase the arable acreage and by encouraging investors to set up agricultural projects so that the new arable land may become an export vessel.

Muhammad Badawi adds that attention must be devoted to the production of special crops for export so as to make it possible to acquire foreign currency. Attention must also be given to vertical increase and to supplying all the [production] elements, including seed and guidance programs to increase agricultural productivity.

#### **Five-Year Plan and Vital Role**

Chemist Sabri 'Ajlan, chairman of the Executive Board of the Abu-Za'bal Fertilizer and Chemicals Company and adviser to the minister of industry, says that when the current five-year plan was being prepared, the main inlet was to narrow the production-consumption gap. For this to be accomplished, several axes must be followed:

- Reduce the demand, making such reduction a national objective.
- Increase supply by maximally utilizing all the available capacities.
- Expand the existing projects horizontally and vertically through replacement and renewal or through the conclusion of contracts for new joint projects by encouraging investment.
- Reduce unessential consumption.
- Increase the productivity of both man and machine.
- Devote attention and care to all the packaging processes.

#### **Government and Fruitful Efforts**

Maj Gen Munir Muhaysin, chairman of the Agricultural Authority's Executive Board, says: The government is making constructive and fruitful efforts to enhance agricultural production quantitatively and qualitatively by:

- Providing all the requirements of agricultural production.

- Improving crop quality through seed research.
- Advancing research in all agricultural spheres.
- Generalizing successful experiments in order to attain the highest productivity rates.
- Providing agricultural protection, embodied in guidance research, pesticides and pest control and preventive and curative programs.

#### **Narrowing Gap Is Main Objective of Economic Policy**

Accountant 'Abd-al-Hamid Sa'id, Executive Board chairman and commissioned member of the Canal Fish Processing Company, asserts that narrowing the food security gap is the main objective of Egypt's economic policy, adding that when we speak of this gap we must deal with the production and consumption elements.

First, production: It is essential to increase production through vertical expansion and through the use of modern mechanization and highly-productive fertilizer and seed.

Second, consumption: Consumption must be streamlined and attention must be paid to stopping waste and to packaging.

#### **Adopting Well-Studied Plans**

Eng Fawzi 'Abd-al-Jawad, chairman of the Executive Board of the Egyptian Gulf Oils Processing Company, notes that Egypt's need of oils amounts to nearly 650,000 tons annually and that our production amounts to 150,000 tons, meaning that we experience a gap of nearly 75 percent in oils. To fill this gap, well-studied agricultural development plans for the production of seed oils, such as sunflower seeds and soybeans, in the new lands must be adopted.

#### **Coordination and Integration**

Tharwat Abu-Zayd, chairman of the Executive Board of the Cairo Ice and Refrigeration Company, says that to narrow the production-consumption gap, we must:

- Enhance awareness among the consumer masses so that consumption may be streamlined and waste may be reduced through small packages.
- Establish coordination between the production, agricultural and distribution companies so as to create some sort of integration to produce what is really needed.
- Establish small central agro-industry complexes in the agricultural areas producing the same crop so as to eliminate damage.

#### **Improving General Climate**

Eng Hamid Abu-al-'Ala, chairman of the Executive Board of GERCO [General Engineering and Refrigeration Company], says that the gap must be narrowed, considering that our production is below what it should be even though we do possess all the elements, including climate, manpower, knowledge and land. A general climate must be created to improve performance through



alert and flexible management. Attention must be also devoted to the human element, considering that it is the production lifeline. We must also encourage individuals to improve and increase collective productivity.

### High Productivity

Eng Faruq 'Afifi, chairman of the Executive Board of the Central Sugar Crops Council, believes that the food security gap has emanated from two fundamental factors

- The constant population growth which devours any agricultural growth rate even though productivity per feddan has increased.
- The rising living standard which has resulted in a higher income level and in a greatly increased per capita consumption rate of numerous foodstuffs and consumer goods.

### Serving Consumer Masses

Faruq Fahmi, chairman of the Executive Board of the Egyptian Fish Marketing Company, notes that there are statistics which say that Egypt's fish production amounts to nearly 250,000 tons of fresh fish. We, as a Ministry of Supply, import 45,000 tons of frozen fish annually which are supplied to the local market at low prices. This has a great impact on curtailing inflation and establishing a price balance. The company implements its plan of supplying this fish through numerous outlets that serve the consumer masses in all parts of the republic, thus making it possible to serve people with limited income.

### Self-Sufficiency

Dr 'Ali Abu-Zayd, chairman of the Executive Board of the Egyptian Aswan Fishing and Fish Processing Company, says that for Egypt to achieve self-sufficiency in fish, it must take a number of steps, among them:

Provide equipped fishing boats capable of fishing in high seas. This can be accomplished through investment groupings, provided that the price is equal to the production value plus a profit margin and that such a project is managed economically.

Encourage capital to invest in this area in the light of scientific studies, research and evaluations.

### Strengthen Belonging

Eng Hilmi 'Abd-al-Majid, chairman of (FOODECO) Executive Board, asks: Where is the flaw, considering that all the elements of agriculture are available, including land, embodied in millions of reclaimable feddans, water which can be increased in volume through streamlined consumption and through the application of modern irrigation methods, abundant money, as proven by the Egyptians' reassuring savings, and, finally, manpower which we export to the Arab countries.

### Changing Consumption Patterns

Husayn Khalil, chairman of the Executive Board of the General Agricultural Potato Producers Cooperative, believes that changing the consumption patterns is one of the fundamental solutions for narrowing the consumption gap. For example, we find that potatoes are a main crop that does well in Egypt and that is highly productive. Therefore, national campaigns in which the efforts of all the agencies and institutions unite must be launched to increase the per capita consumption of potatoes. This will have a major impact on reducing bread consumption, as well as rice consumption, and, consequently, on reducing wheat imports, thus saving hard currencies.

### Development of Production Means

Dr Ahmad Tal'at 'Adawi, chairman of the Executive Board of the Livestock Insurance Fund, asserts that Egypt's production problem makes it necessary to reconsider and to adopt a scientific system to develop the production means.

The law must also be applied to all, without exception, in all spheres so that the public good may be accomplished. Dr 'Adawi adds: Agro-industry complexes must be set up, especially in the new lands, considering that they are the hope and that they include all specializations. In doing this, Egypt's manpower must also be reassessed.

### Enhancing Food Security March

Accountant Majdi Husayn, chairman of the financial affairs sector and member of the Executive Board of the Egyptian Oils and Soap Company, asserts that to achieve food security, ceaseless efforts are needed to increase production in all sectors. Moreover, the efforts must unite and turn to reclaiming new lands. It must also [as published].

### Making All Efforts

Muhammad Ghanimah, chairman of the Executive Board of the Nile Consumer Complexes Company, believes that sound planning to streamline consumption will lead to the presence of enormous surpluses. Attention must also be paid to packaging so as to reduce waste. Moreover, all efforts must be made to increase production and to coordinate the production, marketing and distribution processes so as to meet the wishes of the consumer masses.

### Uniting All Efforts

Accountant Fu'ad Ahmad, the general director of the General Federation of Garden Crop Producers and Exporters, says that the food gap is widening as a result of the population growth and of the agricultural readiness and production required in order to keep up pace with this immense growth. It is also widening as a result of the unbalanced consumption growth. To set the pattern right, all efforts must unite with the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation so that we may

proceed forcefully to reclaim new lands in Western al-Nubariyah, the New Valley, al-Tahrir Province and the western delta in order that we may create a new valley. He adds that cooperation between the state's various sectors is inevitable. It is unreasonable that the government alone should solve all the problems and smooth all the difficulties. The same goes for the private sector. Therefore, full and complete coordination must be established between the government and the private sector to overcome this crisis and to achieve high production rates. Concluding, Accountant Fu'ad Ahmad asserts: We, as a Federation of Garden Crop Producers and Exporters, create the right climate and offer, in cooperation with the agencies concerned in the Ministry of Agriculture, all the facilities to develop garden crops that meet the export standards.

#### Altering Customs and Traditions

Eng Mukhtar Abu-Basha, general director of (MABA) Company, says that customs and traditions have the greatest impact on widening the production-consumption gap.

He adds: We hope that the Egyptian people's eating habits will be altered and that the Egyptians will turn to potatoes instead of bread and rice. Potatoes can be cultivated twice annually whereas wheat can be cultivated only once. This means that we can produce a dry product estimated at 3.33 tons of potatoes per feddan, compared to 1.25 tons of flour from the wheat produced per feddan. This gives us the opportunity to exploit the arable acreage ideally.

#### Importing Oil Seeds

On the gap in the oils area, Chemist Muhammad 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-Sawwah, chairman of the Cairo Oils and Soap Company, says that the Egyptian oils industry must be founded primarily on imported oil seeds and that we must never import oils. Egypt has the production capacity to press more oil seeds than it produces domestically.

#### Devoting Attention to Vertical Development

Eng Hasan Muhammad Salim, chairman of the Executive Board of the Egyptian Agricultural Seed Production Company, says: The limited cultivable acreage from which the Egyptian economy suffers saddles the Ministry of Agriculture agencies with the obligation and the responsibility to give priority to implementing the vertical development projects as soon as possible. These projects are based on the ideal exploitation of the agricultural means and resources at our disposal, of which the most important is superior seed for various crops, to achieve the highest productivity possible with the objective of:

1. Attaining complete self-sufficiency in the legumes group (broad beans, lentils), in the white meats group and in fish and eggs.

2. Increasing the export of fresh, dried or processed vegetables and fruits.

3. Raising self-sufficiency in sugar to 80 percent and in oils to 40 percent.

#### Gap-Narrowing Elements

Accountant 'Uthman al-Jammal, chairman of the Executive Board of the Egyptian Oils and Soap Company, says: To fill the food gap and eliminate the imbalance between our consumption and production, two elements must be observed:

First, the horizontal element which is embodied in marching toward the desert and giving youth the opportunity to own, reclaim and cultivate land there.

Second, the vertical element which is embodied in the use of modern technology, such as improved (crops), seed and irrigation methods to enhance the productivity per feddan.

The specialists participating were:

Maj Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa. Maj Gen Husayn Mudyin. Eng 'Adil 'Izzi. Eng 'Isam Shabanah. Eng 'Adil al-Shahawi. Eng Samahah Yusuf. Eng 'Ali Abu-Jaziyah. Dr Tawfiq al-Bardini. Dr Ahmad Tal'at al-'Adawi. Dr 'Ali Abu-Zayd. Maj Gen Munir Muhaysin. Eng Hilmi 'Abd-al-Majid. 'Uthman al-Jammal. Eng Fawzi 'Abd-al-Jawad. Tharwat Abu-Zayd. Badawi 'Abd-al-Rahman. Muhammad Ghanimah. Eng Hamid Abu-al-'Ala. Eng Faruq 'Afifi. Chemist Sabri 'Ajlan. Faruq Fahmi. Eng Mukhtar Abu-Basha. Majdi Husayn. Hasan Muhammad Salim. Husayn Khalil. Fu'ad Ahmad. Chemist Muhammad 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-Sawwah.

Participating from ROSE AL-YUSUF were:

Khalid Tawhid. Jamal Ghali. Ashraf al-Qirabi. Majdi Sanad.

#### Construction Company Lists Bridges, Tunnels Completed

45040430 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI  
in Arabic 27 Jul 89 p 9

[Article by Ahmad Kamil 'Awad: "Arab Contractors ('Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and Partners) and High Dam Epic"]

[Text] The company's name has been tied to the construction of the gigantic High Dam, the first mammoth project built by the company and a major starting point in the enormous projects accomplished to date in all the various fields.

By all criteria, the High Dam is a school which graduated all of the company's current pioneers and leaders in the various fields. Scientific and practical experience molded them while they were building this gigantic and important project which has proven its significance and vitality and that has protected Egypt from the drought

years that afflicted most of the African countries recently. Speaking of the High Dam, Engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman has said: It is not just a word. It is a long and multi-colored story that tells of the will of people and the determination of a nation that wants to open its path to glory and to catch up with the bandwagon of civilization and culture. The High Dam is also a mirror that reflects the capability of the Arab engineers, technicians and workers and their ability to implement gigantic projects previously monopolized by European and U.S. firms.

In this regard, we say with utter pride that the Arab Contractors—'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and Partners—participated in implementing the High Dam work and overcame all the difficulties it faced at the time with the resolution of its men and the determination of its sons, Egypt's loyal soldiers.

**Arab Contractors—'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and Partners: Egyptianization of Bridge Industry and Construction of Numerous Bridges**

To the Arab Contractors—'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and Partners—goes the credit of being the first to Egyptianize the bridge industry in Egypt. It began in 1967 by building al-Jizah Bridge on the Nile which is a prominent landmark in the history of Egyptianization of the bridge industry. It is a fixed overhead bridge built of pre-stressed concrete, considered the most advanced and strongest form of concrete. The bridge is 500 meters long and has a 104-meter long section which opens for navigation.

At the time, the bridge was built in the most magnificent technical and engineering style and earned everybody's admiration. It was inaugurated officially in January 1971.

**6 October Bridge**

The Arab Contractors then developed this Egyptianized industry and began to build the gigantic October Bridge which is a truly miraculous cultural accomplishment by virtue of its numerous access and exit points and of the traffic fluidity it provides.

The 6 October Bridge extends from the Agricultural Museum in al-Duqqi to Ghamrah on Ramsis Street. It is 13 kilometers long and 14-34 meters wide. It has 26 access and exit points. Work is currently underway to extend the bridge so that it may reach al-Nasr Street in Nasr City when phases eight and nine are completed.

All the obstacles facing the construction work as a result of the nature and conditions of work at the work sites were overcome, thanks to the efforts of the Arab Contractors' workers. Every phase was completed on schedule so that this mammoth accomplishment may contribute to easing the masses' hardship and to facilitating traffic in the important areas through which the bridge crosses.

Gigantic bridges were then built in succession in all parts of the Arab Republic of Egypt and they continue to testify to the great sacrifice and the magnificent accomplishment of the company's workers. Of these accomplishments, we will note the following as an example:

**The 15 May Bridge:** It is one of a number of bridges included in the plan to renovate the bridges built on the Nile, such as al-Zamalik Bridge.

**Abu-al-'Ala' Bridge:** It is another example of sophisticated engineering, considering that it incorporates numerous modern technological applications and scientific systems that are unique to this bridge, excluding the other gigantic engineering projects.

This bridge extends from the Arab League Square to Sultan Abu-al-'Ala' Mosque. It was built in two stages. The latest technology of the age, embodied in raising the superstructure so as not to obstruct traffic and sealing off the construction area, was applied in the second stage.

It is expected that there will be a third stage to extend the bridge until it links with al-Azhar Bridge at the Opera Square, passing over the 26 July Street.

The bridge is 3 kilometers long, in addition to 2.5 kilometers in access and exit points, totaling 22.

**The Ahmad 'Arabi Bridge in Shubra al-Khaymah:** It is 1,000 meters long and has 2 lanes.

This bridge has contributed to serving the masses of the vital industrial zone and to eliminating the area's traffic bottlenecks.

**The multi-level King Faysal Bridge and the overhead al-Jizah Square Bridge.**

This [King Faysal Bridge] is the first multi-level concrete bridge built in Egypt and the Middle East. It is unique in design and it was built precisely and promptly in four stages to eliminate the traffic bottlenecks in al-Jizah Square and its intersections and at the beginning of King Faysal and Sudan Streets. This bridge is 4 kilometers long.

**The Bani Suwayf Bridge on the main Nile:** It links West and East Bani Suwayf. It is 1,086 meters long and 21 meters wide. It incorporates the biggest navigation opening [moving section] on the Nile at the time.

**The Airport Road Bridge:** It consists of 6 axes to serve people traveling from the city center to the airport and vice versa. It also serves the surrounding areas, the Airport Sheraton area and the beginning of the Isma'il-iyah desert highway.

**The Banha Bridge on the Nile:** This bridge is being built to facilitate traffic on the Cairo-Alexandria agricultural highway and the Lower Egypt highway without entering the town of Banha. It is 5 kilometers long and has a 120-meter moving section to permit navigation.

It incorporates a number of bridges on the Dumyat, al-Riyah and al-Tawfiqi branches of the Nile, as well as ground-level bridges, to solve the traffic problems experienced by this area.

The New Passengers Terminal Bridge which is designed to move passengers from the new passengers terminal to the airport road. It is 850 meters long and 8.5 meters wide and is built of reinforced concrete.

**Rawd al-Faraj Bridge on the Nile:** It is a new artery being built over the immortal Nile to link the Nile Corniche near Rawd al-Faraj on the eastern bank with Imbabah area on the western bank. It is 5 kilometers long and includes a moving 130-meter long section for navigation. Two stages of the bridge have been completed and work is currently underway to build the main part over the Nile. When completed, the bridge will help move the traffic coming from Lower Egypt to Upper Egypt without any need for this traffic to go through the city center, thus contributing to the traffic bottlenecks at the axis and intersections through which the bridge crosses. This bridge has 17 access and exit points to serve traffic at the various intersections.

- The Asyut Bridge.
- The Banha Railroad Bridge.
- The mobile Shubra Bridge on the Isma'iliyah Canal.
- Forty bridges over al-Mansurah and Port Said railroads.
- The Shubra Bridge over the Ismailia Canal in al-Mizallat area, currently under construction.

#### **Metal Bridges**

These are easy-to-assemble-and-disassemble overhead bridges built by the company to solve traffic bottlenecks at vital intersections, such as al-Azhar, 10 Ramadan, al-Sayyidah 'Ayishah, al-'Arrubah, 'Amr Ibn-al-'As and al-Firdaws bridges.

This is in addition to 12 other bridges built on the beltway encircling Cairo.

It is worth noting that the company had previously built a number of other bridges, such as al-Raswah-Port Sa'id Bridge, al-Qantarah, al-Kab, al-Tinah, al-Manayif, Maryam and Jazirat al-Fursan bridges.

#### **Martyr Ahmad Hamdi Tunnel: One of Accomplishments of Age and Feats of Arab Contractors—'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and Partners**

One of the biggest projects built with the latest methods of construction in the world and one of Egypt's true modern feats is Martyr Ahmad Hamdi Tunnel which links the beloved Sinai with the west bank of the Suez Canal and which has totally eliminated the Sinai isolation. It passes under the Suez Canal and it has been given its name to immortalize the engineers corps commander who was martyred in the crossing war. The tunnel consists of 2 lanes for vehicle traffic. It passes under the Suez Canal in al-Shallufah area, 17 kilometers north of the city of Suez. The programs to broaden and deepen

the Suez Canal had to be taken into consideration when the tunnel was built. This tunnel is built at a depth of 51 meters. It is 5,912 kilometers [presumably meaning meters] long. The western entrance is 2,288 meters long and the eastern entrance is 1,984 meters long. The main tunnel is 1,640 meters long and it crosses at a depth of 10 meters below the bottom level of the Suez Canal water in the future canal projects. The main tunnel section is cylindrical in form and has an internal diameter of 10.40 meters and an external diameter of 11.4 meters. It is divided into 3 segments: The central segment which consists of 2 lanes for vehicles and 2 sidewalks for control and maintenance. The lower segment is for tunnel ventilation and for water pipelines and electricity cables extended to the Sinai and the top segment is for the passage of exhaust emissions. The method of construction of the Ahmad Hamdi Tunnel is unique in the world because the permanent road was built while the main lining behind the shield was being installed. The tunnel has been built according to the Shieldsystem. The outer diameter of the shield installed is 11.80 meters and its length is 9.20 meters [as published]. The tunnel was dug and lined in 65 weeks, at the rate of 42 linear meters weekly. It is lined with two layers of lining: The first is made of pre-stressed concrete. The second, and subsidiary, lining consists of Formica boards. The tunnel is fitted with equipment that enables its controllers to control whatever is happening inside it, including: Television screens linked to television cameras installed inside the tunnel, air-pollution measuring equipment, control equipment for operating the ventilation plants and their fans and equipment to control lighting in the tunnel. The ventilation system used in Ahmad Hamdi Tunnel is the total-ventilation system.

#### **Varied Tunnels to Serve Intersections at Which They Are Built**

- Al-Mirghani Tunnel, 440 meters long.
- Al-Jala' [Evacuation] Tunnel, 600 meters long.
- The Kit Kat Tunnel, 440 kilometers long.
- The Sidi Bishr Tunnel in Alexandria, 400 meters long.
- Abu-al-Fida Tunnel, 260 meters long.
- 'Abd-al-Mun'im Riyadh Tunnel in Alexandria, currently under construction. It is 400 meters long.
- Al-Azhar Tunnel for pedestrians.

In view of this quick review of the accomplishments of the Arab Contractors—'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and Partners, we believe that this firm has contributed effectively to eliminating a large part of the hardship experienced by the Egyptian masses, for whose comfort all efforts are made, with these vital and extraordinary accomplishments. These are truly great accomplishments made with young Egyptian arms that have given sincerely and have been rewarded with praise and admiration for these mammoth accomplishments that continue to stand witness to excellence, precision and magnificence of performance.

### **Feature Claims Plan To Arrest Islamists for Interrogation**

*45000181 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 8 Aug 89 p 5*

[Text] "Akhbar Mamnu'ah" ["Forbidden News" feature in AL-SHA'B] reveals to the public a government plan in the war against the Islamic trend, especially the Muslim Brotherhood society, headed by Hamid Abu-al-Nasir. The plan rules out wide-scale nighttime arrests, at least for now.

This is being done on the basis of arresting elements that security forces consider representing the society's secondary ranks and having a role in the activities of their regions. The purpose of arresting them is to extract information from them in the manner of Lazughli [brutally], release them after a time, arrest a second group, and so on.

The latest to be arrested in accordance with this plan were four [men] from Shabin al-Kawm in Minufiyah. They are Sabhi Shawqi al-Sawi, a student rendered unconscious for three whole days due to the severity of his beating; Sayyid al-Haj, another student; 'Abd-al-Wahhab Shihab-al-Din, a student in al-Azhar; and Dr Mustafa al-Hamzawi. They were all subjected to brutal torture.

### **AL-SHA'B Follows Current Arrests, Reports Rights Violations**

*45040435B Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Jul 89 pp 1, 2*

[Article by 'Ali al-Qammash and Mahmud Ibrahim: "Police Combing Raids Continue"]

[Text] Security police again intensified their repressive measures against citizens, with more arrests, savage torture measures against detainees, and continued provocations against citizens.

In al-Minufiyah, the Bureau of Investigation for National Security at the beginning of this week arrested Hajj 'Ashur Sulayman Ghanim, a candidate for the Consultative Assembly from the Third District, and Rajab Abu-Zayd, a lawyer and candidate for membership in the Consultative Assembly from the Second District.

In al-Buhayrah, they arrested 15 farmers from the village of al-Hamra, near Abu Hummus, and sent them off to Abu Za'bal prison, after destroying their houses, burning their belongings before their eyes, and humiliating them in front of their wives and children. The farmers in the village had conducted a sit-in at the village mosque to protest measures illegally seizing their lands as a favor to a NDP [National Democratic Party] member of the People's Assembly and his family. The State Security Court decided last Saturday to postpone consideration of the case in order to inform the defendants. The lawyers, 'Abdallah al-Zughbi and Sayyid Abu-Zayd, complained to the public prosecutor about the decisions for the arbitrary arrest of the peasants. They asked that

the detainees be given medical examinations to prove that they had been subjected to torture.

The previous Monday, riot police stormed al-Tawfiq Mosque in al-Bajur district in al-Minufiyah Governorate during afternoon worship. They fought with worshipers and seized a video cassette player and color television set, to prevent the showing of a video about the battles of the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviet army and the puppet government in Kabul. The raid resulted in the wounding of one worshiper and the arrest of another.

In a related development, visiting the political prisoners has continued to be forbidden since before the Feast [of Immolation] until the present. No reason has been given.

In another development, the Association of Islamic Lawyers of the Lawyers' Guild has sent the public prosecutor a complaint, demanding that he intervene immediately to protect Islamic lawyers from arrest while carrying out their work. The security police had arrested Tharwat Salah-al-Din while he was carrying out his work.

The association issued a statement asking all organizations concerned about human rights throughout the world, as well as the Union of Arab Lawyers, to intervene for the release of their arrested colleagues.

The lawyers announced their dissatisfaction with the refusal of the technical office of the office of the public prosecutor to give out testimony or minutes of sessions, thus hindering the taking of legal measures, or to release the detainees, despite their having obtained release rulings.

The Human Rights Organization announced that it had sent a telegram to the president, begging him to intervene in the case of Dr 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, who is currently being held at al-Fayyum prison. His health has deteriorated, and the security police are continuing to mistreat him.

### **Editorial Argues for Constitutionality of Islamic Law**

*45040360B Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 9 May 89 p 6*

[Editorial by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman: "Who Is It That Is Violating the Constitution?"]

[Text] We can lay it down with some assurance that our country is today witnessing a crystallization of ideological positions which is progressing day by day, whose features are taking on definition and whose outlines are emerging. One camp believes that Islam is creed, law, politics, economics, society, and ethics; and another states that it is a creed and a number of liturgical practices and insists on excluding the social, political, economic and ethical aspects. Both camps embrace numerous groups and factions which share their general character and differ to a greater or lesser extent with respect to other matters, a situation which has led to

great confusion, widespread unrest, and the appearance of such erroneous or defective characterizations as political Islam, institutional Islam and Sufi Islam.

In its program promulgated in 1979, its slogan of "Islam is the solution", and the slogan of the general congress, "Comprehensive reform from an Islamic perspective", the Labor Party is adopting a credo of full and all-embracing Islam. It has consequently encountered a devastating press campaign waged by non-religious writers and journalists who reject the completeness and comprehensiveness of Islam and who back the credo of the second camp, the camp that would exclude from Islam those aspects relating to life as a whole, using for that purpose the government newspapers and magazines that they control. It has been clear that they are endeavoring to persuade the public and the rulers of this country that the Labor Party has violated the constitution with the Islamic slogans it invoked in the parliamentary elections and the general congress, as if it was the case that the Egyptian constitution adopts their point of view and determines that Islam is not a solution to the problems affecting our lives, and as if it endorses faith and worship and rejects all the legislative principles enshrined in the Koran and Sunnah for the regulation of social, economic, political and ethical life.

But who is it that is really violating the constitution? Is it the camp that believes in the wholeness and all-embracing character of Islam as a faith and a holy law, or the other camp, the one that speaks of faith and worship and rejects Islamic law?

The Egyptian constitution answers this question unequivocally and decisively and throws responsibility for violation of the constitution on the second camp, that which rejects Islamic law and the view that Islam extends to all aspects of life.

This is the objective, surprising and painful fact that is demonstrated in the present article.

In the first lines of the Constitutional Proclamation, which constitutes an introduction to the provisions of the constitution itself, the Egyptian people who have granted themselves this constitution are described as "a people who believe in our immortal spiritual heritage, and who are confident of our profound faith".

Article 2 proclaims to the people that: "Islam is the religion of the state, Arabic its official language. Islamic jurisprudence is the chief source (al-masdar al-ra'isi) of legislation". The word "chief" (ra'isi) is derived from "head" (ra's), which means: "the eminence of power; that higher than everything; the master of the people; the first of anything; the entirety of the thing" (see the dictionary). This means that Islamic law is the most eminent source of legislation, the highest of them all, their sovereign, the first over all of them, and even their entirety. It is self-evident that rule or hegemony cannot be a secondary legislative source. Wherever there is a

difference among sources, the judgement of the predominant Islamic law is the most deserving of respect. Legislation thus becomes Islamic in all spheres of Egyptian life without exception.

It is unthinkable in any circumstances that article 2 of the constitution permits the exclusion of any aspect of our life from being subject to the chief source of legislation, namely Islamic law. It is foolish and stupid to say that politics, or economics, or society are not subject to the law of Islam. If Islamic law provides for consultation and free allegiance, it is imperative that the Egyptian system of political rule should be consultative and that it should be based on free allegiance. If Islamic law condemns the pointless squandering of the people's wealth, it is imperative that it should condemn all kinds of usurpation, looting, theft, misappropriation and oppression, the first of which is usury (riba). If Islamic law forbids espionage, all kinds of spying on citizens must be banned and prevented and punished by law. If Islamic law provides that the poor have a right to the protection of the wealthy, it is imperative that that right should be secured. If Islamic law requires that the needs of peoples should be met, then it is necessary that all needs be met until there are no hungry, homeless or naked in the Egyptian family. If Islamic law determines that the non-Muslim "people of the Book" should have the same rights and duties as Muslims, it is necessary to achieve, safeguard and implement that by all possible means. Article 2 of the constitution can only be understood in that sense. And that sense has no justification other than a belief that Islam is all of life, and that it comprises faith and worship just as it comprises politics, economics, and society. Any tendency to fragment Islam and shelve some of its aspects is, accordingly, an unconstitutional tendency, to say nothing of its being un-Islamic. And this is precisely the tendency of the non-religious writers and the fanatics who trade in attacking the slogan of our Party, "Islam is the solution", and who rose up, raged, and frothed in protest against the slogan of the Party's fifth general congress: "Comprehensive reform from an Islamic perspective". Despite all their claims and allegations that the Labor Party has violated the constitution, objective analysis of article 2 of our constitution confirms that it is they who are violating it and in rebellion against it. This is insolence sustained against the facts: The offender usurps the judge's seat, assumes the role of the public prosecution, attempts to impute his wrongdoing to honest men, and condemns the innocent for his own sin. In doing so, he is exploiting the partiality towards him of the ruling party, the fact that it provides him with a newspaper or magazine, and the fact that it recompenses him with high position, seductive rank and generous rewards.

There is nothing in the Labor Party program or in its slogans that adds to anything in the constitution. It is not true that the Party's program has "exceeded" the constitution, as one of the losers in the elections to the executive committee has claimed. Quite the opposite is true. Article 2 of the constitution stipulated at one time

that Islamic law was "one of the chief sources" of legislation; it was then amended in 1980 to read "the chief source of legislation". The Labor Party program, drawn up in 1979, stipulates that: "Islamic law is the basic (al-asasi) source of legislation in the state. Laws may not contain anything incompatible with Islamic law." The word "basic" (al-asasi) is derived from "uss", which means: "the foundation of a thing, its basis; the origin and beginning of a thing". The text as a whole adds nothing to what is contained in the constitution. Although it contains an additional expression explaining the word "basic" (al-asasi), it does not thereby depart from the scope of the meaning of the word "chief" (al-ra'isi) contained in the constitution, if it is not, indeed, somewhat weaker in expressing the hegemony of Islamic law and its sway over the other sources of legislation.

The essence of the matter, then, is that the constitutional provision that the religion of the state is Islam and that Islamic law is the chief source of legislation is the constitutional expression of the belief that "Islam is a complete life" encompassing faith and worship, society and ethics, politics and economics. Any attempt to fragment Islam, as the non-religious and the fanatics seek to do, is an attempt to violate the constitution. This must be halted and the perpetrators punished and brought to trial as offenders who are breaking the law and violating the constitution of the country.

This is the objective, astonishing and manifest fact which we place before our people, a people who believe in their immortal spiritual heritage and are confident in their profound belief and who have granted themselves a constitution which expresses their belief that Islam is all of life, is the solution to all our problems, and the guarantee of our independence, progress and happiness in this life and the next—even though the offenders, the fanatics and the non-religious may dislike that fact.

The question is not only that of article 2, as might be thought. It is also a matter of the true nature of the entire constitution as embodied in its provisions. This, God willing, will be the subject of our next article.

### **Commentator Sees Need for Egyptian "Bastille Day"**

45040424B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic  
15 Jul 89 pp 1, 2

[Editorial: "When Will the Egyptian Bastille Be Destroyed?"]

[Excerpts] Egypt is participating officially and in the media in France's 200th anniversary celebrations of its great revolution, which shook the pillars of the old world, and whose slogans of "liberty, justice, and equality" became a world-wide model, to be raised by all revolutions and all ruling regimes—even those that lack liberty, justice, and equality.

Egypt is linked historically to the French revolution, not only by Bonaparte's campaign, but also by the pursuit of revolution as a method of change and a program of government, regardless of the results that the revolution reached in each of the countries. [passage omitted]

The French revolution—the mother of revolutions—was the first to suffer from this contradiction between slogans and realities. The masses that destroyed the Bastille on this day 200 years ago were led by hope for a dignified life better than life under feudal princes and a feeble, irresolute monarchy. But as the days passed, the masses were deprived of their hopes. They fell victim to a band of swindlers, spillers of blood, and opportunists, who were skilled at delivering impassioned speeches, fine words, and fiery phrases, but who knew nothing about the art of governing or how to provide food and clothing for the deprived. Since the masses could not eat poetry or wear prose, they rose, swept away the heads of the terror, and destroyed the prisons crowded with the innocent. The French people discovered how much duplicity and deception there had been in the revolution, how much falseness and how many lies there had been in the flashy slogans. The French looked north. They found that their English neighbors across the channel had attained the same results of freedom and democracy without bloodshed. They found that the English had built their system of government on a foundation of parliamentary democracy that had become a model to imitate. The difference between the methods of the two countries became apparent to the world. The French had turned to bloody revolution; the English had held to the path of democratic revolution—if one may use the expression. Each of them had reached this high level of respect for human rights, respect for general freedoms, and respect for the nation's sovereignty.

What share did we, the people of the Arab East, have of these changes that blew our way from Europe with the increase of relations and links? Most of the military coups, from Husni al-Za'im's 1949 coup in Syria, to 'Umar al-Bashir's a few days ago in the Sudan, raised the French revolution's slogans of freedom and democracy, without embodying their content. As the leaders of coups understand it, freedom means the freedom to monopolize power, the freedom to coerce, oppress, and terrorize, the freedom to strike down every opposing voice, the freedom to open prison camps and jails. So it was with the coup of 23 July 1952, whose 37th anniversary the ruling National [Democratic] Party will celebrate in a few days. The leader of the coup announced his rejection of the parliamentary constitutional life that arose in Egypt following the 1919 revolution. He announced his intention to establish a sound, democratic life. Afterwards, the people discovered from hardships that democracy as understood by the leader of the coup meant cancelling the constitution, dissolving political parties, seizing the newspapers, turning the economy into the property of an enthroned government, and suppressing every voice that dared to speak out. Under his administration, "blessed Egypt" turned into a big

prison run by whip, arrogance, mutilation, and burying opponents alive. That was the concept of democracy as understood by the leader of the revolution. As for the concept of justice, it meant turning the Egyptian citizen into a hostage or prisoner, living on grants, gifts, and the support provided by the ruler, contingent upon heeding and obeying.

Is this the final outcome of the one-man rule that came as a result of the revolutionary method of change: youth-deadening unemployment, a suffocating economic crisis, sham representative councils formed by open fraud, and prisons populated by all shades and groups under the emergency law?

How we wanted official Egypt to go to the French celebrations, carrying in its right hand a book clean of all forms of coercion, suppression, fraud, disdain for the rule of law, and contempt for the will of the nation!

How we wanted Egypt to participate in the celebration of the fall of the Bastille, carrying real testimony to the fall of every Egyptian Bastille—carrying official testimony that all Egyptian prisons were empty of prisoners without trial!

How we wanted Egypt to participate in the festivities for liberty, justice, fraternity, and equality, while practicing these great principles in deed, not in word!

So we hoped; but one does not obtain everything one hopes for.

## IRAQ

### Educational Ties With Soviet Union Expand

44000618 Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER  
in English 12 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by Nadiya Ahmad]

[Text] The Soviet Union will offer 115 scholarships to Iraqi students in various specializations, in accordance with a new cultural agreement.

Iraq and the Soviet Union are also expected to exchange teachers to teach Arabic and Russian languages in universities of the two countries.

The new cultural cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries in Moscow recently.

A source at the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research told THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER that the agreement is based on an accord signed between the two countries in 1959.

According to the new agreement, universities in both countries will maintain close links. The Universities of Baghdad, Mawsil and Technology would enhance their ties with the Soviet Pushkin Institute, the Kazakhstan Institute and the Energy Institute in the Soviet Union.

The College of Science of Baghdad University and the Soviet Physics College would cooperate in scientific fields.

Furthermore, Iraq would offer Soviet students three one-year scholarships to study at Arabic Language Department in the College of Arts, Baghdad University.

The agreement allows for exchange of participants in international seminars, conferences and symposiums held in either country. It also provides for the exchange of publications.

According to the agreement, the Soviet side will offer 10 four-year scholarships for Iraqi students to study in Soviet industrial institutions. This is expected to be applied in the academic year of 1991-1992. Textbooks and teaching aids will be provided by the Soviet institutions for Iraqi secondary schools that teach Russian language.

Each year, 15 top Iraqi students from secondary schools would be sent to the Pushkin Institute in the Soviet Union, the agreement indicated.

Scholarships will be provided by the Soviet side for graduates of the Iraqi Music and Ballet School and the Music Institute.

The agreement also covers cooperation in information and culture fields. The Iraqi News Agency (INA) and the Soviet News Agency TASS would increase bilateral cooperation.

In 1990, Iraqis working in cinema industry are expected to take part in the Moscow International Film Festival and the Tashkent International Film Festival.

Iraqi films will be shown in the festivals. Folk troupes will take part in festivals and gatherings held in both countries. Iraqi and Soviet writers unions would exchange visits and publications, according to the agreement.

Soviet and Iraqi TV and Radio stations would further their cooperation links, on basis of the agreement signed between the two sides in June 1969. The two sides would enhance bilateral cooperation in fields of journalism, sports and youth activities.

## ISRAEL

### Defense Ministry Comments on Escalation of Uprising

44000640 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
27 Aug 89 p 2

[Text] Dan Sagir writes that "the escalation of intifadah [uprising] incidents that has been felt in the territories in the last month is explained in the defense establishment as being the result of Fatah convention decisions that called upon residents to step up acts of protest, of the reopening of schools in the West Bank, of the feeling of



residents of the territories that there is no progress on the political level, and the feeling that they have reached a dead end." A new direction in activity in the territories is incidents that the IDF [Israel Defense Force] calls "quasi-terroristic"—local activity, planned or spontaneous, to hurt Jews or IDF soldiers without using firearms.

### Arabs Planning Strategies for Histadrut Elections

44230156a Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR  
in Hebrew 27 Jun 89 p 8

[Article by Qasim Zayyd: "Outside the 'Unity'"]

[Text] The leaders of HADASH [Democratic Front for Peace and Equality], the Progressive Party, and Darwishah's Arab Democratic Party [ADP] are apparently taking a correct reading of the Arab political situation on the eve of elections for the Histadrut [Federation of Workers in Israel]. They have come to the conclusion that the raised minimum quota in elections for the Histadrut Congress to 3 percent may affect their parties' chances of exceeding the minimum quota if each one of them appears on a separate list; consequently, they merged on one list.

In recent weeks party representatives held secret meetings at which they examined the possibility of running for election together. They made a public announcement on their talks as soon as they came to an understanding and an agreement. At their last meeting last week they issued a joint communique in which they announced their intention to hammer out a joint list for the Histadrut Congress and Workers' Committees, while leaving the door open to all Arab parties and political bodies, including the Islamic Movement and the "Villagers' Party, to participate in forming the joint list.

Prior to that, HADASH leaders approached MAPAM [United Workers Party] and CRM [Citizens Rights Movement] for the purpose of forming a Jewish-Arab list, thereby expressing the unity between Jewish and Arab workers. Although the HADASH leaders' suggestion was not accepted, they continue to uphold their slogan that their joint list will be a Jewish-Arab list, so as to be able to show that they have tried, and to remove fears of an ethnic-isolationist list.

It is not clear how sincere was the suggestion to establish a joint list of majority Arab and Jewish parties; on the other hand, neither was it clear how sincere HADASH, the Progressive, and the ADP were in their invitation to the Islamic Party to appear on their joint list. It would appear that the leaders of the three parties know full well that the Islamic Party will never join in action with HADASH because of the ideological rift between them. Nevertheless, they decided to approach it in order to prove to the Arab public that by refusing to join hands with the "Arab Unity," the Islamic Party will bear the responsibility for the division among the ranks. It is also

possible that the three parties meant to hamper the progress of a party inexperienced in status and professional areas.

If a joint list does indeed come into being, that will be primarily a victory for HADASH, which will take up  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the list. The remaining third will be divided between the Progressive Party and the ADP. Although HADASH indeed has greater experience than the Progressive Party, ADP will be the one to call the tune.

As far as the Progressive Party and the ADP are concerned, forming a joint list with HADASH was the lesser of two evils. In the last elections to the Histadrut Congress the Progressive Party did not attain the minimum quota, while the ADP, which did not exist 4 years ago, is also afraid of a resounding defeat. The joint list will spoil the plans of all the parties vying for the Arab vote.

Alignment, which is in retreat among both Jews and Arabs, will not have an easy job of licking its wounds and winning the massive support of the Arab voter. Alignment will find it difficult to persuade Arab voters to vote for it, particularly in light of the fact that Arab Histadrut members are not happy with Histadrut services. They feel that its only service to them is the Sick Fund, and even that is not on a par with the services offered to Jews. Histadrut, led by Alignment, for years failed to improve and promote services and industrialization in Arab villages. Consequently, a majority of Arab workers are today unemployed.

The fact that MAPAM left the Alignment within Histadrut will also affect Alignment's chances. MAPAM, which leads the struggle against the brutal policy in the territories and has remained faithful to the struggle of Jewish and Arab workers, has good chances of winning a sizeable slice of the Arab vote.

Despite the appreciation that the CRM enjoys among Arabs from a political viewpoint, it is doubtful whether the party will win significant Arab support in the Histadrut elections. Arabs do not view the CRM as a workers' party. Many know that a fair percentage of its members are not socialists and are not much interested in labor issues.

The Islamic Party, which has not yet mapped out its policy for the Histadrut elections, takes the place of the other parties' propaganda. The party leaders currently find themselves in the thick of debate to establish their future line. Apparently, party leaders will not join in forming a joint list with HADASH, because their party is at the beginning of its political career and is not interested in blurring the differences of views between it and HADASH. Today, the Islamic Party leaders regret not having hastened to map out their line on the eve of elections for Histadrut, before the announcement of the joint list of HADASH, the Progressive Party, and ADP, and they admit that they have missed an opportunity to be the first to sway the trend among Arab voters.

It would seem that the Islamic Party will not reach a decision in the coming month, in view of the fact that its leaders are now on pilgrimage to Mecca. Hence, the decision is frozen until their return from Saudi Arabia.

The Alignment-Histadrut leadership has for some time been courting the Islamic Party; one of the senior advisers to the Histadrut director general, Yisra'el Qis-sar, is attempting to have talks with the Islamic leadership, but his chances look very poor, in view of the fact that the Islamic Party will fear that cooperation with Alignment will make it fall victim to attacks by its rivals. Thus, two possibilities remain open to the party: to cooperate with one of the left-wing parties, including MAPAM, or to allow its supporters to vote independently according to their considerations and understanding.

Five months before the elections for Histadrut the picture of the situation among the Arab voting public is neither quite clear nor final. It is difficult to predict how the 170,000 Arab Histadrut members will vote. Naturally, political and state events in Israel and in the region and the electoral platforms of the various parties will have an impact on the Arab vote.

Very broadly it can be said that the formation of a joint list between HADASH, the Progressive Party, and ADP on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the fact that the Islamic Party has not taken a position are leaving the Arab voters exposed to propaganda. At the same time, despite expected changes, it can be said that the Arab vote will probably be split and will not tilt the balance in the Histadrut elections—on the contrary.

### Reserve General Ely Gev'a on Military Affairs

44230155b Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT Weekend  
Supp in Hebrew 30 Jun 89 p 11

[Interview with Reserve General Ely Gev'a by Yaron London; date, place not given]

[Text] Rafal, in his autobiographical book, devotes a chapter to him. In history books, an equally long line will be dedicated to each of them. The leader of the most failed war on the one hand, on the other, the symbol of the conflict which that war aroused. Ely Gev'a, then 32 years old, one of the youngest unit commanders, requested to be released from his command on the eve of the incursion into Beirut. It is not certain that his protest made a difference, but it is certain that Gev'a was the symbol of the rift. As always, the man is smaller than the symbol. A good man, brave and true, he enjoys games of logic but does not withstand the test of logical consistency.

Seven years have gone by. Now he manages small companies that manufacture continuous form paper. His expertise, acquired after a long and difficult period of adjustment, is expressed in finding suitable balances. At

the beginning of the week he shut down a plant in Jerusalem and resolved a painful dispute over compensation to his workers.

There are within him patterns of a man of Zen: tense and relaxed. His eyes are mischievous and his smile is restrained. Carmel Systems and containers gives him ample time to seek out new opportunities. His wife, Liora, is an attorney. She specializes in business law and makes good money. They live comfortably with their three children in a cottage in Ra'anana.

Gev'a's self-confidence, I am sure, is a foundation that was not achieved through suffering, but was molded within him like an embryo in the womb. His mother died when he was a child and he acquired a young and devoted stepmother. He had a stable orphanhood.

His father, Reserve General Yosef Gev'a, was a man with a lust for life, intelligent and magnificently built. He was the kind of father you envy, until your eyes meet his.

It is easy to imagine Ely, a stocky youth, standing in front of his soldiers, or tapping out messages on his communications device. Without hesitation, he offers himself to the judgement of his interviewer. "I believe I was right," he might say, "but perhaps I was wrong."

The intifadah [uprising] vibrates with questions close to those that stimulated his separation from the command of his unit: the limits of obedience, the justification for refusing to serve, the responsibility of the commander, and the like.

Gev'a tends to deny the representational role we have saddled him with. He refuses to be the main character in our fable.

This may be seen as modesty ("What, after all, did I do?") or as arrogance ("My case is not like the others. It is special in its own right.")

I started with a question on the similarity between the situation in Lebanon and the intifadah. The differences are marked: in Lebanon, the initiative was ours, whereas we did not initiate the intifadah. In Lebanon, we were able to activate the full force of the army, whereas in dealing with the intifadah, there are very heavy restrictions on the use of force. There are also disparities in the character of these political differences of opinion.

The similarity is that in both conflicts, our enemy comes out ahead. The enemy realizes a significant portion of his goals, whereas we cannot escape the conclusion that in both cases we failed to achieve what we wanted.

What we could have achieved in Lebanon fell short of the leaders' expectations, but we did not accomplish even those goals within our reach.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you find a similarity in the fundamental reasons for the resistance? The quality of leadership? The level of officers?

[Gev'a] There is a certain similarity with reference to the "greater" Israel Defense Forces [IDF], in decision-making at the strategic level. In both cases, the military leadership did not organize the fragments of information to make an intelligent generalization.

In Lebanon, we did not do this at the beginning, nor at the stage of occupying territory. The elite, who should have seen at a certain point the strategic permutations that were taking place, failed to do so.

In the more strictly defined IDF, from the unit commanders to the rank and file soldiers, there is no similarity between the two campaigns, Lebanon and the intifadah.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is the difference?

[Gev'a] In Lebanon, the same section of the IDF that was supposed to carry out the goals imposed on it had the appropriate tools and technology, and the goals were accomplished. In some sectors the IDF was completely successful; in other areas it met with burning defeat. But even in these latter, in places where they failed, at least some of the military objectives were achieved. The same is not true in Judaea and Samaria or Gaza.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] From time to time, people complain to the minister of defense that he has not given the army a clear order to eliminate the intifadah.

[Gev'a] It would not help the chief of staff if he were to speak, and later have to deny that he spoke the truth about the intifadah: there is no full military solution, because 1 and 1/2 million Arabs will not disappear, even with the help of prayer.

The role of the army is to provide better tactical answers, to calm the situation, and to allow a satisfactory respite until a diplomatic solution can be found.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you have "better tactical answers?"

[Gev'a] I do, but I will not allow myself to be quoted. I have discussed them with people who deal with the subject, But I do not want to be like the annoying reserve officers who made suggestions to the army when I was a career officer.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] To use more force?

[Gev'a] To the contrary. What I can say is; that there must be a tariff...I am talking in terms of a man who deals in commerce...impose a tariff on Arab provocation. They should know the price they will pay for each of their acts.

The army must reduce its forces in the territories, because the very presence of the army among Arab residents draws fire, or stones. The army should spend more time preventing divisiveness between the Arab population and the Jewish settlers, because the frequent

antagonism between the two populations impedes the Israeli leadership from achieving the diplomatic process.

From among the possible strategies, I will mention only one: the Palmah [Strike Force of the Hagana] established a unit of Arabic speakers who penetrated the enemy's ranks. Something like that should be established, to conduct activities that will flush the leaders of the intifadah out of their holes so they can be captured.

In the meantime, the strategists of the intifadah have been more successful than we have been at tailoring their means to their needs. It may be true that it is much easier to conduct a guerilla war against an army with moral and political convictions than it is to suppress the guerrilla fighters. Only Ge'ula Kohen thinks the intifadah can be ended quickly.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] The two campaigns, the war in Lebanon and the intifadah, brought out the problem of the division of responsibility between the political echelon and the military echelon. Do you have a formula?

[Gev'a] This separation gets my back up, not because I think that the senior army command should dictate political processes, rather because it is impossible for generals not to serve as a workshop for political thought. They must make their contribution to the formulation of national political strategy.

Once you relieve them of this function, you allow them to play the role of pawns. This is very convenient for the generals but very bad for the army. Then they can say: What do you want from me? I did not know that the army intended to go deeper than 40 km into Lebanon. If you do not know, then how did you prepare for the war? That is, what war did you prepare for?

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You know the heroes. You served under Mitzn'a. What is your opinion of him?

[Gev'a] He is a superior officer and history will turn to his credit the fact that, at every step of the way, he was careful to maintain a humanistic image. Beyond that, he should be judged according to the principle I suggested earlier: To overcome the intifadah, we must come up with no end of new ideas in order to compete with the initiators of the uprising who hold so many of the cards in their hands,

In recent days, there have been comparisons made between Mitzn'a and Yitzhaq Mordekhay. I am not saying that Mordekhay is not a good officer. But if whoever appointed him is relying on his record in Gaza, that is bullshit, because you cannot compare the complexity of the control over Judaea and Samaria with the relative simplicity of the situation in Gaza. In Gaza, the territory is small. There are no settlers in the heart of the Arab population, and the international press is not blocking your every move.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Are there officers in the IDF hierarchy who should not be there?

[Gev'a] There are many. In any event, 26 generals is an insane number. [YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Is there anyone who should be in the IDF hierarchy and is not?

[Gev'a] I will point out only one: Avigdor Kahalani. I was under his command in the Yom Kippur war. And I know there were moments when he and only he tipped the scales of fate in the battle against the Syrians. There is no one among those who were with him that could claim responsibility for those moments. They belong only to him.

Perhaps he is not a great strategist, but he is a symbol. There are those generals who were appointed for empty reasons, mere balloons filled with air.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Your separation from the command of your unit was a radical act of protest. How do you judge those who protest against the policy of the government in the territories by refusing to serve?

[Gev'a] Their actions are harmful. I cannot match the verbal slaughter of Ish'ayahu Libovitch, but I do think that he is misguided when he holds the hands of those who refuse to serve. I am aware of the possibility that from the vantage point of the historian, the act of refusal may appear to balance the scales against the opposite kind of extremism. In a few more years, the historian will say it was good that decisionmakers knew that there were limits; that was the role fulfilled by those who "drew the line."

But as one who refused the instinct that drives men to walk together, I can tell you that there is also a limit to man's ability to be separate. The refusal to serve in the territories is causing an upheaval in Israel. And we must not be distracted in this way because we face a real problem of survival. Any fair man, left-wing or right-wing, will admit that. I think that these people, whose political solutions are not far from my own, can influence the behavior of the army, especially when they serve.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] I do not understand the difference in principle between your type of protest in Lebanon and the type of protest conducted by those who "draw the line."

[Gev'a] I am aware that I have failed in my meager efforts to explain that difference. It may be that I was wrong not to try harder. Then, 7 years ago, there were complex issues and charged feelings. Later, when the perspective became more clear, I was no longer interested in bringing those issues up again, I went on.

Now, I will tell you: even in Beirut, when I was debating how to act, I knew I was not merely right. In my righteousness, there was an integral degree of injustice. But I thought I was more right than wrong. I am just a man, and it is possible that I have not been able to see things at arms length. I did not tell my commanders that I would refuse to carry out an order. It was clear to everyone that despite my opposition to the incursion

into Beirut, that I would stand up and carry out any order given to me, unless it was blatantly illegal.

Rafael's greatest success in his struggle with me was that he successfully clouded the fact that he refused to give me an order. I know why he did not: because I left a written prophecy as to the results of entering the city. Had such a command been given, he could not have denied the fact that someone knew and warned him.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Were blatantly illegal commands given and carried in Lebanon?

[Gev'a] Not in places where I fought. But I think there was bombing from the air and shelling of civilian targets in Beirut that bordered on illegality—really walking a fine line.

In Beirut there was no talk about bombing terrorist hideouts, where one would then be compelled to kill civilians living in proximity, willingly or unwillingly. There was talk of bombing aimed at breaking down the spirit of the people.

Not only were the pilots who followed orders guilty, but also mainly those responsible for sending them. These latter, both from the point of view of their position and from the point of view of the time and resources available to them, when the decisions were made, bear the brunt of the responsibility.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] It was Knesset Member Yitzhaq Rabin who made the infamous suggestion to tighten the siege on Beirut. That makes him a moral partner to acts that border on the blatantly illegal.

[Gev'a] The leadership of the Labor Party understood too late the significance of the war.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Regarding Rabin, are you unwilling to draw the conclusions to their full seriousness?

[Gev'a] Neither of us heard what he said to Arik [Sharon]. I am not at all sure that what was published was the truth. Every minister came up with a version that suited his purpose. I prefer to avoid generalizations.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What would you do with an officer that said to you: I am not prepared to restore order in a disruptive village near Nabulus because I predict that there will be thus and so many civilian casualties?

[Gev'a] Ask your question directly. What would I do with Ely Gev'a, and I will tell you: I would give him an explicit order to carry out the commands he receives, when he receives them, if he receives them.

But, at the same time, I would digest what Ely Gev'a was saying, and put it into the equation. And perhaps I would have the ability to change the solutions I had planned. A general must have the ability to define a problem, and

generalize data. Thus, he must be, in a sense, a fountain of suggestions and new ideas.

If the officer were to say to me what you established in your example, I would digest the information. And if I arrived at the conclusion that in light of this information there was reason to change my approach, I would change it. If not, I would order him to obey.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] That is how you always behaved: you obeyed or you protested and carried out your orders after making the decision that followed your protest, even if you did not like it?

[Gev'a] I am telling you explicitly: twice, in the course of the war, I did not carry out specific orders given by the chief of staff. He knows this. And he knows that I prevented a great deal of bloodshed.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Where?

[Gev'a] Only for your ears. I will not be quoted.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] If that is the case, then you disobeyed orders, and in terms of your decision, you asked to be released from the command of your unit. If that was just an attempt at persuasion and not protest, then I will allow myself to say that I do not understand you at all.

[Gev'a] You are separating the events from the circumstances at the time. Three weeks after the outbreak of the war in Lebanon events occurred quickly. Senior officers, with inexplicable faint-heartedness, did not dare to say aloud what they were thinking. They cried on each other's shoulders and allowed the chief of staff to continue making mistakes. After a certain battle, close to Beirut, an officer came to me and cried, actually cried, about 14 boys that he lost in one battle, and more than 26 that had been killed in another. Even so, they did not dare to open their mouths.

So it is true that I used drastic means. But those were the means available to me in that situation.

Despite that, I tell you that no man can be his own judge, and therefore I cannot criticize the fact that they did not allow me to continue. I paid the price.

I would like to change the subject and deal with the issue of cost: Every stand you take has a price that you must pay with pride.

Rabin is right when he compares the people in the northern settlements with the settlers in Judaea and Samaria. The residents in the north did not all settle there by choice.

Rather, the settlers established themselves where they did out of solid political and religious views, but they cry all the same. What do they cry? That they will pay the price. I paid—for the stand I took. Let history judge me.

### **Murders in Gaza Strip Examined**

44000639 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 27 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] A military correspondent quotes a senior military source as saying: "Only 20 percent of the Palestinians murdered in the Gaza Strip are known to us as having cooperated with the security arms. The remaining 80 percent, murdered by masked assailants, are not directly or indirectly connected with the General Security Service, the IDF [Israel Defense Force], or the Civil Administration and police, and it is not clear to us why they were murdered." The source added that the IDF is focusing its activity in the territories on the struggle against groups of masked people, who spread fear and create an atmosphere of terror in the neighborhoods, and concentrate their struggle against the magnetic cards. According to the officer, many Gaza Strip residents have been murdered for no special reason, a fact which testifies to a loss of control by the leadership. The IDF is making great efforts to protect those who cooperate with the authorities.

### **Regulations Governing Defense-Related Exports Reported**

44000644 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 25 Aug 89 p 2

[Text] Dan Sagir reports that the export of arms, combat materiel, and defense know-how from Israel is subject to regulations and orders updated at the end of 1986, in the wake of the Bar'am affair, also known as the "Bermuda Affair." The following are the regulations which are currently binding: The declaration of the supervision of products and services (combat materiel and defense know-how) 1986, and the defense service regulations (obligations of reserve duty soldiers), 1986. According to the supervision order, it is prohibited to conduct negotiations for exports and the providing of defense know-how to someone who is not an Israeli resident or to a corporation not controlled by Israel. In accordance with the regulations and procedures of the Ministry of Defense, it is prohibited to conduct negotiations for consulting, export mediation, or the providing of defense know-how without first receiving a license from the Defense Ministry's director general. In the second stage the interested party must receive a license and approval prior to executing any export deal (the regulations are the same for weapons, equipment, and know-how). The licenses are given in accordance with the type of weapons and service being sold, the target countries, or organizations within those countries, and an array of political and security considerations examined beforehand. In particularly sensitive cases, the decision is made by the defense minister himself, and sometimes even by a vote in the Inner Cabinet. Sagir remarks that in order to reduce the number of licenses and to increase the Defense Ministry's control, it was determined in 1986 that no "general" licenses for defense exports would be issued, and that a new license for negotiations would have to be requested each year.

**Government Investments in Territories 1988-1989 Given**

44000641 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 25 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] Arye Avneri and Yisra'el Tomer report that according to an internal document of the budget department of the Ministry of Finance, the estimate of investments by government ministries in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza in 1988-1989 is \$220 million. The investments are being made in new settlements, industry, water, paving of roads, tourism, and other areas.

**Figures on Uprising-Related Arrests Given**

44000642 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 30 Aug 89 p 10

[Text] Military Advocate General Amnon Straschnow yesterday told a conference of lawyers in Eilat that since the beginning of the intifadah [uprising], 40,000 arrests have been made in the territories and some 16,000 of those arrested have been tried. According to Straschnow, administrative detention has proven its effectiveness. He added that 85 soldiers and officers have been transferred from their posts in the territories since the beginning of the uprising, and that some of them were forced to leave the army.

**Union of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce Established**

44000643 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 31 Aug 89 p 7

[Text] A union of Palestinian chambers of commerce and industry was established in East Jerusalem this week, for the first time since 1967. The chairman of the union is 'Ali Muhammad Ta'ziz, head of the East Jerusalem chamber of commerce. The new chamber of commerce will deal with all industry and trade problems in the territories, including those related to the intifadah [uprising].

**JORDAN****Large Drug Cache Discovered**

53004526 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 4 Jul 89 p 2

[Article: "Smuggled to Neighboring Arab Countries. Large Amounts of Narcotics Destroyed in Jordanian Cement Company Furnaces"]

[Text] Large amounts of narcotics, drug enforcement agencies had seized in the past few months when they foiled a number of smuggling operations aimed at neighboring Arab countries, were destroyed yesterday in the Jordanian Cement Company furnaces.

Major General Nassuh Muhyi-al-Din, assistant director of judicial police public security and chairman of the committee overlooking the destruction process, said that

the amount destroyed included 1,348 kilograms of hashish, 9 kgs of heroin, 26 kgs of opium, a total of 51,658 narcotic "keptagin" pills and 207 hemp plants.

In a statement to the Jordanian News Agency, he said that these drugs, that were the subject of 99 police cases, are valued at about 2 million Jordanian dinars at consumer market prices.

Maj Gen Muhyi-al-Din indicated that the total number of seizures recorded by the Drug Enforcement Administration this year has reached a level unprecedented in Jordan since the administration came into being, emphasizing that the seized material, according to investigations, was on its way to neighboring Arab countries.

He said that, thank God, Jordan has been clean of narcotics and the number of addicts is very small and mostly comprised of students who studied or worked in countries where narcotics are easy to come by.

He pointed out that Jordan's geographic location between producing and consuming countries has encouraged smugglers to use its territory as a corridor for their smuggling operations, but effective measures and outstanding scientific methods employed by Jordanian enforcement agencies in the last few years have led to the entrapment of veteran gangs and the seizure of most operations, emphasizing that the Jordanian people's awareness and effective help played a major part in this regard.

The committee included the directors of the Investigations and Budget Administration, Criminal Examination, Legal Affairs, Narcotics and Counterfeiting and representatives of Military Justice and the Ministries of Health and of Finance and Customs.

**LEBANON****Views on Current Situation Presented****Kazim al-Khalil (Pro Tem) Interviewed**

44040502 London AL-HAWADITH  
in Arabic 14 Jul 89 pp 14-15

[Interview With Deputy Kazim al-Khalil, speaker pro tem of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies; Date, Place not Given; "Kazim al-Khalil to AL-HAWADITH: I Fear Lebanon Will Stay in The Freezer Until Middle East Crisis Is Resolved"]

[Text] If the president of Lebanon were to be elected next Thursday, for example, the person to set the date and summon the deputies to meet at the parliament has to be Deputy Kazim al-Khalil in his capacity as speaker pro tem of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. There has been a lot of din and clamor on Kazim al-Khalil's speakership of the Chamber of Deputies among all the Lebanese, be they deputies, politicians or ordinary citizens, keeping in mind that the Lebanese citizen is more strongly attached to politics and the political industry

than the deputies and the political leaders themselves. It was said at the beginning of last fall that Husayn al-Husayni's speakership of the Chamber of Deputies had ended with the end of the term which will be renewed by the new constitution. Because it was impossible for the Chamber of Deputies to meet, some constitutional experts expressed the view that by law, al-Husayni's speakership reverted to the most senior member. George Fidel, a French constitutional expert, is one of those who hold this view. But another legal study submitted by Edmund Rabbat, a well-known Lebanese legislator, says that al-Husayni's speakership remains legitimate by the rule of continuity until the chamber convenes and elects a new speaker and a new president of the republic. This is because the chamber's failure to convene is the result of security difficulties, not of al-Husayni's determination to retain the speakership. Rabbat's study also says that beginning with the 2 months preceding the end of ex-President Amin al-Jumayyil's term in office on 23 September 1989 [as published], the Lebanese deputies have constituted a purely electoral body that is not entitled to legislate, consider laws or engage in any other activity, meaning that since 23 July 1989, Speaker al-Husayni has been the chairman of the parliamentary electoral body. On the other hand, General 'Awn's government has objected to this interpretation and has, on its part, considered Kazim al-Khalil to be the chamber speaker in his capacity as the pro-tem chairman. General 'Awn's government and a number of constitutional experts considered Kazim al-Khalil the speaker when he represented the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies as its speaker on more than one national occasion, including the independence anniversary (22 September)—an occasion when he sat on the official review stand next to the head of the military government. Kazim al-Khalil has refused to get involved in bickering over this particular issue because he does not wish the argument over his speakership to lead to the replacement of the current Chamber of Deputies by another chamber because the current chamber is the only body that has not been divided or splintered throughout the war years.

The debate has not, of course, subsided even though the complaint about al-Husayni's speakership and al-Khalil's speakership is not as severe as the complaint about 'Awn's premiership and al-Huss' premiership. Despite all these complaints, the Chamber of Deputies speaker who will run a session to elect a president is the pro-tem speaker, i.e. Kazim al-Khalil. It is in this particular capacity that al-Khalil sent last week an important message to the members of the Arab Supreme Tripartite Committee (a message which he has given exclusively to AL-HAWADITH to publish) and coupled this message with a complete draft solution to the Lebanese crisis—a solution which deals with the sectarianism of jobs, with the president's powers, with the parliament and with the cabinet. Kazim al-Khalil believes that the Lebanese war is not a civil or sectarian war but a war imposed on the Lebanese—a political war under all circumstances and a war that has nothing to do with religion or with the sects.

Al-Khalil's draft solution focuses on electing a new president of the republic. But for the president to be elected, there has to be a cabinet and for a cabinet to be formed, the deputies have to be able to meet, once to elect their speaker and once to elect a president. Therefore, it is understood from Kazim al-Khalil's plan that reform will follow formation of the new cabinet because what side [other than the cabinet] can present a reform bill to the Chamber of Deputies to be approved or disapproved?

Articles 53 and 54 of the constitution have to be amended. For them to be amended, the provisions of articles 76, 77 and 79 of the constitution are supposed to be observed. These articles dictate the presence of a legitimate cabinet which applies to the Chamber of Deputies for an amendment of the constitution.

Kazim al-Khalil also says that for a president of the republic to be elected, the deputies (and the people, of course) must have security in order that the deputies may perform their role without pressures or threats. Consequently, this cycle must be broken finally so that people may not keep on reiterating the story of the chicken and the egg. Whether it is the egg before the chicken or the chicken before the egg, what is needed is a chicken to lay eggs and an egg to produce another chicken.

For all this and to avoid an unjustifiable crisis, Kazim al-Khalil has sent a complete draft solution to the tripartite committee. AL-HAWADITH has interviewed al-Khalil on his plan and on the Lebanese situation as he sees it.

The following is the interview:

[AL-HAWADITH] What did you expect the tripartite committee to do for Lebanon?

[Al-Khalil] I expected the tripartite committee to perform a survey on Lebanon's crisis, remove the malady and restore a sound and healthy Lebanon. However, I see the resolution issued by the committee as nothing but some sort of a palliative that postpones the surgery. Till what time? This is the committee's secret.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you think that the Arabs are in agreement on solving the Lebanon crisis?

[Al-Khalil] It seems that the Arab countries have been interested in ending the Lebanese crisis, especially recently. But they have resorted to the long-drawn approach whereas Lebanon is in the direst need of prompt accomplishments. The proverb says: "He who receives the blows from a stick is not like he who counts them."

[AL-HAWADITH] What role do the major powers have?

[Al-Khalil] To date, we have received from the major powers, led by the United States, nothing but honeyed words to the effect that Lebanon's independence, territories, safety and sovereignty must be preserved. But

practically, we feel that these are hollow and meaningless words. What I fear worst is that they plan to put the Lebanese crisis in the freezer until the Palestinian-Israeli crisis is ended and Lebanon is made the sacrificial lamb for ending this crisis—a sacrificial lamb burnt in an incinerator designed, built and founded by the Zionist Henry Kissinger, the object of wrath who has asked God to forgive him, and I don't think He will forgive him but will send him to hell, and what an evil fate.

What has afflicted Lebanon to date is nothing but a part of what Kissinger planned and what he has encouraged, and continues to encourage, implementing verbatim. I hope President George Bush will remove this man from the foreign policy arena. If he wishes to retain him, then let him retain him for his domestic policy.

If the major powers have a role now, it must be the role of supporting the Arab efforts and Arab League resolutions and of expediting the implementation of these resolutions, especially the resolutions on a cease-fire, on lifting the blockades and on opening the crossing points.

[AL-HAWADITH] Does your plan include reconsidering the sect of the president, prime minister and chamber speaker?

[Al-Khalil] It is difficult now to alter the sect of the president, prime minister and speaker. But if we wish to save Lebanon in the future, and the near future at that, then we are supposed to abolish sectarianism from all of Lebanon's institutions and positions as soon as possible because the political sectarianism which politicians use as a pretext and behind which they hide in Lebanon and outside Lebanon is this country's malady. Therefore, it is our duty to eliminate it. Sectarianism has been clung to so far only because there are no sound and healthy parties, excluding one or two parties, from which the Lebanese policy emanates. All the other parties are either personal or dynastic parties. To eliminate political sectarianism, we must begin by abolishing it in the parliamentary elections which must be held on non-sectarian bases. This means abolishing the candidates' sectarianism and allowing the largest number of voters from the various sects to take part in electing the same candidate. Therefore, we are required to divide Lebanon into 5 or 6 election districts. There is no objection at present if we take the governorates and make each an election district. We will thus let all sects take part in electing a single candidate representing them and will make this representative accountable to all the sects, not just to one sect.

I do not share the opinion of those who express reservations and fear that the minorities will lose their representation in the parliamentary assembly because I believe that competition between candidates in the election districts and the formation of numerous lists of candidates dictate that the candidates seek the help of the minorities and that they represent them in the parliament. This theory has been indisputably confirmed by the municipal elections which are held in Lebanon

and which are not tied to sectarian division. These elections have secured the rights of all the minorities.

#### **Text of Kazim al-Khalil's Message to The Arab Supreme Tripartite Committee**

"The world welcomed it and the Lebanese hailed it when you took charge of the responsibility of rescuing Lebanon from its ordeal.

"This is because you are the messengers of right guidance, love and amity to a nation with which division and aimlessness have toyed and which is now in the direst need of its leaders' help. The nation has tested its leaders' mettle and has found your mettle to be the firmest. It has thus entrusted you with rescuing it and with proclaiming the truth, fearing nobody's censure. Supporting the weak, your excellency, is a national, pan-Arab and humanitarian duty, and whoever abandons his duty is sinful.

"The brothers owe Lebanon the right to tend it and protect its survival.

"In the south, there are Arab people who believe in God and in their homeland. They are people who have fallen prey to their enemy and yours—an enemy who pours on them the wrath of his fire, who sheds their blood, destroys their homes, drives their children homeless and wreaks havoc on all the mainstays of their life, violating their safety, land, sovereignty and independence. They seek your protection from a tyrannical and oppressive enemy that will not desist.

"If we turn to the reasons and causes of complaint, we will find that which may help develop the desired solution. This is what I am presenting. If you find it worthy of your excellency's conviction, you will endorse it and the sublime national objectives will be achieved.

"May God keep you a support and haven for all the Arabs and may He preserve you and lead you on the right path."

Lebanese Chamber of Deputies Speaker Pro-Tem Kazim al-Khalil

#### **Shi'ite Deputy Rafiq Shahin Interviewed**

44040502 London AL-HAWADITH  
in Arabic 14 Jul 89 pp 15, 17

[Interview With Shi'ite Deputy Dr Rafiq Shahin at His Residence in East Beirut; Date not Given; "Rafiq Shahin to AL-HAWADITH: Solution Will not Be Completed Until South Is Liberated"]

[Text] Deputy Dr Rafiq Shahin has a special characteristic that distinguishes him from the other Lebanese politicians. He is the deputy of al-Nabatiyah, in the Shi'ite south, and he is related by marriage to the late Sulayman al-'Ali, a Sunni deputy who has a strong popular and political presence in 'Akkar. Shahin is married to Zaynah al-'Ali al-Mar'ibi, a cousin of the



'Akkar leader. Moreover, Shahin lives in East Beirut, al-Hazimiyah specifically, crosses the line separating the two Beiruts, visits West Beirut and then returns to East Beirut.

Dr Shahin is very close to Speaker Husayn al-Husayni. This has motivated him to contribute to crystallizing several settlement plans during the crisis which has shaken the country for 4 months. He conveyed a series of proposals and contacted many of the parties concerned, exploring their opinions and then conveying these opinions to the other party. He has thus truly gained the quality of "messenger of good."

AL-HAWADITH has interviewed Dr Shahin at his residence, talked to him at length on numerous issues and sought his opinion on numerous positions.

[AL-HAWADITH] Dr Rafiq Shahin, the Arab reader wants to know on what crossroad Lebanon is standing nowadays.

[Shahin] There is no doubt that Lebanon is currently undergoing the most delicate phase of its political life. It is at a very dangerous crossroad. Therefore, all the efforts are currently focused on steering it away from this crossroad which may lead to dividing and partitioning it if goodwill is not present in the dealings among all the parties concerned—goodwill that enables us to develop common denominators that rescue this homeland and restore to it its health, independence and sovereignty so that it may be able to regain its role among its brothers in the Arab countries, may exercise its presence in the international sphere and may deal with all countries at the level of its cultural, political and economic entity.

On this basis, we all find, whether within the domestic or foreign framework, that all the sincere, and they are the silent or moderate majority, focus their efforts on facilitating any initiative, be it domestic, Arab or international, to rescue Lebanon.

This is insofar as the domestic framework is concerned. Within the Arab framework, we feel for the first time that there is Arab credibility in the approach to the Lebanese issue since the Arab summit convened and the tripartite committee, comprised of Arab kings and president, was formed. Therefore, what this committee—which has gained the support of all the Arab countries and of all the European countries, and especially of the United States and the Soviet Union which have blessed its movement and supported its endeavor—will do to rescue Lebanon from the crisis in which it has been floundering for 15 years [as published].

Because of all these circumstances which did not exist previously, there are international and Arab indicators that motivate me to be optimistic about what this honorable tripartite committee, from which we hope for good results, can do, especially with its expected executive resolutions, to loosen the conditions in Lebanon and to later embark on a complete and comprehensive solution.

A loosening of the domestic security conditions is occurring at present in the wake of the turn these conditions took toward a land and naval blockade which was not confined to one area but which included all of Lebanon because the Lebanese people are one people. The political part of the Arab committee's action is embodied in familiarizing itself with all the opinions of the various Lebanese parties concerned now that Arab League Assistant Secretary Lakhdar Ibrahim, and prior to him the Arab six-member committee, has been fully familiarized with all the political opinions of all the Lebanese parties concerned, whether at the official political level or at the level of the political notables in East and West Beirut.

It is my belief that what this committee will accomplish, keeping in mind that all of us as Lebanese are supposed to aid it and help facilitate its mission, is the development of a vision for dealing with the political part of the political crisis. Some say that elections must be held remotely from any pressure or coercion and that an agreement must be reached on reconciliation and on reforming the political conditions. Others say that elections and reform must be simultaneous. A third group says that it is impossible to hold elections before complete political reform is attained and the responsibilities of all the parties are defined. We do not wish to disable any initiative that seeks to activate process, especially since the tripartite committee has assumed this mission and has pledged not to fail. It should be noted that this was a fundamental condition made in the Casablanca summit because the committee members agreed to the mission after hearing promises from all the Arab countries to support and observe the resolutions. Therefore, failure is prohibited for this committee.

Now that the committee has put all the papers on the table, it will develop a vision which will be taken into account after the security aspect, on whose contents an agreement is in place, is dealt with completely. The committee will also have a working plan in accordance with which the Lebanese will be able to turn to dealing with their political situation.

As an official of the State of Lebanon and through my belonging to the mother constitutional institution, namely the parliamentary assembly which is the only legitimate institution that has continued to perform its duties, I find it necessary to reconcile those advocating the theory of reform first and those advocating the theory of election first by developing any solution other than simultaneity. What I mean is that we cannot dive into the reform process under this circumstance. In 15 years, we have not accomplished anything specific. So how can we accomplish reform at this particular time when the country has no constitutional institutions exercising their powers? So the entity must be saved first and the country must be rescued from collapse, partition and division. But we can draw up the broad lines of the reform agreed upon at the many meetings held in the past and at present between members of the legislative authority and numerous political notables. These broad lines are tantamount to a working paper on which the

deputies agree and which is similar to what was issued by the Chamber of Deputies in 1976 (the constitutional charter). At its first official meeting, the chamber can ratify this document which will have been discussed by a single assembly incorporating all the deputies or in a plenary parliamentary meeting. The presidential election can be held simultaneously.

As for the detailed political reform called for by this memorandum, it will be studied by the cabinet which will be formed—an expanded national cabinet which presents bills or constitutional amendments that emanate from the spirit of the memorandum approved by the chamber.

[AL-HAWADITH] What are the broad lines of this memorandum, especially since you have visited Speaker Husayn al-Husayni repeatedly and discussed this issue with him?

[Shahin] I will say more. I will be revealing no secret when I say that in the past, when the Americans played the role of the mediator or mailman between Beirut and Damascus in dealing with the Lebanese situation, especially with the political reform, I was acquainted with the course of the events, considering that I was repeatedly entrusted with conveying the political ideas of some of the Lebanese parties concerned to the American team so that it may be familiar with their viewpoint. By virtue of this, I was acquainted with most of the political reform proposals concerning the executive authority and its powers, the role of the Chamber of Deputies and the distribution of its seats and with the proposals on how and when to abolish sectarianism, and so forth. These are the bannerlines that have been the subject of discussion, and numerous proposals have been made to explain their provisions and to put them in greater detail until a cabinet is formed and it undertakes the task of fully clarifying these bannerlines.

For example, there has been an acceptable idea which says that when the executive authority is confined to the cabinet which is headed by the president of the republic, in case a cabinet meeting is held under the prime minister's chairmanship in the president's absence, the decisions made by the cabinet will be presented to the president. If he approves them, they go into force. Otherwise, another cabinet session should be held under the president and he would call for a vote on the decisions. If they win a majority, then they will be implemented. As for determining the majority and whether this majority consists of  $\frac{1}{2}$  the votes plus one or three quarter the votes, this can be agreed on later.

As for the abolition of political sectarianism, which everybody is demanding, it cannot be accomplished with the stroke of a pen. One cannot abolish it when it has taken deep root in the hearts over 15 years. Preparations must be made for this and practical steps have to be taken within a set timetable in order to begin applying the abolition.

As for the Chamber of Deputies, there is no disagreement on dividing the seats equally between Muslims and Christians. All these issues are being discussed at present.

[AL-HAWADITH] Have you conveyed these proposals to the politicians in East Beirut?

[Shahin] At present, I cannot say that these opinions have been conveyed to East Beirut. In the past, they were presented to ex-President Amin al-Jumayyil.

[AL-HAWADITH] Through your mediation between East and West Beirut and your relationship with Speaker al-Husayni, let us ask you about the meeting between al-Husayni and Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sufayr in Rome.

[Shahin] Lebanon will triumph and the victory will come through the moderation represented in the majority. Radicalism, here or there, is of no use. Lebanon, with its structure, is founded on freedom, democracy, justice, equality and moderate positions. There are common denominators among the sects and no sect may overwhelm another. On this basis, we can say that Speaker al-Husayni's meeting with Patriarch Sufayr is nothing but a meeting of and a victory for the moderate positions. The two men represent moderation in the comprehensive view of the constants on which Lebanon's political and social structure is founded. Each knows, acknowledges and says that there has to be reform and that the reform must be made through the constitutional institution which alone is empowered to deal with political reform. This is agreed upon. Moreover, this meeting at this particular time is not tantamount to overstepping the Arab committee's efforts because the patriarch's and Speaker al-Husayni's vision of the solution is totally similar. It was very beneficial for the two to meet and discuss the situation generally and to develop a general view of their specific vision of the solution so that these solutions may march side-by-side with the proposals and resolutions issued by the Arab committee, i.e. so that they may complement and support these proposals and resolutions, not obstruct their implementation. So this meeting, the details of which the pope was familiarized with during his meeting with Patriarch Sufayr, was important. The statement issued by his holiness the pope has given the Lebanese crisis a look and a direction with an understanding spirit showing an awareness of the need to solve this problem that has lasted much too long. It is my opinion that Speaker al-Husayni was pleased with his meeting with his beatitude the patriarch. He has told me that Patriarch Sufayr was very positive and pleased with the meeting itself and with the exchange of opinions on the general conditions.

[AL-HAWADITH] But what did Speaker al-Husayni specifically propose?

[Shahin] The crisis is well known. When we speak of the crisis, we speak of it as a whole and with all its aspects and bifurcations, whether it be security, political reform, preservation of the sects' rights, reaffirmation of equality

among citizens in rights and duties, non-domination of one sect by another or fair distribution of responsibilities.

[AL-HAWADITH] Some political circles have hinted that the objective of this meeting was to blockade Prime Minister General 'Awn.

[Shahin] I refute this theory. I know the three men: General 'Awn, his beatitude the patriarch and Speaker al-Husayni. I know how al-Husayni and the Maronite patriarch think. It is very difficult to say this. To the very contrary, General 'Awn has declared his adherence to the Arab resolutions. What Speaker al-Husayni heard from the patriarch confirms his support for these resolutions, which are also supported by al-Husayni. So how can the meeting be considered a blockading of General 'Awn's movement? All demand that the legitimate government regain its role and its sovereignty over all the Lebanese territories on the basis of implementing [UN] resolution 425 in the south and ousting all foreign armies from Lebanese territories. Any government formed in the future will carry out what duty dictates to it if it wishes to restore its sovereignty, and it will tackle these issues positively, stressing Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. I don't consider the Rome meeting to be a leap over the movement being made by General 'Awn. Rather, there will be positive domestic movement when the picture confirming the presence of indisputable common denominators among the Lebanese becomes clear.

[AL-HAWADITH] Will the deputies respond to an invitation to meet outside Lebanon if such an invitation is addressed to them?

[Shahin] I wish to say that we prefer the meeting to take place in Lebanese territories first and last. But for some reason, this is impossible. So we must not dwell on this point because saving the country is more important than any other consideration. If such a meeting will save the country, then let it be [wherever it may be]. There are numerous examples of such a meeting, including the negotiations on Vietnam which were supervised by Philip Habib and were held in Paris. After the negotiations, everybody went home and matters were set aright. If we meet abroad, it will be solely for the purpose of exchanging opinions on how to deal with the political solution and to agree on general matters concerning the political reform. We will then return to Lebanon, meet and agree on the same points anew so that the Chamber of Deputies may then be summoned to an election session.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you think that withdrawal of the foreign forces is inevitable if resolution 425 is implemented?

[Shahin] We wish with all our heart that resolution 425 would be implemented immediately. But let us be realistic. There are regional and international givens from which we have suffered, and we have continued to suffer

after the resolution was issued. When Speaker al-Husayni assigned me to head a delegation of my colleagues, the deputies, on a tour of the European capitals and the United States opposite another delegation which toured the eastern bloc capitals and the Soviet Union, the question we were asked in London and Washington was: What government can spread the state sovereignty over the south if Israel withdraws and what army will take charge of this? This was being asked at a time when political estrangement was prevailing between the late Prime Minister Rashid Karami and a part of his cabinet on the one hand and President Amin al-Jumayyil on the other.

So they told us: We are with you. But what government, what state and what army will take charge of the responsibility? When you make up your mind in Lebanon, it will be possible to implement resolution 425.

These considerations are, in my opinion, still existent. Herein lies the role of the Arab tripartite committee which emanated from the summit. What the three countries' foreign ministers did when they visited the decision-making capitals was to surmount the obstacles and to extract a promise that the resolution will be implemented when the State of Lebanon is able to spread its sovereignty and when its army goes to the south and spreads the state's sovereignty over its territories.

I don't know what [other] promises the ministerial committee was able to get in this regard. I believe that the Lebanese crisis is being eased. But the solution will not be accomplished until the south is liberated, all the Israeli troops are withdrawn from there and the other foreign armies are withdrawn from Lebanon.

[AL-HAWADITH] But there are numerous stumbling blocks obstructing the realization of this dream.

[Shahin] If we actually manage to overcome this delicate phase of the reconciliation, reform and elections and form a complete and comprehensive national government and if the state begins restoring its military structure...

[AL-HAWADITH] Will it be given the opportunity to do this?

[Shahin] This must be done. Here [lies] the credibility of the Arab countries which are supposed to adhere to and help Lebanon and refrain from any intervention in its domestic affairs so that it may be able to stand on its own feet, regain its strength and implement what was agreed upon in Casablanca. This commitment is very essential. Otherwise, the crisis will have run in place and a president will have been elected only to secure international legitimacy.

If there is no decisive promise from the Arab countries and the major powers [to stand] with resolution 425 and to support the state's restoration of its sovereignty and authority over all its territories, a solution will be difficult.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you truly believe that Lebanon will be saved or is Lebanon moving toward division and partition?

[Shahin] My faith in Lebanon is great and it will not be shaken. I have been saying since the start of the crisis that we must support the legitimate government. Lebanon will not be revived unless legitimacy is firmly established in all the institutions. However, we do criticize numerous manifestations in the various provinces, such as [the presence of] autonomous security, civil administration or whatever indicates partition. There will be no solution unless legitimacy is restored to all the institutions. I have great faith and the majority believes, like me, in a single and united Lebanon, in the language of coexistence and in Lebanon's social structure which is formed of several sects. Herein lies its significance.

It is true that there are factions that want to destroy, divide and partition Lebanon. But the Lebanese will shall ultimately triumph. We greatly hope that the Arabs will, for the first time, tackle the Lebanese crisis seriously. This is what we see so far. When King Hassan II speaks so forcefully and when I see his brothers, His Majesty King Fahd and His Excellency President Bendjedid—all of whom are reliable Arab leaders—standing next to him, I doubt that anybody will be able to obstruct their movement because I doubt that King Hassan II, a strong man, will accept failure for himself.

#### **Tripartite Council Recommendations**

44040502 London AL-HAWADITH  
in Arabic 14 Jul 89 p 19

[Article: "Next Step in Tripartite Committee's Movement: Cease-Fire, Unifying Two Governments and Dialogue Between Warlords"]

[Text] The tripartite committee, comprised of King Fahd, President Chadli and King Hassan II, is definitely sailing the Lebanese ship toward a safe shore, despite difficulties, storms and tempests. This is what observers have become sure of and what pervades the conviction of the Lebanese and the Arabs. The Morocco and Algeria meetings and the movements by Ministers Sa'ud al-Faysal, Bouallam (Essaieh) and Abdellatif Filali, added to Arab League Assistant Secretary Lakhdar Ibrahimi's efforts in Beirut and Damascus, confirm that the fruit is ripe and that the harvest is inevitable and imminent, if not by 100 percent certainty then at least by 80 or 90 percent, thus paving the way for a firm and strong reconciliation.

A week from now, 2 months will have passed on the creation of the Arab Supreme Committee which will have 4 more months to develop some sort of a solution to the Lebanese crisis, considering that the Arab summit which convened in Casablanca at the end of last May gave the Supreme Tripartite Committee absolute powers to loosen the knots of the Lebanese crisis within 6 months at the most.

In the past 2 months, the Supreme Committee focused its efforts on studying the field situation in Lebanon before storming into the appropriate solution. Toward this end, the committee has repeatedly sent the members of its ministerial tripartite subcommittee to the major and minor powers concerned with the Lebanese crisis and those influencing it. The Supreme Committee developed a number of convictions with which it has promptly launched its ceaseless effort.

The first conviction is that what is being said about inter-Lebanese disagreement no longer has any noteworthy weight. The Lebanese agree on the need for a prompt solution, even if this solution is at the expense of one or more sects.

The proof of this conviction is that no Lebanese deputy has refused to meet with the Arab Supreme Committee or with its representatives to express his opinions on the war and its causes and on the means to overcome it.

The second conviction is that the presence of weapons in the militias' hands gives preponderance to the viewpoint that the war is inter-Lebanese. To completely invalidate this argument, the tripartite committee has held talks with the countries that arm the parties to the conflict in Lebanon and with the countries which arm the countries that arm the parties to the conflict, and we quickly saw Soviet pressures on Iraq and Syria to halt the delivery of weapons to the armed elements in Lebanon.

Observers say that this action was a brilliant master's blow on the part of the tripartite committee which had been constantly confronted with the theory saying that "General Michel 'Awn's army is the party that exchanges fire with the army of Brigadier General Sami al-Khatib and with his allies, Amal and the Socialist Party, in West Beirut." To invalidate this theory, the committee has requested that arming the two parties to the Lebanese war be halted so that the war may inevitably end when they consume the weapons in their possession or so that the Arab committee may realize that there are behind the fighters those who supply them with weapons secretly or who open fire on their behalf. In this case, the Supreme Committee will have something else to say, considering that Arab summit resolution No 7 (on Lebanon) "empowers the committee to take the measures and hold the contacts it deems appropriate for solving the Lebanese crisis."

The third conviction is that the major powers which arm the countries that supply the Lebanese armed elements with weapons no longer contemplate igniting war in the Middle East. The international detente, the door of which has been opened by Soviet Leader Gorbachev and which has received the attentive ears of the previous (Reagan) and present U.S. administrations and the positive response of all the European countries, is focusing its attention on civilian means to revive the economic conditions in both hemispheres of earth and has put an end (at least for now) to the cold war theory and to igniting fires in the world's hot spots. It has become

evident to both Moscow and Washington that the (expanding sphere of the vast U.S. foreign aid, measured against the U.S. wealth) causes the United States fatal harm rather than bringing it prosperity and control). The same goes for the Soviet Union and the so-called socialist bloc which have devoured everything to keep up pace with the United States in the insane race for world control. When the two sides discovered that they have to choose between coexistence and oppressing peoples, they opted for coexistence, i.e. the detente which promptly reflected on all the minor and local wars in the world, including the Middle East and Lebanese crises.

In his latest visit to France, Soviet Leader Gorbachev acted extraordinarily when he agreed with French President Mitterand on a joint statement on Lebanon calling for a cease-fire, for refraining from arming the parties to the war and for insuring Lebanon's safety and its sovereignty over all its territories. The voicing of these demands by Gorbachev in particular was tantamount to an excellent qualitative move made by the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Lebanon. Most often, the Soviet Union had opposed Lebanon's government and system and had supported whoever struck Lebanon, regardless of whether the blows were dealt by Israel, Palestine, Syria or Iran. The Soviet Union did not do this out of spite for Lebanon or the Lebanese but out of hatred and rejection of the U.S. logic which called for ousting the Soviets from the Middle East crisis and from Lebanon. There is no doubt that the Soviets' entry into the line of the Lebanese crisis with such a positive attitude, said to be motivated by French President Mitterand, will bring release from the Lebanese crisis closer than ever before.

The French have always said, even though the conditions seemed to indicate the contrary, that Moscow, not Washington, can lift the Syrian pressure on Lebanon. Observers have felt that Washington is the key to the Syrian balance and this can only be interpreted as ignorance on their part. This is where the Soviet opinion in the Lebanese crisis gains special significance, considering that the final "no" belongs to the Soviets, not the Americans.

In light of this particular Soviet entry, we have seen how the Lebanese crisis has taken in the past 2 weeks a new turn that had not been expected by anybody earlier. The parties concerned have agreed to a cease-fire even though they have not agreed to lifting the naval blockade on the grounds that the sea will bring Frog-7 missiles to General 'Awn. Amal Leader Nabih Birri has demanded that Damascus supply him with similar missiles and with tanks so that he may establish balance between the forces in East Beirut and West Beirut. After a meeting with Patriarch Sufayr, Gen Michel 'Awn, Dr Samir Ja'ja' and Dr George Sa'adah, the Phalanges Party leader, Lakhdar Ibrahim, the Arab committee delegate, declared that the cease-fire must be entrenched to pave the way to lifting the blockade, which must be simultaneous with the demanded political reforms. All these signs indicate clearly that the fundamental objective, i.e. ending the war, is coming closer to the reality. The missile and

counter-missile crisis and the naval blockade are no more than details at which the Arab Supreme Committee will not dwell long because they know from the Soviet and U.S. support for their initiative that Frog missiles, tens of which are said to be possessed by Gen 'Awn's government, are short-range missiles that pose no threat whatsoever to Syrian territories. These missiles have a range of only 70 km whereas the Syrian territories closest to these missiles are 100 km away.

The Arab Supreme Committee members are well aware that Minister Nabih Birri's demand for similar missiles signifies a political, not military, attempt to establish a balance between the local forces so that this balance may be used if the parties to the conflict get together around the negotiating table.

The intensification of the war in Lebanon, the tightening of the blockade against the eastern ports, the starving of more than one million people in the eastern provinces and their deprivation of food, drink, sleep and rest are considered by observers to be indicators of an imminent end of both the crisis and the war.

According to the observers' information, the the Arab committee is currently working to implement a working program which can be summed up in the following:

1. Establish a cease-fire.
2. Unify the two governments through a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies to elect a president of the republic. This is because what is required for Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon is the presence in Beirut of a unified government that asks the UN Security Council officially to implement its resolutions on withdrawal.
3. Complete Lebanon's sovereignty over all its territories with the help of the Arab committee and with the withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon after the Israelis withdraw so that with the withdrawal of these forces, the conditional demands of the other parties may come to an end.

What the Arab committee is doing currently is merely to move all parties to the Lebanese conflict from the conflict arena and to the negotiating table. Because the committee is in such an extreme hurry, considering that it has only 4 months left, it set the negotiating table quietly and wisely and invited the negotiators who were caught by surprise and thus rushed to the table in their military uniforms. This is the reason for the confusion among both the Arabs and the Lebanese who are not yet accustomed to dealing with people who take up politics as a profession and not as a hobby. An Arab ambassador in Paris has said: "The Arabs have not realized yet that there are those who engage in Arab politics with aptitude and sophistication which not many people can imagine."

## Views of the Tripartite Report Expressed

### Emergency Summit To Convene

44040515 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT  
in Arabic 2 Aug 89 p 4

[Article: "An Interpretation of Supreme Tripartite Arab Committee Report: Unequivocal Indication of Difference in Points of View with Syria; Impasse Opens Door to Emergency Summit"]

[Text] The Supreme Arab Tripartite Committee announced that it had reached an impasse in its efforts to find the security and political grounds for saving Lebanon. This announcement constitutes an extremely grave turn of events for the situation in Lebanon, especially since all the parties in Lebanon without exception supported the committee's efforts and had expressed their willingness to work with the committee. In fact, the Lebanese parties considered the committee's efforts to be the last chance to pull Lebanon out of the abyss of murderous confrontations and the unknown dangers of partition and disintegration.

In writing their report the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries which are members of the committee used the same style they used in making their contacts and conducting their efforts. The report actually defines who was responsible for the fact that an impasse had been reached, and it points out the differences in points of view between the committee and the parties who refused to show the necessary measure of flexibility, especially in the area of shifting Arab efforts from security considerations to political ones.

The report pointed out a clear difference in points of view between the committee and Damascus on the matter of establishing Lebanese authority over all Lebanese territory and the period of time which is required to achieve that. The report also pointed out the difference in opinion which exists with regard to Syrian-Lebanese relations.

The report which was issued yesterday by the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries of the tripartite committee makes it clear that the committee had in fact reached an impasse. The report indicates that convening a summit conference for the three countries that are members of the committee was now likely and that convening an emergency Arab summit conference was also likely. That emergency Arab summit conference will once again look into the crisis in Lebanon and the eruption of violence which destroyed security there in the wake of the committee's inability to find a way out of the existing crisis.

A careful reading of the committee's report makes it clear that its members had set for themselves an ambitious goal. They wanted to end the tragedy in Lebanon by coming up with a comprehensive and total solution that would take all the objective facts into consideration

and lay the foundations for the rights of Lebanese citizens under freedom, sovereignty, and dignity.

To achieve that "noble objective," as defined by the committee, the ministers of foreign affairs of the member countries dedicated themselves to finding a way that would "end the acts of violence for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of Lebanese citizens. Eventually, they would pave the way to a political solution which would guarantee for the fraternal country of Lebanon the revival of its constitutional institutions and the establishment of a national reconciliation government."

According to the committee's method, this process would begin with a cease fire. Violence would be brought to an end, and dialogue would be undertaken in preparation for the establishment of an executive authority, with the president and a government. That executive authority would lay the foundations for national reconciliation.

The committee leaves no room for doubt when it indicates that the crisis in Lebanon has gone beyond being a local crisis and that it has become a source of grave danger to the Arab world. Possibilities for dividing and partitioning Lebanon have increased.

In light of this grave danger, the committee thought it was its duty, since there was no agreement between the Lebanese parties, "to draft a national reconciliation document. An effort was made to make that document compatible with the provisions of the resolution issued by the Casablanca Summit Conference and to make it offer the necessary measure of balance which such a document must have so that the resolutions of the summit conference can be implemented."

This draft document which was written by the committee since it applied itself to that task became the foundation of its work and its communications with the various Lebanese, Arab, and international parties.

What are the main points of this draft plan?

In political reforms the draft plan provided for a true partnership between Muslims and Christians to ensure balance in both the executive and legislative branches of government. Although it is true that the committee's report does not explain how this balance is to be achieved, it is likely that the committee approved what most parties in Lebanon had agreed to regarding having equal representation for Muslims and Christians in the House of Representatives. Most parties in Lebanon had agreed to entrust the executive power to the president and the council of ministers together instead of giving that power exclusively to the president.

The draft plan stipulated that the state of Lebanon was to establish its authority over all of Lebanon. In accordance with the resolution of the Arab summit meeting, the state of Lebanon was to use its own forces to establish its

authority. This means implicitly doing without Syrian forces which were being used to provide backing for Lebanon's security forces.

To remove the Israeli occupation the draft plan calls for the use of every expedient to implement Resolution 425 and all other UN Security Council resolutions which have to do with liberating Lebanese territory from occupation.

Regarding relations between Lebanon and Syria the draft plan calls for agreements to be made in all areas so that what serves the interests of the two fraternal countries can be achieved. To prevent any biased misinterpretation of its proposals the draft plan emphasized that Lebanon must not become a threat to Syria's security and that Syria must not become a threat to Lebanon's security. In other words, the draft plan placed equal importance on the security of both countries within the boundaries of each country's sovereignty.

These are the general principles of the draft plan which the committee had hoped to discuss in a meeting that was to be held with Lebanese representatives outside Lebanon. The committee had hoped to invite those representatives to discuss the plan and approve it.

To achieve that goal, the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries that are members of the committee and L'Akhdar al-Ibrahimi, the assistant secretary general of the Arab League, contacted various parties who are associated with the crisis in Lebanon. They also contacted the local parties themselves. The ministers completed all these contacts before inviting the representatives to do their duty.

The committee's report makes it clear that the key communications were conducted with Syria. It seems that Syria's positions on the draft plan's security or political considerations were not close to those of its Lebanese allies.

To the committee the subject of security was a condition and an introduction to discussing the various other items of the draft plan. But there was a difference of opinion between the committee and Syria regarding lifting the sea blockade set up by Syria and its allies around the country's eastern seaports. Whereas the committee asked for the immediate lifting of the sea blockade and the opening of the land routes between the two parts of Beirut, Syria demanded that a security committee be formed to inspect the ships that come into the country's eastern seaports to prevent the delivery of weapons to the government of Gen Michel 'Awn. At the same time it refused to have that same committee inspect the ports and the land routes through which weapons could be delivered to the militias which are allied with Syria in the country's western sector. Syria would do no more than pledge that it would not supply them with weapons.

On the subject of politics there was a difference of opinion between the committee and Syria on two points.

The committee suggested that Lebanon's internal security forces undertake the task of establishing Lebanese authority over all Lebanese territory and that they receive support from Syrian forces where these forces are found on Lebanese territory. This task is to be accomplished within a certain period of time during which and at the end of which Syrian forces would be amassed in al-Biq'a', the area near Syria. This would be done in the context of a comprehensive security plan for all of Lebanon and it would provide for [the following]:

- All Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias are to be disbanded. These militias are to turn in their weapons to the Lebanese state.
- The internal security forces are to be strengthened.
- Volunteer opportunities in the internal security forces are to be made available to all the Lebanese who are to receive their training in all the governorates.
- The security system is to be reinforced so that the entry and departure of individuals through border points can be controlled.
- The army is to support the internal security forces when there is a need for such support.
- Army troops are to be reorganized and retrained so they can assume their national responsibilities and act against aggression.
- The intelligence agency is to be reorganized to serve military purposes exclusively.
- All those who were forced to leave their homes since 1975 are to be allowed to return, and the reconstruction of homes which were torn down is to be guaranteed.

Syria opposed the committee's plan which gave the Lebanese state a certain period of time to establish its authority over its territory and required Syrian forces to be amassed in the area of al-Biq'a'. Syria asked that this matter be dealt with after a national reconciliation government is established. The committee opposed Syria's opinion for two reasons. First, most of the Lebanese parties insist that the matter of having the Lebanese state establish its authority is to be settled in the manner proposed by the tripartite committee. Second, the committee opposed Syria's opinion because Syria wanted the approval of political reforms to carry the same weight as the establishment of the state's authority over Lebanon's national soil. The Syrians wanted this to be part of the required balance between Muslims' and Christians' demands.

With regard to the subject of relations between Syria and Lebanon, the committee thought that agreements could be made to regulate relations in the future between the two countries. These agreements could be consecrated by having the Syrian and Lebanese governments sign a security agreement, which could be sponsored by the tripartite committee itself. It seems that this could be done to ensure a balance between the interests of the two fraternal countries.

Syria opposed the proposals made by the tripartite committee in that regard because it seemed to be



thinking that the required agreements with Lebanon should include strategic, economic, and social considerations and should not be limited to security matters only.

While it appeared clear that there was a wide gap between the solution envisioned by the tripartite committee and that envisioned by Syria, the committee was careful, on the other hand, to state for the record that President Saddam Husayn was cooperating with it. The president of Iraq pledged that he would comply with the committee's request and stop supplying weapons to the feuding parties.

The committee also stated for the record that various international parties supported its efforts and proposals. These international parties expressed their willingness to support the committee.

In light of everything it did and in light of all the positions it faced and the reactions it got, the committee had to present the final outcome of its efforts to the Arab countries as well as to public opinion in the Arab world and the international community. It announced unequivocally that it had been unable to achieve the objective it had sought and that it had reached an impasse. The committee announced that Lebanese citizens as well as the task which the committee had tried to complete were the targets of the eruption of violence which occurred recently in Lebanon and destroyed security there.

What could possibly happen, now that the tripartite committee has announced the failure of its mission and has held Syria indirectly responsible for that failure?

The committee's report states that the committee will present a comprehensive report to the leaders of Arab countries about what can be done to help Lebanon get out of its predicament.

This report could call for a tripartite summit conference to be convened. This conference would approve the report and propose measures which must be taken to rescue Lebanon.

Some observers think it is not unlikely that members of the tripartite committee will propose that a new emergency summit conference be convened so that Arab leaders can assume their responsibilities in that regard.

In the short term, however, this will have no effect on the security situation in Lebanon where an all-out military eruption of violence seems inevitable.

#### Outstanding Concerns Discussed

44040515 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT  
in Arabic 2 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by Samir 'Atallah: "Tripartite Committee's Despair Is Not End of Arab Efforts; Death of International Figures Does Not Mark Beginning of International Efforts for Lebanon"]

[Text] When the formation of the Tripartite Committee was announced in Casablanca, it was said that the committee was the last hope for reaching a solution in Lebanon.

On the same day that announcement was made, King Hasan II said that the high level committee, which had 6 months to carry out its task, would announce its failure or its success. In either case the committee would make the reasons for its failure or success public. And now here is an official report announcing from Riyadh, Rabat, and Algiers that the mini-summit on Lebanon would stop its work and that it would submit to the kings and presidents the reasons and causes behind that announcement.

Quite simply, never in the history of the war in Lebanon was such a report ever issued. In essence, this report is a real obituary for every Arab effort that was made to reach a peaceful solution to the fighting which is taking place on Lebanese territory.

The tripartite committee did not wait for the 6 months to pass. Why should it chase a mirage? Why should it give the Lebanese people hope when there is none? Why should it lead the Lebanese people to believe that there is a place for logic when people are not given a chance to catch their breath before the next round of shells hits them? Why should the committee give the Lebanese people hope when the Grim Reaper might spare them briefly only to return shortly thereafter and take them away?

When one reads the report by the royal, presidential committee, what comes to one's mind before all else is this question: what will the world say? We do not wonder what the Lebanese who are lying sleepless in the shelters will say, nor do we wonder what the other Arabs who are also suffering with Lebanon will say. Instead, we wonder what the world will say. Wires had been sent to Casablanca from everywhere in the world appealing to the summit meeting to put an end to this war which is starting to pose a threat to the world.

How can an Arab summit that represents the prestige of all Arabs from the ocean to the Gulf fail? How can an organization representing the entire Arab world from the east to the west fail? How can three leaders and three ministers fail when they command such presence and respect and represent such diplomacy and capability?

The historical danger does not lie in the war in Lebanon, which is like a painful fire that consumes the burning rubble and yet feeds on it and continues to grow. The historical danger rather lies in the fact that the political walls have become so high and so impenetrable that those who have historically been patient have been forced to declare their despair with a situation everyone knew was hopeless. However, no one knew that the situation was that hopeless.

This is real hopelessness.

And yet, this is not the end. The day Arab mediators end every attempt they were making in Lebanon's case is not the end for Lebanon. That day rather marks the end of the intra-Arab peace. Although it is only recently that Rabat chose to deal directly with the war in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia has a responsibility in Lebanon, not just a



role it has to play there. Algeria has remained involved in the war and peace in Lebanon since the early moments of that ill-fated outbreak.

That is why the situation may be hopeless after what happened, but it does not mark the end. The tripartite committee referred that matter to the summit. This was not some kind of gesture indicating that the Arabs were washing their hands off the Lebanese tragedy, but it was a gesture indicating the grave nature of Lebanon's tragedy. That is, after an effort that was half Arab or part Arab failed to bring about any solution to the problem in Lebanon, the total Arab effort was in grave danger.

At any rate, an international effort to solve the problem of Lebanon is not the answer. It was only yesterday that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was saying that "the United States cannot do anything to help Lebanon at the present time." And yet, it is known that this is not true. The United States sent Lebanon \$5 million in cash to help the wounded and to bury the dead. And yet, where do we go from here?

Last year, that is, since the onset of the constitutional vacuum in Lebanon 1 year ago, the Arabs made two, more serious and more comprehensive attempts to settle the Lebanese war. The first attempt was made by a committee of six ministers who looked into all the details and studied all the elements of "the crisis." The second attempt was made by the Tripartite Committee which was formed by the Casablanca Summit.

The committee of six ministers limited its activities to the Lebanese and the Arabs. While committee members conferred with parties in Lebanon on more than one level, the chairman of the committee, al-Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, went to Damascus more than once. But the tripartite committee extended its efforts beyond local Lebanese elements. It conducted talks with Arabs on the highest levels, and then it conducted the more important international talks on Lebanon with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The international elements in the Lebanese question had to be ensured because of their association with the Arab elements in Lebanon.

To put it more candidly, the application of Resolution 425, that is, Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon, required that the United States apply pressure on Israel so that Israel would withdraw from south Lebanon. "It is only then," according to a statement made once by Mr Marwan al-Qasim, Jordan's minister of foreign affairs, "that is, after Israel's withdrawal, that Arab countries can ask Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon or stay there as part of an Arab deterrent force policing the interior of Lebanon as well as south Lebanon."

What happened? Where did this solution falter? What does James Baker's statement about the United States not being able to help Lebanon "at the present time" mean? Does it mean that the United States cannot apply pressure to make Israel withdraw from Lebanon?

At any rate, while the ministers in the tripartite committee were meeting in Rabat, the Lebanese crisis took another turn and went in a different direction. While everyone was asking how Beirut could be protected from extinction, Israel kidnapped Shaykh 'Ubayd from the town of Jibshit. The sequence of events which followed was extraordinary. Although U.S. President George Bush declared some kind of mobilization, Col Higgins, the American officer who was serving with the UN forces in Lebanon, lost his life. Thus, once again, south Lebanon, not the conflict in Beirut, became the object of international attention.

The problem became a problem of hostages and not that of peace or that of finding solutions. On the one hand, a state with a regular army had kidnapped a cleric from another country. On the other hand, an unknown organization had carried out a death sentence by hanging an officer serving with the UN forces. That same organization threatened to execute another hostage in a matter of hours.

The significant legal point in the execution of Col Higgins is not that the man was an American citizen, but that he was a member of the UN force stationed in south Lebanon in accordance with one or more than one UN resolution.

That is why the problem of Lebanon surfaced on the international scene. But the problem in Lebanon did not become an international problem. Instead, Lebanon was being discussed by people from all the countries in the world as a place for terrorists. Lebanon was being discussed as the place where the western hostages were being held. These hostages, or some of them, have been held in captivity for 4 years.

That was natural. After all, the superpowers are primarily concerned about their own people. Ever since 14 March, approximately 1,000 persons were killed and wounded in Lebanon, and half of Lebanon's economy has been destroyed. But that was not a good enough reason for the American ambassador to cut his vacation short. Two days ago, however, Mr Bush changed his official schedule, and all the media in the United States were thrown into a state of turmoil.

This is the first test for George Bush since he came to the White House earlier this year. In this test George Bush must not only decide if he should respond or whether he can respond, but he must also decide whether or not Israel's kidnapping of Shaykh 'Ubayd forced him into this difficult test. Mr Bush must also decide why Israel kidnapped Shaykh 'Ubayd.

This is also the first test for the new president of Iran, who was receiving yesterday the Soviet Union's minister of foreign affairs.

## OMAN

**Rise in Number of Expatriates Leaving Country Recorded**

44000624b Muscat TIMES OF OMAN  
in English 3 Aug 89 p 8

[Text] The number of expatriates working in Oman went down during 1988, statistics released by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor show.

The sustained decrease in the expatriate labor force is attributed to the strict measures the Ministry has been taking to accelerate the process of Omanization.

During 1988, the number of expatriates in the private sector went down by 40,200 compared with the 1987 figure.

The Ministry's report said that labor inspection has played a pioneering role in ensuring the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Law of Oman and the ministerial decisions issued to carry it out.

The Ministry has carried on extensive campaigns to stop the violation of labor and immigration regulations.

The total number of establishments which were covered by the labor inspection campaign was 488. The companies were also subjected to inspection to ascertain their actual requirements of foreign workers.

With this aim in view, a total of 14,962 companies were visited by the Department of Inspection during 1988.

The Ministry feels that the expatriates were required initially to man vital projects necessary for the immediate requirements of the country for the 1970 renaissance. As almost two decades are now over since, Omanis must replace the foreigners in all spheres.

**Citizens Offered Jobs in Private Sector**

44000624a Muscat TIMES OF OMAN  
in English 3 Aug 89 p 9

[Text] The number of Omanis who applied for jobs in the private sector during 1988 was a big increase.

A total number of 6,171 citizens were registered as employment seekers in the private sector during the year.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor proposed the names of 8,627 candidates for a total of 3,984 job vacancies in 1988.

Of these more than 1,311 citizens were appointed.

More replacements are being one, as the process of Omanization proceeds.

The Ministry is making all efforts to ensure that qualified Omanis replace the expatriates in the private sector

as early as possible to reduce the burden on the national exchequer caused by the employment of expatriates.

Pursuant to a Royal directive, the national manpower is being developed in all the spheres and citizens being encouraged to take professional and manual jobs.

**Gas, Oil Finds Reported**

44000615b Muscat TIMES OF OMAN  
in English 29 Jun 89 pp 1, 3

[Text] Three major gas and oil discoveries have been reported in the Sultanate. A PDO gas find at Sayh Nuhaydah exploration well in the Andam formation is the largest for 22 years.

Provisional estimates place recoverable reserves at 10 billion cubic meters, making it Oman's fifth largest gas field, according to "Al Fahal", the PDO newspaper.

It is the biggest since Maradi Huraymah was discovered in 1967 with recoverable reserves of 11 billion cubic meters.

Well testing which finished this month produced 600,000 cubic meters a day of unassociated gas, the report said, quoting Exploration Manager, Peter de Ruiter.

He said that apart from the size of the find what is "important is that there is a relatively high condensate element, tested at some 175 cubic meters a day. This is an extremely useful product which can be produced separately or mixed with crude to make it lighter."

Condensate is the heavier end of the gas spectrum. It exists in the reservoir as gas under high pressure and temperature, but with reduced pressure and cooling it condenses into a liquid at the surface.

The Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals and Japex (Oman) Ltd on Monday announced the discovery of a commercial oil field with production of 8,000 to 10,000 barrels per day expected by July 1990. The oil field which covers an area of 38 square kilometers will be developed in two stages. In the first stage, 20 wells will be dug and production is expected to commence by July next year. In the second stage, 54 rigs will be used between 1993 and 1995. The expected period of production, in commercial quantities, from this field will be approximately 17 years. The Government of Oman owns 86.5 percent of total production.

Al Fahal also reported a PDO oil find in Central Oman at al-Hawqayh, about 25 kilometers south of Hasirah. The new field was producing under test last month 500 cubic meters a day making it one of the better producers of the widespread Bahjah production area. It was discovered by Rig 1 which started drilling the prospect in April hitting light oil at 2,200 meters in the Gharif formation—the commonest oil reservoir in South Oman.

#### Data

The prospect was identified after re-evaluation of seismic data of the area. Follow up drilling is planned.

Giving further details of the gas find, Mr Peter de Ruiter said the find was made by Rig 9, the largest rig working for PDO, drilling Sayh Nuhaidah 24 in April. It was planned as an additional development well into the oil producing Gharif formation at 2,500 meters with a follow-up search deeper for gas. Drilling stopped at 4,297 meters.

Mr de Ruiter said: "There is a strong feeling that oil and gas in Oman are generated from deep sources some 5,000 to 6,000 meters deep. This is based on complex geochemical evidence and the fact that hydrocarbons are found in some of Oman's oldest rocks.

"If the oil and gas has migrated from that deeper source, there should be intermediate fields deeper than our current producing fields."

The find was in sand bodies in the Andam formation which has never yielded oil or gas. This opens up scope for further deep exploration in the area.

Already changes have been made to Rig 12's programme for drilling Abeir. It was originally planned to drill down to the Gharif formation to about 3,000 meters but now the gas well which was spudded this month, will continue to the Andam formation at 4,500 meters.

#### Industrial Project To Be Set Up

44000615a Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN*  
in English 6 Jul 89 p 17

[Text] An ambitious plan to set up a multimillion dollar petrochemical and metal products manufacturing company in the private sector involving shareholders from Arab Gulf Cooperation Council states was announced in Doha recently.

Addressing a news conference at Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting [GOIC] headquarters Dr 'Abdallah al-Mu'ajil, GOIC out-going secretary-general, said a nine-member founding committee had been set up to promote the company.

The location of the project would be Bahrain and the company will have an authorized capital of \$100 million-fully paid-up.

So far 80 Gulf companies and individuals have expressed an interest to become shareholders. Many more are to be invited to subscribe to its equity shortly. A board of directors is expected to be elected by early next year.

At present the founders committee—comprising two businessmen from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain each, and one from Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and the GOIC—are steering the project.

#### Modern Irrigation System Introduced in Farms

44000624d Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN*  
in English 20 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by Bala Menon]

[Text] The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries is introducing modern irrigation systems in farms across the country, in a bid to streamline the use of water and prevent wastage.

Standard technical specifications of these systems have already been formulated in the light of different types of farming methods.

According to information released by the national Committee for the Guidance of Water Use on the Batinah, the Ministry began a comprehensive study last year on the techniques of maximum utilization of falaj waters. The study, in general, aims at reviving old aflaj which have either dried up or become inefficient in their role of supplying water for agricultural use.

#### Aquifers

The study is also to reinforce the aflaj with additional quantities of water from underground aquifers not being utilized by existing wells. Also included in the ambit of the study are the expansion of agricultural activity based on falaj waters and utilization of the surplus waters in the aflaj by storing them and subsequently pumping them out when needed.

Experts say that modern irrigation systems will facilitate the full control of the water distribution network in agricultural areas and will be based on the actual requirements of the plants.

In some areas, the recommendation is for irrigation to be carried out with the help of watering cans. This system is ideal after sunset as it ensures a 40 to 50 percent utilization of the water used, which is otherwise lost by evaporation.

#### Spray

The spray system of irrigation enables the output of some crops to be doubled. The fountain system has been found to be ideal for date palms and fruit trees and this can replace the flood irrigation method, which is now considered wasteful especially in arid and semi-arid areas.

The fountain system is some 80 to 85 percent more efficient than ordinary surface irrigation. Another advantage of the system was that it prevented insects from attacking the plants and made fertilization easier, according to Ministry experts.

The drip irrigation system is the best suited for vegetable farming as it provides the humidity needed for consistent growth. The system is about 90 percent more useful than surface irrigation.

The Ministry is now encouraging farmers to take soft loans from the Bank of Agriculture and Fisheries to introduce modern systems.

Apart from this, the Ministry is also looking at the repair and maintenance of old wells. During the period 1986-89, a total of 525 wells were repaired in the Batinah region. The break-up is: 109 wells repaired in 1986 at a total cost of RO 280,070; 11 wells repaired at a cost of RO 7,700 in 1987 and 405 wells serviced at a cost of RO 283,500 last year.

The situation assumed greater importance after reports started coming in that indiscriminate well-digging and wasteful irrigation methods had resulted in a drop in the water table along the Batinah Coast and the intrusion of sea water into aquifers. A committee was formed by Royal Decree in March this year to coordinate and formulate regulations on water use in the region and this committee is now coordinating related activities of many Ministries.

### Mineral Deposits To Be Exploited

44000624c Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN*  
in English 3 Aug 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by Oswald Pereira]

[Excerpt] The Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals is to exploit the vast and as yet untapped deposits of gold, platinum, laterite, chromite, copper and sulphide in Oman.

"Feasibility studies are under way and the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals has set future targets for the exploitation of these minerals," Dr Hilal Bin Muhammad al-Azri, Director of the Department of Geological Survey in the Ministry, told the *TIMES*, in an exclusive interview this week.

The Sultanate was already exploiting these minerals but there was great scope for further tapping of large deposits of these minerals present in the Oman ophiolite, Dr al-Azri said.

Copper is located in the upper parts of the Oman ophiolite and the biggest chromite deposits in the Sultanate exist in the lower parts of the ophiolite. Other massive deposits and sulphide, platinum, laterite and gold are known to exist in Oman.

### Production

The Director gave present production levels for some of the minerals. He said that every year, one million tonnes of crude copper is being exploited in the Suhar mines which give 20,000 tonnes of refined copper. A new copper mine has been discovered in the 'Ibri area, and a Japanese firm was conducting feasibility studies for further exploitation. So far, 8 million tonnes of copper reserves have been proven.

Feasibility studies were also on for the further exploitation of chromite. The latest figure of known chromite deposits was 1.6 million tonnes, Dr al-Azri said.

Big reserves of laterite also exist in Oman. This is being exploited by Oman cement companies. Laterite can also be used for producing iron and nickel.

At present, gold and silver are extracted as a by-product in copper mines, the Director said. But deposits of gold are known to exist in the Sultanate.

There is also the possibility of deposits of diamonds existing in Oman, according to latest indications, Dr al-Azri said. Diamonds were discovered in a rock formation in Morocco, similar to the Oman ophiolite. This is gathered from an abstract of a paper to be presented at the major 12-day international symposium on "Ophiolite Genesis and Evolution of Oceanic Lithosphere" to be held at the Sultan Qabus University from January 7 to 18, next year. [passage omitted]

## QATAR

### Diversification of Revenue Resources Emphasized

44000612b Doha *GULF TIMES* in English  
24 Jun 89 p 3

[Text] The secretary general of Qatar's Supreme Council for Planning (SCP), Salih Abu-Dawood al-Muhannadi, said the council's most important task would be the development and the diversification of revenue resources, creating production capabilities and seeking new alternatives in industry and agriculture in the state to lessen dependence on oil.

In an interview with Qatari daily *AL-RAYAH*, published on Thursday, al-Muhannadi said the SCP would start with the development of the public administration as a whole until the best performance was attained and following it up in various government ministries, departments and public corporations in an attempt to upgrade their administration and develop working methods and procedures.

Al-Muhannadi said work was currently under way to set up the SCP's general secretariat with various departments and sections as well as the preparation of its organizational structure, headquarters, general job classification and the functions of every department.

He noted that the framework of the council would be set up during the coming five or six months including the selection of personnel, distribution of departments, administrative and financial regulations, the SCP cadre and its general budget.

He reaffirmed that the SCP would strive to harness all expertise and capabilities of the highest calibre whether domestic or foreign with emphasis on the Qatari expertise. The SCP would establish relations of cooperation and coordination with various state departments to help it carry out its duties in the best possible way, he added.

Al-Muhannadi said that to create a comprehensive national industrial development in Qatar the existing legislation to encourage local industries should be reviewed to achieve a greater impact on the development of the national economy.

He noted that a comprehensive review of the existing situation in agriculture would be carried out to encourage farmers and farm owners in the state.

Al-Muhannadi added that the SCP will undertake a comprehensive planning for all the resources and capabilities to develop the national economy underlining the importance of promoting industrial investment in the state. The private sector should assume a greater role in industrial investment, he said.

He affirmed that the Qatari youth would have a major role through the SCP to contribute to the development and to build a strong base on sound and scientific grounds.

He expressed hope that the SCP in Qatar would establish constructive and fruitful cooperation with other planning bodies in the Arab world especially in the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states to exchange expertise in related fields.

#### **Petrochemical Firm To Be Set Up**

44000612a Doha GULF TIMES in English  
19 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by K.N. Sharma]

[Text] An ambitious plan to set up a multi-million dollar petrochemical and metal products manufacturing company in the private sector involving shareholders from Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states was announced in Doha yesterday.

Addressing a news conference at Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting [GOIC] headquarters Dr 'Abdallah al-Mu'ajil, GOIC out-going secretary-general, said a nine-member founding committee had been set up to promote the company.

The location of the project would be Bahrain and the company will have an authorized capital of \$100 million-fully paid-up.

So far 80 Gulf companies and individuals have expressed an interest to become shareholders. Many more are to be invited to subscribe to its equity shortly. A board of directors is expected to be elected by early next year.

At present, the founders committee—comprising two businessmen from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain each, and one from Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and the GOIC—are steering the project.

Legal consultant have been contacted to complete legal formalities for the incorporation of the company and

financial institutions, marketing agencies and technology suppliers are being contacted to discuss terms of their assistance.

Dr al-Mu'ajil said the idea of the project sprang from the deliberations of the Second Industrial Conference of the seven-nation GOIC at Riyadh in last December. Dr al-Mu'ajil acts as coordinator of the steering committee.

Dr al-Mu'ajil said governments in GCC states are being contacted to accord the company the special status of a national enterprise and give its products preference against foreign products. Government participation in the company's equity is not being sought, he said, replying to a question.

Dr al-Mu'ajil said the company would function in close liaison with GOIC and an agreement is being worked out to enable it to benefit from GOIC's expert studies and consultancy services. Its products would include ferromanganese, ferro-alloys, ferro-silicon, and raw material for polyethylene. Dr al-Mu'ajil said these products were the "missing link" in Gulf industrial landscape.

#### **Program Designed To Train Engineers**

44040516A Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 18 Jun 89 p 5

[Article by 'Atif Sulayman: "18-Month Training Program To Qualify Engineers To Assume Responsibility in Best Way Possible"]

[Excerpt] Engineer Shaykh Ahmad Bin-Hamad Al Thani, director of the Administration of Financial and Management Affairs in the Ministry of Public Works, stated that the role that engineers play in life is a large, influential, and effective one. He mentioned that a philosopher once said that if a physician errs in his work, he is condemned to have his hand that caused a man's death cut off; if an engineer errs, he must be condemned to death, since he has caused the death of many persons who lived in the house he built that collapsed on innocent souls.

This was said in the course of a speech he gave at a gathering organized by the Public Works Ministry on the occasion of the graduation of three new engineers, following an 18-month training course given for the first time by the ministry.

Eng Shaykh Ahmad Al Thani added that he had always aimed at replacing foreign workers with local personnel. When he assumed his post in the ministry and began his career there, the ratio of local work force in the various departments of the Ministry of Public Works was 34 percent. Now, it has reached 89 percent. Local Qatari personnel have taken over the ministry's various administrations and many departments.

He said he was very happy that the Ministry of Public Works has begun offering training courses for recently graduated young engineers embarking on a career for the first time.

Shaykh Ahmad and his colleagues, the directors of various administrations and heads of departments, delivered certificates of training to the first class of Qatari engineers trained by the ministry. These graduates possessed high academic qualifications and lacked only practical and administrative experience. To remedy this deficiency, the ministry set out to develop an 18-month training program to qualify engineers to assume the responsibilities entrusted to them in the best way possible.

As for the areas of concentration in the course, Shaykh Ahmad Bin-Hamad Al Thani stated that training had included many things, such as becoming acquainted with all the departments of the ministry's administrations and familiarization with the nature of the work of these departments.

The course also concentrated on the administrative experience needed to manage engineering projects and on quality control of materials. The ministry gives particular care to the latter subject.

About the program of the course, Eng Shaykh Ahmad Al Thani said that it took in a number of administrations and departments:

1. Administration of Civil Engineering, with its various departments:
  - a. Roads and Traffic Department
  - b. Sewer Department
  - c. Surveying Department
  - d. Laboratory Department
2. Administration of Architecture, including:
  - a. Buildings Department
  - b. Popular Housing Department
  - c. Building Maintenance Department
  - d. University Project (including development and modernization of Qatar University and construction of automobile parking)
  - e. Education Ministry Project (including the construction of many schools)
3. Administration of Management and Financial Affairs, including:
  - a. Budget Department
  - b. Consulting Services Department
  - c. Contract Preparation Department
  - d. Computer Department
  - e. Warehouses Department
  - f. Archives
  - g. Accounting
  - h. Bids
  - i. General Office
  - j. Production Department
  - k. Project for Housing High Officials, with its departments:
    - 1) Construction Engineering Department
    - 2) Quality Control Department
    - 3) Services Engineering Department
    - 4) Architecture Department
    - 5) Survey Department

[passage omitted]

### 1988 Imports Statistics Reported

44040516B Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 19 Jun 89 p 3

[Article: "4.6 Billion Riyals Total Value of Commodity Imports for State of Qatar Last Year"]

[Text] Total value of commodity imports for the State of Qatar last year amounted to 4,613,146,000 Qatari riyals, for an increase of 11.8 percent over 1987, when imports amounted to 4,127,904,000 riyals.

Mr Muhammad Ma'yuf al-Na'imi, head of the Central Bureau of Statistics, stated to the Qatari News Agency that the geographical distribution of these imports by countries was as follows:

- GCC countries—336,753,000 riyals, for an increase of 29.6 percent over 1987, when the value of imports was 259,178,000 riyals.
- Other Arab countries—126,737,000 riyals, for an increase of 26.3 percent over 1987, when imports amounted to 100,379,000 riyals.
- Western European countries—1,828,943,000 riyals, for an increase of 4.34 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 1,754,215,000 riyals.
- Socialist European countries—50,310,000 riyals, for an increase of 70.9 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 29,435,000 riyals.
- Asian countries—1,396,790,000 riyals, for an increase of 19.1 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 1,173,309,000 riyals.
- African countries—7,208,000 riyals, for an increase of 15.1 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 6,263,000 riyals.
- North and South American countries—59,703,000 riyals, for a decrease of 8 percent from 1987, when imports amounted to 602,264,000 riyals [figures as in source].
- Oceania and other countries—268,703,00 riyals, for an increase of 32.9 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 202,161,000 riyals.

In his statement to the Qatari News Agency yesterday, the head of the Central Bureau of Statistics indicated that the 10 most important countries for Qatari imports were:

1. Japan, with imports valued at 811,975,000 riyals, or 17.6 percent of total Qatari imports.
2. United Kingdom—637,980,000 riyals, or 13.8 percent of total imports.
3. United States—429,024,000 riyals, or 9.3 percent of total imports.
4. Federal Republic of Germany—364,860,000 riyals, or 7.9 percent of total imports.
5. Italy—197,478,000 riyals, or 4 percent of total imports.
6. France—183,733,000 riyals, or 4 percent of total imports.
7. UAE—143,777,000 riyals, or 3.1 percent of total

imports.

8. Australia—140,997,000 riyals, or 3 percent of total imports.
9. Saudi Arabia—137,448,000 riyals, or 3 percent of total imports.
10. Brazil—127,048,000 riyals, or 2.8 percent of total imports.

Mr Muhammad Ma'yuf al-Na'imi mentioned that the statistics showed the following distribution of 1988 Qatari imports according to principal categories of commodity classification:

1. Foodstuffs and live animals—794,024,000 riyals, for an increase of 12.4 percent over 1987, when imports amounted to 706,201,000 riyals.
2. Beverages and tobacco—73,106,000 riyals, for a decrease of 7.8 percent from the previous year, when imports amounted to 79,283,000 riyals.
3. Nonedible raw materials (other than fuels)—140,854,000 riyals, for an increase of 25.8 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 111,948,000 riyals.
4. Mineral fuels, lubricants, and similar materials—33,762,000 riyals, for an increase of 4.3 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 32,076,000 riyals.
5. Oils, lubricants, and waxes of animal or plant origin—25,467,000 riyals, for an increase of 6 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 24,035,000 riyals.
6. Chemicals and associated products—297,739,000 riyals, for an increase of 12.7 percent over 1987, when imports amounted to 261,576,000 riyals.
7. Manufactured goods classified by material of manufacture—870,380,000 riyals, for an increase of 22.7 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 709,234,000 riyals.
8. Machines, appliances, and transportation equipment—1,820,766,000 riyals, for an increase of 9.2 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 1,666,892,000 riyals.
9. Miscellaneous manufactured goods—535,816,000 riyals, for an increase of 5.2 percent over the previous year, when imports amounted to 509,283,000 riyals.
10. Categories and transactions not classified elsewhere—21,232,000 riyals, for a decrease of 21.1 percent from the previous year, when imports amounted to 26,896,000 riyals.

#### Profits, Production of Iron, Steel Reported

44040516C Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 28 Jun 89 p 3

[Article: "Qatar Iron and Steel Company Board of Directors Meeting Yesterday, 30,000-Ton Increase in Sales for 1st Half of This Year"]

[Text] Qatar (QNA)—The board of directors of Qatar Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., held its second 1989

meeting under the chairmanship of Engineer Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali al-Sabi'i, chairman of the board of directors.

This is the second meeting since the Qatari side assumed management of the plant at the beginning of January of the current year.

The board discussed a number of subjects at the meeting. The most important of these was the report of the company's general director. It dealt with the positive development in production and profits realized during the first half of this year in comparison with the plan laid out in the budget.

The increase in sales amounted to about 30,000 tons. This led to an increase in company profits during this period of approximately 76 percent of the basic plan, even though prices of raw materials imported from Sweden, Brazil, India, and Chile increased by 18.5 percent, while reinforcing iron prices increased by only 6 percent.

During the first half of this year, the company realized a 3.24-percent production increase above the basic plan for sponge iron, and 9.12-percent increase above the basic plan for steel beams. There was a 6.22-percent increase above the basic plan for reinforcing iron.

550,000 tons of these materials are scheduled to be produced this year. One should note that the 10-percent increase in production capacity for this year was recorded in the first quarter of the year.

The board examined the report submitted by a subcommittee of the board of directors concerning new developments and results of the assumption of company management by the Qatari side. It expressed its satisfaction at the positive results of these matters.

#### Advanced Technology Used To Improve Agriculture

44040516D Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 28 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by al-'Azab al-Tayyib: "Future Vegetable Production in Qatar Dependent on Protected Greenhouses"]

[Text] Qatar is characterized by a desert climate having a long, hot summer and a moderate, warm winter with little rain. Its lands are predominantly desert in nature. Few days of the year lack wind, and there are many days of sand storms. Summer temperatures in the shade can reach 50° centigrade. Relative humidity can reach 100 percent in the morning and evening.

Vegetable cultivation by traditional methods is therefore subject to many environmental difficulties and obstacles. Some arise from soil problems, such as increasing salinity as a result of irrigation with water containing a high percentage of salts. There are also nematodes and various other soil diseases.

All this has led the Technical Center for Industrial Development to adopt techniques of soilless agriculture and to consider projects for protected greenhouses. It has adopted methods that have proved most successful in the various areas of protected agriculture and that fit local needs and conditions and their development.

### Beginning in 1978

How has the Technical Center for Industrial Development achieved this? 'Isa al-Halawi, the center's financial and administrative director, said that the center began to make studies and practical experiments in 1978, seeking advanced ways to grow vegetables. Among the ways studied was the possibility of applying the principles of what are called "greenhouse" or "protected agriculture." The idea of constructing cooled greenhouses, as dictated by climatic conditions in Qatar, emerged. The idea of using sand in these houses emerged, because abundant quantities of sand are available in various parts of the country.

Al-Halawi added that in the years 1983-85, the Technical Center for Industrial Development constructed an outstanding agricultural greenhouse project with a total area of 32,040 square meters on new and advanced scientific principles. The project is located on the center's Farm 2, near al-Shahaniyah. In designing apparatus and equipment and selecting the site, consideration was given to future expansion. The project was implemented in the period from 1983 to 1985, under a contract concluded with the Dutch company HVA on the basis of competitive bidding by the most important companies with international experience in the area of agricultural greenhouses. The project aims to produce and supply vegetables on a constant year-round basis.

Do we rest content with this information? Of course not. The project demands journalistic follow-up in the field; so we decided to go to al-Shahaniyah. After more than 1/2 hour in the car, we arrived there. We began a tour immediately. Engineer Yasir Hasan Sharafi, assistant director of the project, accompanied us and explained the project's dimensions and various steps.

### Computer: The Sole Master

Inside the project management building is a center for control, operation, surveillance, and maintenance. All this, as Eng Yasir Hasan Sharafi says, is done by computer, which seems to be the only master here. The computer controls the greenhouses in terms of temperature and humidity, shade, and irrigation—all the requirements of the plants. The irrigation system—drip or spray—is computer controlled.

Eng Yasir Hasan Sharafi said that seeds of the desired variety are placed in artificial soil and then moved to project's nursery for a period of 7 days in summer (15 days in winter), depending on the variety. Afterwards, they are moved to sand bags or beds.

He added that clean, salt-free sand is used in two main ways in agricultural operations in the project's greenhouses: placed in plastic bags, or in the form of beds. In general, in both cases the sand serves as a medium and helping agent for the unimpeded passage of water, nutrients, and air to the roots of the plants, without any complications from weeds, pests, diseases, etc., such as occur in normal soil conditions. This allows healthy plant growth and increased productivity under ideal conditions.

He added that using sand has another advantage. A project like this can be established on land basically unsuited to agricultural purposes. In sand agriculture, the crops are supplied with nutrients by dissolving the necessary fertilizers in the correct proportions in irrigation water.

### Irrigation Water

Eng Yasir Hasan Sharafi said that a ground water desalinization unit obtains water from a subterranean well near the project. The unit, which reduces the well water's salinity to about 50 parts per million, operates at a capacity of 25 cubic meters an hour. The water is stored in 4 tanks, each with a capacity of 250 cubic meters. They are sufficient to operate the project for a week, in case the unit unexpectedly breaks down. An additional unit for biological water treatment produces drinking water.

He added that drip irrigation is used when plants are grown in plastic bags. The plants are supplied with the required nutrients dissolved in the irrigation water. The number of waterings depends on the kind and age of the crop. Overhead spray irrigation is used to grow plants in beds. The nutrients needed by the plants are in this case supplied either by solution in the spray water or by normal fertilizer application, depending on the variety of crop.

I asked, "What do you grow?"

Eng Yasir Hasan Sharafi replied, "We grow mainly tomatoes and cucumbers. Studies and experiments showed that these two vegetables had a high yield, lower cost, and greater disease resistance."

He added that there were also green peppers, though in smaller quantities. The growth period for cucumbers takes 1 month, after which the 2-month production period begins. The growth period for tomatoes takes 3 months, with a production period also of 3 months. Then the cycle begins anew.

He said that the project's designed capacity was 600 tons of produce a year. Real production, however, has surpassed this figure and has approached 700 tons. "We have a plan to increase real production to 1,000 tons a year—i.e., 1 million kg of tomatoes and cucumbers. Summer production averages 1.1 tons a day; winter production 2 tons a day."



"True," he said, "production costs at the beginning of the project were somewhat higher than in open-field agriculture. There is the cost of electricity, since everything in the greenhouses operates by means of it. However, the large yield compensates for the high cost. I can say that the annual yield per square meter amounts to 27 kg, which is a high rate of yield. Don't forget that we rely less on human labor. In this project, composed of 12 greenhouses with a total area of 3.2 hectares and a producing area of 2.185 hectares, we have only 25 workers, 3 technicians, the director, and his assistant."

Smiling, Eng Yasir Hasan Sharafi said, "Don't forget to quote me as saying that we are planning for the area of this project to reach 9 hectares. By the way, I can say that this project is suited to growing all kinds of vegetables. The climate can be controlled to fit the growth pattern of any vegetable crop. We have a complete laboratory to conduct experiments on various varieties of plants."

Regarding the diseases that confront local agriculture, he said that there was white fly. "It is combatted by the use of chemical pesticides. We also use chemicals for cleanliness."

#### **Qatari Management**

I asked, "Who manages these agricultural greenhouses?"

He replied, "In the beginning, the management was Dutch, in participation and cooperation with the Technical Center for Industrial Development. However, the agreement was that the Dutch management would train local experts to be responsible for operating the project. This is what in fact happened after 2 years, when the Qatari side completely took over the management. There is not a single foreign expert now, though we occasionally receive foreigner visitors. I would like to tell you that the production increase that took the project's yield from 600 to 700 tons a year was achieved under Qatari management."

Eng Yasir added, "I believe that the future of vegetable production in Qatar depends on agricultural greenhouses. I call for intensified interest in constructing these greenhouses."

An important question remains. Why are prices for project-grown produce higher than for the corresponding imported produce?

'Isa al-Halawi, the financial and administrative director of the Technical Center for Industrial Development, answered as follows: "The project's yield is marketed by public auction. All government sales take place by this method. Every morning, our produce goes to the central market."

"To answer your question, I say that we send our produce fresh to the central market, since harvesting takes place the afternoon of the day preceding sale. Imported produce, on the other hand, remains stored in refrigerators for a long time, which reduces its price.

That first of all; second, produce from the center's project is always sorted according to quality and size and placed in 10- to 12-kg cardboard packages of definite weight and constant size."

## **SAUDI ARABIA**

### **Ministry Reports Economic Growth, Predicts Further Growth**

44000631 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English  
14 Aug 89 p 3

[Article by S. Sidahmed]

[TExt] Riyadh, Aug 13—Saudi non-oil, non-petrochemical exports have fetched the Kingdom more than SR2 billion last year, according to foreign trade statistics, an increase of 100 percent over the previous year. In fact these exports netted in the first half of last year more than the value collected during the whole of last year. After all the Kingdom is not only oil exporter.

Moreover 62 percent of the Kingdom's ports activity last year concentrated on exports, another indicator of the Kingdom's growing export abilities based on its productive sectors.

According to forecast by the Planning Ministry, the GDP [gross domestic product] and private sector growth is expected to register a positive mark reaching 8.1 percent by the end of next year and the non-oil sector alone 4.3 percent by the end of 1990, the last year of the current Fourth Five-Year Development Plan. The ministry indicated that the beginning of the plan witnessed negative growth in its early years reaching 14.8 percent in 1985, the year the fourth plan started and 6.3 percent in the following year, while the non-oil private sector registered a negative growth of 11.9 percent in 1985 and 6.8 percent in 1986. In 1985, the Kingdom's oil production reached its lowest level of 2 million bpd as it was adopting a policy of defending prices through cutting production, while in the following year the price war erupted in the oil market.

However, things started to improve as OPEC returned to fixed oil prices by the beginning of 1987 and a degree of stability was restored to the market, which started to get cooperation from non-OPEC producers for the first time. And this is expected to have its positive impact on the Saudi private sector as well.

The Kingdom's private companies have witnessed continuous improvement over the past few years. Their numbers reached more than 7,000 with a combined capital of SR70 billion by the end of 1986. The number of these companies has grown between 9.7 percent and 4.6 percent over the previous two years, while their capital had been growing by 5.4 percent and 3.6 percent

over the same period. Fifty-three percent of these companies are limited liabilities, though their capital constitutes only 32 percent, while the public companies represent only 1 percent with their capital representing 62 percent of the combined capitals of these companies.

These companies, especially the ones active in productive sectors, are contributing mainly to the export drive currently, experienced by the Kingdom. To push forward this attitude the Center for Promoting Saudi Exports was established more than two years ago at the initiative of the private sector and support of the government. The center's board is composed of 22 businessmen in addition to representatives of the chambers of commerce in the three main cities of Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam and Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC).

According to Dr Naziyah Nasif, the board chairman of the center, the trend to export has been growing over the past few years, in line with the tendency to diversify the country's economic base and attain extra revenues. He added that because of the government support for productive sectors, domestic consumption is absorbing only around 55 percent of local industry production.

A survey conducted by the center found that Gulf markets absorb 35 percent of total Saudi exports in non-oil, non-petrochemical fields, the rest of the Arab world 15 percent another 12 percent by Islamic and Asian markets. On average export activities by the private sector accounted for 22 percent, though in some cases the rate goes as high as 35 percent as in foodstuffs, and drinks or 33 percent in case of plastics and some chemical products.

The center plans to concentrate on certain markets and conduct more studies. These markets cover the Gulf, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan to find out the needs of these markets, finance problems and whether there is a need to open branch offices. As for an export finance institution, Nasif said that they are working on the idea to see whether it will be feasible and increase Saudi exports. At the moment, the Kingdom is participating in some regional export programs like the one handled by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in which the Kingdom has provided 21 percent of participation. There is also another program handled by the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF). However, he thinks that establishing a national export credit agency could be viable on the medium and long-term as what is needed now is to make use of regional programs provided by the IDB and AMF.

In the meantime, efforts are under way to establish the SR50 million export company—which has been looked after by the Ministry of Industry. The idea is to establish a limited company in the beginning with an ability and authorization to conclude deals with importers worldwide, and later the company could be turned into a public one.

### Saudi Company Finances Refinery

34000625z Paris *THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER* in English 24 Jun 89 p 8

[Text] Work is expected to begin on Djibouti's first oil refinery within the next few months. The government approved two bills on June 5 which settle the question over the concession for the refinery on one hand and over permits for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons on the other. Disagreement on the duration of these permits held up the project for several months. The authorities have still not however, revealed the period of validity of the permits granted, nor the site where the petroleum complex is to be built.

Its capacity will be 100,000 barrels per day and it represents an investment of 750 million dollars provided by one Saudi private source, the Al-Rahbani Company, owned by Saudi businessman Sheikh Halim Fares Al-Rahbani. Originally, there was another Saudi businessman involved in the financing of this project, Ahmad Abdul-Allah Bakhar, but he seems to have backed out. The Djiboutian State is not contributing to the financing of the project but has accepted to allow the refinery total tax exemption for fifty years on crude which is imported from Saudi Arabia and other neighbouring countries, including North Yemen, to meet the refinery's requirements. Discussions are said to have taken place between Somalia and Djibouti for the refining of crude from Loog Haya, 120 kilometres from Zeila, in Somali territory, should the existence of an oil deposit be confirmed after Chevron discovered traces there. But, Rahbani Co., will not be exempt from paying tax on profits, the Djiboutian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Moumin Bahdon Farah said in a statement to pro-government Djiboutian weekly, *LA NATION*. Djibouti itself only uses 6,000 barrels per day, so the rest of the refinery's production will be exported, but for the time being the Djiboutian authorities are not disclosing who their future clients may be.

### Intensive French, Saudi Aid to Education

34000625y Paris *THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER* in English 24 Jun 89 p 6

[Text] Education in Djibouti is undergoing certain changes, and both in Arab and in French. First, Saudi Arabia, which has been seeking to accelerate the "Arabisation" of this Muslim Country, member of the Arab League, is financing the construction costs of an Islamic Institute in Djibouti. The institute, when it reaches completion in 1990 will register some 450 students who, it is hoped, will become Arab teachers or preachers at the end of their studies. The overall cost of the institute is estimated at 705 million Djiboutian francs (3.9 million dollars).

France, with 227 expatriate teachers in Djibouti, which represents two-thirds of the entire Djiboutian teaching staff, has decided to grant four million French francs (about 600,000 U.S. dollars) for the construction and

equipment of a Staff Training Centre for State Education. It is to be opened in October 1990 and will give pedagogic training to Djiboutian students trained in France, and who will gradually replace (at a rate of 20 to 40 posts a year) teachers of French nationality posted in Djibouti.

#### **Fishing Industry Statistics Provided**

44000629 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English  
14 Aug 89 p 3

[Excerpt] Jeddah, Aug 13—Fu'ad 'Abdallah Daghistani, director of the Red Sea water resources center, has stated that last year over 46,000 tons of fish worth SR500 million were caught and expressed his hope that the Kingdom would achieve self-sufficiency in fish over the coming few years.

"The present volume of catch represents only 50 percent of the local demand and we are still importing fish to meet the domestic requirements," Daghistani said. Currently a total of 4,705 people work in the fisheries sector along the Red Sea and 1,444 along the Arabian Gulf, he noted.

There are now 1,775 fishing boats made of wood and 1,188 boats made of fiberglass apart from 205 traditional boats without engines along the Red Sea, the director said. Along the Arabian Gulf there are 1,235 boats including 1,215 boats with engines. [passage omitted]

### **SUDAN**

#### **Soviet-Sudanese Relations Seen Improving**

45000183 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
9 Aug 89 p 8

[Text] The Soviet leadership has decided to commission Gennadiy Zhuravlov, Soviet ambassador in Cairo, with the mission of nonresident ambassador to Sudan after recent events there. The Sudanese leadership had already notified Moscow of its desire to improve relations with them and start a new phase in these relations, which collapsed during the two previous regimes. Moscow notified Khartoum of its agreement to the Sudanese request to renovate Sudanese factories and furnish necessary spare parts.

#### **Zaire's Mobutu To Open Border 21 August**

EA16082155 Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic  
1930 GMT 16 Aug 89

[Text] The Zairean president, Mobutu Sese Seko, has agreed to open the border between Sudan and his country on 21 August.

Brigadier Dominic Kassiano, member of the Revolution Command Council and leader of Sudan's delegation to Zaire, Uganda, and Kenya, declared that President Mobutu also agreed to allow the transport of relief across his country to the Yei area in Equatoria Region.

Brig Kassiano added that delegation's discussions with the heads of these states were constructive and positive. They dealt with bilateral relations, peace in Sudan, border problems, and issues of common interest.

#### **Mustafa Salah Reportedly to Gain 'Sensitive Position'**

45000182 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic  
14 Aug 89 p 5

[Text] The spotlight in Sudan is centered on an important person who was unknown in previous years. This [attention] is for his role in the uprising that brought Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir to power. This person is Lieutenant Salah Mustafa, former director of intelligence, who is now in detention. Sudanese sources said that Lt Salah and a number of detained officers will soon be released and will be vested with sensitive civilian, not military, positions.

#### **Government Committee Reorganized**

EA2008084789 Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic  
1700 GMT 19 Aug 89

[Text] Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, National Salvation Revolution Command Council [NSRCC] chairman, has issued a decree on the reorganization of the committee of services, transport, and communications as follows: Brigadier Dominic Kassiano, chairman; Flight Colonel Faysal Madani Mukhtar, deputy chairman; Deputy Commander of the General Staff, supplies, member; minister of energy and mining, member; minister of transport and communications, member; minister of health and social welfare, member; minister of relief and affairs of displaced persons, member; minister of housing and public utilities, member; minister of education, member; a representative of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, member; representative of the Bank of Sudan, member; Colonel al-Hajj al-Khadir, member and rapporteur.

#### **Security Chief on National Issues**

JN1808104089 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI  
in Arabic 18 Aug 89 pp 24, 25

[By Kamal Hasan Bakhit]

[Excerpts] Khartoum—The Sudanese Security Department was one of the forces that took part in the 30 June coup. This department is headed by Brigadier General Ibrahim Nayil Idam, member of the Revolution Command Council. Idam, who previously served as deputy director of the department, played a major role in the implementation and success of the coup. [passage omitted]

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] What is the truth behind the story about uranium and the role of ex-government senior officials, especially the ex-prime minister, in trading with it?

[Idam] We believed that the uranium story, as dealt with by the press before the revolution, was not true. But after we assumed power, we discovered the most incredible things. What was published in the press was 100 percent correct, and there are documents to prove it. These documents will be sent to court, and all people involved will be put on trial, whoever they might be.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir and some members of the Revolution Command Council talk about various roles played by foreign intelligence in Sudan. Could you give us examples of this presence? What was its aim? And what were its tools?

[Idam] Under the previous government, Sudan was an oasis for foreign intelligence activity, a field for all world intelligence without exception.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] Will you seek the help of the officers and the soldiers who worked in the old security service of al-Numayri, especially since a great deal of them have already been absorbed into the security service?

[Idam] We extend a helpful hand to whoever proves qualified, competent, and trustworthy.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] On what bases were dismissal and retirement lists involving the Armed Forces, police, prison authorities, and security made?

[Idam] There were lists that were necessary to maintain discipline. Some commanders had to be replaced. Some have been pensioned off because the current leadership has found certain things against them. Such things are essential.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] Some people say you intend to dismiss 3,000 top civil servants from their jobs. How true is this?

[Idam] I cannot confirm this because I am too far from the figure you mentioned. These issues were left to the ministers because they are the ones who know what is happening in their ministries. But corrupt employees should leave to make room for others.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] A number of trade union activists were arrested over the past few days. Why?

[Idam] First, I would like to say that there are no unions or associations in Sudan at present. The revolution has dissolved all unions. When it came, the revolution was not antagonistic toward anyone. If it finds people planning or instigating others against the revolution, it will take all necessary measures to stop this, so that discipline in the street can be maintained.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] Have you arrested any professional union members?

[Idam] Yes. A very small number of them were arrested.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] What were the reasons? Have they started any move against you?

[Idam] Yes. They began to move and work against the revolution. They and their meetings were under surveillance.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] What were the undertakings which you ordered the detainees to sign before releasing them?

[Idam] The undertakings were imposed on a group of persons who were plotting, and they were ordered to stay at their homes. Another group includes those who pose no danger and who were released after being arrested in cases involving corruption. They were ordered not to leave certain areas until the investigation committees conclude their work. [passage omitted]

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] What about the former interior and industry minister, Mubarak al-Mahdi? He has been at large since you took power.

[Idam] He has not appeared yet. However, he is still in Khartoum.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] In a news conference he held during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, Lt Gen 'Umar al-Bashir declared that the revolution will start a dialogue with uncorrupt politicians. What does this mean? What is the objective of this dialogue? Will it be attended on party or individual basis?

[Idam] The first thing to say is that party participation is out of question because all parties were dissolved. This dialogue will not take place in the near future. It will only take place when all cases have been investigated, brought to court, and a verdict reached. After this, anyone who feels qualified and honest and whose opinions are identical to the revolution's is welcome. This is what we want from the dialogue with the uncorrupt politicians.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] It is said that you started a dialogue with some party leaders who are detained in Kobar Prison. How true is this?

[Idam] It was not a dialogue. It aimed to explain to certain leaders the dangers behind the moves made by some of their loyalists. The loyalists' moves stopped immediately.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] Within the context of the dialogue which you will start with uncorrupt politicians, will this include certain parties that did not take part in government, such as the communists, the Ba'thists, the Nasirites, and others?

[Idam] Any Sudanese who thinks that he is qualified and honest, and believes that the ideological and political line he pursues is in harmony with the revolution's line, is welcomed and we will give him the opportunity to cooperate with us.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] It has been noticed that you played down the role of the party militias and their size and weapons despite the fact that 'Umar Nur-al-Dayim, who is one of the Ummah Party officials, used to boast

about the size of his militias, as did Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, the political officer of the [National] Islamic Front. Are your assessments in this regard correct?

[Idam] There are certain figures on the militias and we are checking them. Some of those who were leading the militias are now in custody and we question them about the militias and their numbers, weapons, and everything relating to them. At the end it will be shown whether there are any party members carrying arms regularly or not. This may be disclosed by the investigations which are taking place now.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] Have you found any arms belonging to the parties or their militias after you assumed power?

[Idam] There are some weapons, but we are not giving out the numbers. We are busy with the arms about which we received some information. [passage omitted]

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] When will the recommendations of the Darfur peace conference be implemented?

[Idam] The implementation began immediately. The value of losses amounted to 33 million pounds, of which the government paid 11 millions—its share—immediately. The remaining amount of money will be paid by the Fur and Arab tribes. By this method, we reached a final settlement of this problem which would have constituted a grave threat to Sudan.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] Will you disarm the tribes that were armed?

[Idam] God willing, this will happen so that the problem will not explode again. We want a Sudan free of arms except that which the Armed Forces and other regular forces have to defend the national soil. [passage omitted]

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] It is said there is an acute difference inside the revolution council over the "September Laws." Some agree to abolish them, while others oppose this, and there is division inside the council over this matter?

[Idam] The council has not dealt with the "September Laws." It did not discuss them so there is no differences or division over them.

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] Will these laws be abolished if they constitute an obstacle for peace or if the Garang movement demands it?

[Idam] All issues will be raised for serious and frank discussion. What is agreed on during the negotiations will be implemented. [passage omitted]

#### **Supervisor General of Southern Council Named**

*EA2708223089 Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic  
1930 GMT 27 Aug 89*

[Text] Today, Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, chairman of the National Salvation Revolution Command Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers, issued a decree appointing Brigadier Pio Yukwan, member of the Revolution Command Council, as supervisor general [mushrif 'amm] of the Southern Council.

#### **Fourth Relief Train Arrives in Aweil**

*EA2008213189 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic  
1405 GMT 20 Aug 89*

[Text] Khartoum, 20 August—A fourth relief train arrived today at the town of Aweil in Bahr al-Ghazal Region, loaded with 1,500 tons of food. The train, which is part of the UN-sponsored Operation Lifeline, left the town of Babanusah, in southern Kurdufan, on 12 August 1989. The arrival was announced today by Mr Muhammad Kamil Shawqi, commissioner general of relief and rehabilitation.

He also said that a fleet of 15 barges carrying 5,750 tons of relief supplies would leave the port of Kosti for the Central Region and Malakal, in Upper Nile Region, in the next 2 days. He pointed out that five barges had recently left the town of Renk on the White Nile loaded with 1,850 tons of relief supplies. They are heading for Upper Nile Region. The commissioner general for relief added that 40 more barges are being prepared for dispatch as soon as possible, to continue the river transport section of Operation Lifeline which, he said, is proceeding with unprecedented smoothness.

#### **Currency Traders From Previous Regime Released**

*45000177 Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-  
MUSALLAH in Arabic 11 Jul 89 p 1*

[Text] Currency traders that had been arrested during the late regime were released yesterday. Revolutionary Command Council member and spokesman General Staff Colonel Sulayman Muhammad Sulayman spoke with the traders.

He explained the revolution's economic policies and goals to them and invited them to return to the citizenry and work toward bettering their country. Col Sulayman said that the currency traders assured him that they would forsake currency trading and affirmed their support for the national salvation revolution.

He said that they took an oath affirming that they had seen the misguided practices of the previous era, who practiced corruption and sabotage, upon which they were all released.

**Student Union Announces Support for Regime***45000184 Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH in Arabic 20 Jul 89 p 1*

[Text] The General Union of Sudanese Students in Egypt has announced its support for the Revolution of National Salvation.

In its communique yesterday, the union affirmed that it stands with the Revolution of National Salvation, its programs, and goals, and calls for lifting the burdens of life from the citizen, which were created by the erratic policies of partisanism and sectarianism. It also calls for striking at the dens of corruption and at the corrupt with an iron fist.

**Chairman Optimistic Over Cotton Distribution, Transport***45000185 Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH in Arabic 23 Jul 89 p 1*

[Text] The economic committee is confident of the status of transporting cotton from the gins to Port Sudan, and also confirmed the status of transporting the necessary quantities to local mills.

Col 'Uthman Yas 'Abd-al-Baqi, chairman of the executive committee for transportation, told AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH that the committee had been formed on 8 Jul 1989, and that 241,238 bales of cotton were bound for transport, after which the executive committee distributed this amount to railroad transport companies that effectively participated in the transport.

He added that approximately 166,000 bales were left over, among them 47,760 bales for local mills, and thus the remaining ginned cotton amounted to 118,240 bales.

He said that he expected to have all cotton transported no later than 5 Aug 89, rain in certain regions permitting, and that the executive committee for transport will visit Sannar, Halfa, and Port Sudan next Tuesday to oversee transport operations from the gins to Port Sudan.

**SYRIA****Problems Surrounding Energy Reduction Discussed***44040532 Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 22 Jul 89 p 6*

[Article by Haytham Yahya Muhammad: "Baniyas Thermal Generating Plant—Why Has Production of Turbines 1 and 2 Dropped From 340 to 220 Megawatt-Hours?"]

[Text] The Baniyas thermal plant is an important source for the production of electrical power in our country. This importance increased following implementation of the project to expand it and increase its capacity from 340 to 680 megawatt-hours.

The question is whether work and production in this plant are proceeding as they should. This is what we shall try to answer in the context of this newspaper report that follows a field visit we made before the Greater Bairam holiday.

**Reduction of Load Limits**

The basic plant is composed of two power complexes, each with a capacity of 170 megawatt-hours. Because their scheduled periodic maintenance has not been performed, their production of electrical power has decreased daily. Their continued operation in this condition will pose a real danger to their useful life and productive capacity. We became convinced of this after visiting the production sections and examining the load limits of each complex and the conditions of its operation. For example, while we were present, the production of complex one had dropped to 122 megawatt-hours. This figure is its maximum production load limit. On the same day, complex two had a maximum production of 103 megawatt-hours, and the load every day was less than the previous day. When we asked about the opinion of the main planning [department] of the Ministry of Electricity, the technicians answered, "Telegrams from planning ask us for the maximum load from each complex. As you can see, this is currently the maximum load. The reason is lack of approval to stop any complex to conduct periodic maintenance or scheduled maintenance. In our view, this situation is unsatisfactory. It will lead to unsatisfactory results, since production capacity is falling off day by day. The plant's useful life will be much reduced from the useful life stated in the international norms. This situation has also led to an unprecedented escape of coal soot from the furnaces because of the lack of sufficient insulation. This leads to the occurrence of occupational diseases among workers employed in the plant's sections in general and in the furnace section in particular." During our tour, we in fact saw an accumulation of large quantities of coal soot everywhere in the station, and the workers inhale a considerable amount of this escaped soot.

This concerning the state of complexes one and two; as for the new complex three, it began production 2 months ago at 170 megawatt-hours of power. The Syrian side has not yet taken it over, and it is currently being operated by the Japanese side that implemented it. Certain tests are being run on it, with its load being lowered and raised in light of these tests and occasional shutdowns. If one looks at the approximately 140-meter-high smokestacks of the three complexes, one finds that the smoke from complexes one and two is pitch black in color, causing pollution of the environment. The smoke from complex three is white. The reason is that the complex is new and is being operated properly. Complex four is scheduled for launching at a capacity of 170 megawatt-hours after mid-August of this year.

The question is why periodic or general maintenance is not allowed to be performed on complexes one and two, particularly since international scientific directives

stress the need for a 45-day periodic maintenance on each complex every year and a 90-day programmed general maintenance every 2 or 3 years.

The answer lies with the General Organization for Electricity and the Ministry of Electricity, which give or do not give approval for both kinds of maintenance. Nevertheless, we asked Engineer 'Abd-al-Razzaq Yusuf, the plant director, about this. He replied, "The main reason for not performing yearly periodic maintenance or scheduled general maintenance is the country's need for electrical power, a large part of which is contributed by our plant. The second reason is that the scheduled general maintenance requires replacement parts from the country of manufacture and requires technical expertise. Nevertheless, general maintenance is scheduled for complex two beginning on 12 July 1989."

We asked him, "Then no maintenance is being performed on the complexes?" He replied, "Only emergency maintenance—repair of any unexpected breakdown. We sometimes take advantage of the shutdown of a particular complex because of a breakdown and perform some maintenance. For example, when turbine two was shutdown for 27 days beginning on 7 February 1989, we performed some maintenance."

#### Fuel Transport Line

One problem affecting the plant is the fuel transport line from the Baniyas refinery to the plant. This line was not well implemented, and breakdowns recur almost daily. Fuel sometimes leaks from the line into the sea because of breakdowns, polluting the water. The condition of this line needs to be corrected as quickly as possible, particularly since four complexes will be placed in service and the plant's daily consumption of fuel will reach about 3,000 tons. This quantity cannot be transported in tanks.

#### Worker Services

No one who knows the reality of work in thermal plants can deny that working conditions there are very difficult because of intense noise, dangers that sometimes occur, and environmental pollution from gases in which these workers live.

Work in the Baniyas generating plant is on a shift system on a 24-hour basis, particularly in the operation and maintenance sections. Workers and technicians employed in these two sections spoke to us about their difficult working conditions. They said, "In spite of this, we are not given periodic medical examinations. Some of us have not been provided with housing and therefore have trouble with transportation and daily trips. Our reimbursements are not adequate for the work we perform. Services within the plant include a restaurant (we hope its condition will be improved), a consumer store, a seafood store, plastic houses, and a vegetable stand that has been closed. Our main worry is housing. We are asking that the fourth building be completed—it has been on line for about 8 years and will have room for 48 apartments. We are also asking for the building of a new

subdivision to accommodate all the employees along with the existing buildings. This will save the plant large sums of money paid for worker transportation costs from home to work on the shifts."

Concerning these and other worker demands, the union committee gave us the following answer: "The vegetable stand was closed because of financial difficulties and because we were not given regular government invoices from al-Hal market. The food in the restaurant is good—we selected a cook for it a few days ago. The oil problem will be solved soon."

Concerning periodic examinations, the committee said, "On 27 March 1989, we sent letter 12S to the office of the provincial electricity union, stating: "Because workers in the plant are exposed to gases and vapors that can cause occupational diseases, it has been decided to send our personnel in groups to the workers' hospital for periodic examinations and laboratory tests out of concern for their safety." The plant management also sent a letter to the hospital to learn about the hospital's facilities. The hospital's reply, dated 27 March 1989, informed us that the hospital was fully prepared to carry out all that was necessary. We have in fact sent a number of personnel to the hospital, where they were given examinations and tests. However, the hospital declined for its own reasons to continue examining the remaining workers. We have asked for the results of the previous examinations and tests, but even though it is more than 2 months since the examinations, we have not received the results.

"Whenever we ask the workers' hospital for information, they tell us, 'The results and X-rays were sent to you by mail.' As for the fourth building, which needs to be completed, we have learned that the Ministry of Electricity has announced its completion and the construction of a new building near it, so that the workers will be accommodated. We hope this will be done quickly because of its beneficial effect on work and workers.

"As for other services, we operate them and sell their product to workers at cost—plastic houses, the seafood store, or the restaurant."

The director of the plant said, "We have assigned responsibility for worker services to the union committee. It operates them, while we devote ourselves to work and production."

#### Housing

Operation and maintenance personnel work on a 24-hour basis in 3 shifts. The plant must therefore transport them from the plant to their villages and back. The villages are located in rough, mountainous areas between 10 and 50 km away. This has led to large expenditures on fuel and maintenance for the transport vehicles. Automobile breakdowns sometimes lead to workers arriving late and to disruption of work. The plant construction project included the building of housing units to solve the worker transport problem and house them near the

plant so that they would be available as needed to operate the plant or repair unexpected breakdowns. Three housing units have indeed been completed, but their design was not suitable for worker housing. This has led to a waste of space, since the area of a single apartment measures 210 square meters, not to mention bad implementation. All of this makes it necessary to complete the fourth building that has been on line since the construction of the plant and to erect a new building as planned to accommodate the personnel needed to operate the plant optimally.

Also, the administration building should be expanded and the chairs, desks, and air conditioners needed for the sections should be purchased.

The difficult working conditions in thermal plants make it necessary that the authorities involved be fair to their workers. They should give them suitable compensation, increase the fund for incentives, exempt them from the ceiling on compensation for extra work, and include them in directives received from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.

#### In Conclusion

This is the situation of work and production in the Baniyas thermal plant. The plant needs better attention from the Ministry of Electricity, so that it can be preserved as long as possible in accordance with international norms. Finally, thanks and appreciation are due to its workers and management, who, despite difficult circumstances, work late hours to achieve the production figures asked of them. It remains for us to point out that before this newspaper report was dispatched on 17 July 1989, the electricity ration in Tartus Province was about 15 hours a day. Is that reasonable, Ministry of Electricity?

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### Zayid Reportedly Studying the Purchase of Hawk Aircraft

44040522A London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic  
24 Jul 89 p 4

[Article: "Zayid Considers the Purchase of Hawk Aircraft"]

[Text] Last week's official visit to Britain by United Arab Emirates [UAE] President Shaykh Zayid Ibn-Sultan Al-Nuhayyan was occasion to discuss "means of developing bilateral cooperation and bolster good relations" between Abu-Dhabi and London and to discuss the Palestinian question, the Lebanese crisis, and the Arab Gulf situation as the Iraqi-Iranian negotiations falter because of Teheran's procrastination and disparate interpretation of Security Council Resolution 598.

The high level of the delegation accompanying Shaykh Zayid indicated to political observers the importance Abu-Dhabi attached to the visit and appendant discussions. Members of the delegation included minister of defense Shaykh Muhammad Ibn-Rashid al-Maktum, minister of petroleum Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, minister of state for foreign affairs Rashid al-'Abd-Allah, Air Force and Air Defense Commander Col Shaykh Muhammad Ibn-Zayid al-Nuhayyan, and Ahmad Khalifah al-Suwaydi, political adviser to Shaykh Zayid.

Shaykh Zayid's visit was at the invitation of Queen Elizabeth II of Britain. He followed up during the visit, according to London sources, on negotiations for the purchase of an undisclosed number of British-made Hawk aircraft in order to bolster the UAE's air power. This would be the first UAE contract of its kind since its Air Force is composed of French-made craft.



## IRAN

### Goods From East Europe To Be Transported Through USSR

46400097b London KEYHAN in Persian 27 Jul 89 p 4

[Text] Close to 98 percent of the goods purchased from East Europe are shipped through the Black Sea and unloaded at the Soviet ports of Boti and Batumi, before being transported by Russian trucks or rail to the Astara border.

Based on reports published in Tehran's media, the Soviet railway presently stops 5-kilometers short of Iran's border (the city of Astara). The gap shall soon be track-layed for the purpose of strengthening communication and facilitating transportation between the two countries.

Some time ago Abazar Hemati, head of the Astara Customs, declared that based on a protocol drawn up between the two sides, during the current year Iranian trucks shall commute to Soviet Astara for goods at the initial phase, and during subsequent phases they shall commute to east and west Europe through the transit roads of the Soviet Union.

Regarding the likelihood of Soviet citizens visiting Iran, the head of the Astara Customs said to reporters that in the event of government approval the port of Astara will be fully prepared to receive Soviet visitors.

Regarding the chances of expanding tourist relations between the Soviet Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran [IRI], some time ago 'Abd Khoda'i, supervisor of the Tourist Section Undersecretariat of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, while pointing out the expansion of relations between the Soviet Union and the IRI and the likelihood of visits by people to their neighboring countries, said "Since Soviet Muslims wish to visit the holy places in Iran for pilgrimage reasons and since Iranians might be interested to visit the Soviet Union, we are currently in the process of planning and organizing ways to work out such tours."

### Abadan Refinery Produces 100,000 Barrels Daily

46400097a London KEYHAN in Persian 27 Jul 89 p 4

[Text] From the beginning of its renewed operations (1 April 1989) up to 15 Tir [6 July 1989] the Abadan Oil Refinery produced some 10 million barrels of crude oil. Based on this, the refinery whose real production capacity reaches approximately one million barrels a day, has produced during its initial phase about 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day for internal consumption.

The Abadan Refinery Operations' report was made available to agents of domestic and foreign news media some time ago by Salehi Foruz, the Refining Affairs director of the Ministry of Petroleum of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The economic weekly PETROLEUM STRATEGY, quoting the Refining Affairs director, reported that precluding isomax and similar equipment of the Tabriz Refinery, the control chamber of the Shiraz Refinery, and a number of oil reservoirs, restoration work on the existing national refineries, namely the large Tehran Refinery, have now been completed. The said weekly adds that although to date full refining operations have yet to be resumed by the 6 existing national oil refineries, nonetheless it seems that the said refineries are ready to produce crude to the full extent of their capacity and to provide for the country's domestic consumption.

Regarding the method of resuming oil refinery operations in Iran, Engineer Salehi Foruz declared some time ago that the Refinery Complex and Lavan Island combined, produce 36 percent in excess of their designated capacities.

The said official added that the bitumen production unit in the Tehran refinery was designed and constructed by the workers of that refinery. It is now operational with a daily output of 10,000 barrels of bitumen required for asphaltting. The refinery has a round-the-clock capability of supplying the bitumen required by applicants holding orders issued by the Oil Products Distribution Unit.

The Refining Affairs Director of the Petroleum Ministry noted that by the increased output of synthetic paraffin by the Tehran refinery, the production of this substance now meets its consumption requirement within the country.

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